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Ph. D. ABSTRACT 
Title: The Moral and Political Philosophy of Anthon Ashl 
Third Earl of Shaftesbury: 16/1-1713** 
Submitted by James F. Harrison (Department of Politics) 
This work attempts to explain the meaning, the relationship 
betweens and the implications of Shaftesbury's ideas on morality 
and politics. Criticisms of Shaftesbury's thought are limited to 
the pointing out of logical contradictions that are present in 
his writings. A central contradiction is seen to be Shaftesbury's 
undifferentiated appeal to both "reason" and "emotion" as the 
source of moral approbation and disapprobation. The author of 
this work uses the distinction between reason and emotion as a 
means of separating from Shaftesbury's writings two independent 
theories of morality. Both approaches to moral judgement involve 
the belief that the universe is a perfectly organised whole, the 
belief that we behave morally when we consciously pursue the public 
welfare, and the belief that we maximise our happiness by behaving 
morally. 
The "emotional" approach to morality is seen to be closely related 
to Shaftesbury's concern with aesthetic subjects. For Shaftesbury, 
the emotional ability that men use to distinguish between good and 
evil is the same ability that allows them to distinguish between 
beauty and ugliness. As a consequence of this, the artist is given 
a moral role by Shaftesbury. Also, a cultural significance is 
given to those political preconditions that are seen by Shaftesbury 
to be necessary for any society that is to become moral. 
There can also be found in this work a discussion of Shaftesbury's 
debt to earlier thinkers, a discussion of his theory of moral 
obligation, an explanation of the unsystematic nature of his writings 
in the light of his attempt to avoid "enthusiasm", an explanation 
of the relationship between his moral views and his political 
recommendations, and an assessment of the significance of Shaftesbury 
to our understanding of the philosophic climate in England during 
the eighteenth century. 
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** This work was first submitted in the summer of 1968. It is now 
being resubmitted according to the regulations of the University 
of Durham after an oral examination in June, 1969. 
(1) 
PREFACE 
The influence of the third Earl of Shaftesbury upon 
eighteenth. century English thought has been described by, 
A. O. Aldridge as follows: 
.... Shaftesbury is associated with Francis, Hutcheson, Adam Smith, David Hume, Adam Ferguson, and Lord Kames, 
who regarded him as the initiator of a. trend-in philo- 
sophy, of which they were part, to consider morality 
in general to derive its existence from a taste, `-. 
sentiment, or feeling of the beauty of virtue and the 
deformity of vice. 1 
R. L. Brett also informs us that in Germany Shaftesbüry's influence 
extended to Lessing, Mendelssohn, Wieland, Herder, Kant, and 
Schiller. 2 }ý in France his influence is evident in the young 
Diderot who, in 1745, produced Shaftesbury's Inquiry Concernin 
Virtue or Merit as Essai sur lä Merite et la Vertu. Considering 
this apparent influence, it is surprising how little interest 
Shaftesbury appears to have stimulated since the end of the 
eighteenth century. * There are few comprehensive criticisms of 
* In the last quarter of the nineteenth century we-find 
Leslie'Stephen stating that, "The third Lord Shaftesbury is 
one of. the writers whose reputation is scarcely commensurate 
with the influence which he once exerted .... All the 
[British] 
ethical writers . are. related 
to him, more or less directly, by 
sympathy or opposition. " History of English Thought in, the 
Eighteenth Century, II, 18. 
(ii) 
his moral theories, and to my knowledge no attempt has ever been 
made to outline in detail the social and political aspects of his 
thought. The object of the present study is to elaborate the" 
detail and implications of both the moral and political ideas that 
can be found in Shaftesbury's writings. This preface has been 
written to explain what these writings were, and to provide an out- 
line of the context in which they were written. I have taken the 
advice given by Carlyle in his Sartor Resartus, and shall not 
present the reader with the theoretical detail of Shaftesbury's 
philosophy, ".... till a, Biography of him has been philosophico- 
poetically written, and philosophico-poetically read. ,3 
Anthony Ashley Cooper was born on February 26th, 1771, at 
Exeter House in London. In the following year his' grandfather 
received an earldom and became the first Earl of Shaftesbury. As 
a member of the Shaftesbury household the future third Earl was, 
in his youth, subject to the political influence of his grand- 
father and the intellectual influence of his grandfather's 
physician, John Locke. The first of these influences was to 
instil into the third Earl a sympathy toward the Whig party, 
which the first Earl had established as a coherent political 
group during the late 1670s. Under the influence of Locke the 
(iii) 
young Lord Ashley was given full opportunity to develop his 
intellectual potential, and ".... as a , lad of seven the, 
precocious Ashley could read Latin and Greek with ease. "4 How- 
ever, Locke's influence must not be over=emphasised; for between 
1675 and 1679 Locke was in. France, and after 1683 in exile in 
Holland. * 
After Locke's flight to Holland in 1683, the twelve-year- 
old Ashley went to Winchester School, which he attended until 
1686. In the following year, at the age of sixteen, he set out 
for a tour of the continent. Having visited Locke in Rotterdam, 
he, then proceeded through France and the Austrian Empire arriv- 
ing back in England in 1689. In a letter to his father that was 
written during these travels, we find the first expression of 
his belief in the oppressive character of the Roman Catholic 
Church. Referring to the presence and influence of the Jesuits 
in Bohemia (enforceably converted to the Church of Rome during 
the Thirty Years War) Shaftesbury wrote: 
* Locke's association with the first Earl of Shaftesbury, who 
died in 1683, made his affiliation to the monarchy under 
James II suspect. It was only after the 'Glorious Revolution' 
that Locke was able to return to England with impunity. 
(iv) 
Out of Moravia we went, into the kingdom of Bohemia, 
and stayed at Prague two days. This is one of the 
biggest cities. I, ever saw. The country is a, mighty 
fine one .... I need not describe to your lordship how miserable the people are, after I tell you the 
number of Jesuits that are amongst them. In Prague 
they reckon about 2000. I leave your lordship to 
reckon on the condition of this poor place under the 
swarm of such vermin, by the trial we have had lately 
of a few of them only amongst us. Your lordship may 
imagine, perhaps, the ill-condition we had been in 
if fallen into their hands, for this country was 
their conquest from an established strict profession 
of the pure Protestant religion. "5 
This attitude was held by Shaftesbury throughout his life, and 
will be seen to be significant to his general theory of govern- 
ment in Chapter Seven of this work. 
After his return from the continent Shaftesbury devoted 
the next five years of his life to study. Then, in May, 1695, 
he entered the House of Commons. as member for Poole. He entered 
into affairs of state with a great deal of enthusiasm; so much 
so that after the dissolution of Parliament in July, 1698, he 
had to retire from public service. for reasons of health, where- 
upon ha went to Holland for twelve months. However, before 
leaving for Holland he wrote a preface to an edition of 
Benjamin'Whichcote's Sermons, which was published in the same 
year. This was Shaftesbury's first published work, and contains 
(v) 
many of his ideas in embryonic form. It has only been republished 
once since 1698 (in 1742) for which reason I have included it 
as an Appendix to the present work (See Appendix A). 
Shaftesbury returned to England in 1699 after, in the 
November of that'-year, his father had died and he had succeeded 
to the earldom. In the same year, without his knowledge, An 
Inquiry'Concerning Virtue or Merit had been published by Toland. 
The unsought literary reputation which followed the publication 
of this work does not seem to have concerned Shaftesbury. Having 
inherited the earldom, he. took his seat in the House of Lords in 
January, 1700. From then, -until the. death, of William III 
in 
March, 1702, his time was taken up with political affairs. 
Although not holding an official post he appears to have gained 
William's respect for his efforts in the two elections of 1701, 
in which he used his influence to get Whig supporters of the 
king's foreign policy'into the-House of Commons. According to 
Shaftesbury: 
My zeal for the Revolution, and for that principle 
which effected, it, made me active for the support of 
the Government, and for the establishment of the 
Protestant succession, and it was my good fortune 
to have my services well thought of by the King and 
acknowledged by him with great favour. 
NO 
I had the honour ofmany offers' from `the King, '" 
but thinking that for my own part I could best serve 
him and my country in a disinterested station, I 
resolved absolutely against making any advantage 
from the public, either to myself or family, 'by tak- " 
ing-any employment at Court. 6 
Then, with the death of William, . 
Shaftesbury, lost all his 
influence when Queen Anne turned to other counsellors.: Also, his 
health was declining, rapidly.. -.. In a 
letter to a friend in Holland 
written in November,, 1702, Shaftesbury wrote 
...: I am now much withdrawn, and must 
1'be more so, 
not only because of this season, in which it is not 
so proper for such as I am to act; but in truth 
because my efforts in time of extremity, for this 
last year or two, have been so much beyond my strength 
in every respect, that not only for my mind's sake 
(which is not-a little to one that loves retirement 
as I do), but for my health's sake .... I am obliged to. give myself a recess, which will have this agree- 
able in it, besides the retirement which I love, 
that I shall promise myself the happiness of seeing 
you in Holland.? 
Shaftesbury was true to his word. In August, 1703, he travelled 
over to Holland, returning in the August of the following year. 
By now he was, at the age of thirty-three, a confirmed invalid, 
attending Parliament only occasionally. * From now until his 
---------------------- ------------ 
* According to Shaftesbury's doctor, his ailments were, ".... Convulsive Asthma, " which was "joyn'd with a Tertian Ague" 
(continued overleaf) 
(vii) 
death all his energies were directed towards the care of his 
unhealthy body and towards his writing. - 
After his retirement from the political scene, ýShaftesbury's 
first published work was,. A Letter-Concerning Enthusiasm to 
My-Lord *****, the mysterious nobleman being Lord Somers (to 
whom Swift`dedicated his-Taleýof a Tub), with whom Shaftesbury 
maintained, a friendly correspondence. The stimulus for this 
work was the impact which was created by the arrival in London`. 
of three Camisard prophets in September, 1706 - the Camisards. 
being a religious sect who had suffered under the religious 
policies of Louis XIV. These three individuals - Elias Marion, 
John Cavalier, and Durand, Fage - were prone to religious fits 
during the course of which they would make prophecies. It is 
doubtful that these antics would have attracted Shaftesbury's 
attention if two English gentlemen had not chosen to imitate 
the Frenchmen. When John Lacy and Sir John Bulkeley took to 
(continued from previous page) 
upon his return from Rotterdam in 1704, "Periodick Sweats, " and 
"Symptoms of an Acid Putrilaginous Ructus, with a small Acid 
Expuition, severall in the Day .... " His case is., summed up as, "a Scorbuticall Disorder from a too Acid Dyscracy of his Lord- 
ship's Blood. " A medical report by Dr. Christopher Pitt, 
Public Records Office, PRO 30/24/20/100. 
(viii) 
uncontrolled prophetic fits, polite-English society began to 
take interest, especially after Lacy published, A Cry-from the 
Desert: or Testimonials of the! Miraculous. Things lately come 
to pass in the Cevennes AND Warnings of-the. Eternal-Spirit 
(1707). In the following year Shaftesbury's Letter appeared. 
In contrast to the Inquiry which. is a straightforward elabora--, 
tion of what Shaftesbury considered to. be the moral nature of 
man, the Letter is a pronouncement against all those who satisfy 
their search for truth by-riding a tide of uncritical religious 
enthusiasm. In order to combat such irrational enthusiasm as 
was found in Lacy, ridicule is advocated. The prophetic spirit 
must be laughed out of court. This was further elaborated in 
the following year with the publication of 'Sensus Communist' 
An Essay on, the Freedom of. Wit and Humour (17o9). * In this work 
Shaftesbury recommends "good humour" in our approach to moral and 
religious problems. 
* "Shaftesbury in Sensus Communis (1709) tried to justify 
the use of wit in discussing religion. For the rest of the 
century Shaftesbury's position was the center of heated 
debate, with Akenside. supporting, and John Brown and 
Warburton opposing the employment of wit in religion. " E. N. Hooker, "Introduction" to the Augustan Reprint Society's 
Essays on Wit, No. 2, page 3. 
(ix) 
Following the Sensus Communis there appeared a work 
entitled The Moralists, `A Philosophical"Rhäpsody (1709). This" 
work-is a dialogue between two hypothetical philosophers, 
Philocles and Theocles. Through the person of, Theocles we are 
presented with a description of man's moral potential which 
centres upon the individual's appreciation of a harmonious cosmos. 
Of this work, Leibniz wrote in his Judgement,.... of the 
Characteristics (in which all Shaftesbury's works were embodied 
in 1711), 
I at once found there almost my whole Theodicee, (but 
more agreeably turn'd). before it, had come abroad. The 
Universe all of a piece, its Beauty, its Universal 
Harmony, the Disappearing of real Evil especially. 
with Regard to the Whole, the Unity of true Substances, 
the Great Unity ofs, 4the Supreme Substance, of which the 
others are but Emanations and Imitations, are there 
placed in the. most'agreeable. light imaginable .... I 
expected only to have found a Philosophy like that of 
Mr. Lock, -but I was led beyond. even Plato, and 
Des Cartes. If I hadrseen this book before the pub- 
lishing of my Theodicee, I should have made that use 
of it I ought to have done, and have borrowed from 
thence very considerable Passages; and I am only 
sorry that this Treatise does not fill a whole Volume-8 
In the same year as the Sensus Communis and The Moralists 
appeared Shaftesbury was married to Jane Ewer, youngest daughter 
of Thomas Ewer of Lee, Hertfordshire. Shaftesbury's reason for 
k, , 
(X) 
making this match was to provide himself with, anýheir --as we 
are informed in a letter to Robertý(later Viscount) Molesworth 
after his marriage: 
For my own part, if I find any sincere joy, it's 
because I promis'd my self no other, than the 
satisfaction of my friends; who thought my family 
worth. preserving, and my self worth nursing in an 
indifferent crazy state, to which a wife (if a 
real good one) is a great help. Such a one I have 
found:, and if by her help or care, I can regain a 
tolerable share of health;, you may be sure it will 
be employ'd as you desire, since my marriage it 
self was but a means to that end. 9 
Shaftesbury's wishes were-gratified when he was presented with 
a son on February 9,17.11. However, by the July of that year 
his health had deteriorated to such an extent that he left for 
Naples (overland, via France) in the hope that the warmer 
climate would alleviate his sufferings. 
Before leaving for Naples his Characteristics of Men, 
Manners, Opinions, Times, Etc. was published (1711). The. 
three volumes included the works mentioned above, plus two others. 
The other two works were 'Soliloquy; ' or Advice to an Author 
(first published 1710), and Miscellaneous Reflections on the 
Preceding Treatises, Etc. The Soliloquy is a statement of his 
belief that both self-examination and freedom of criticism are 
(xi) 
necessary pre-requisites to , the', formation of a-just, moral and 
artistic outlook, 'a theme"which complements that of the Letter 
and the Sensus Communis. ' The Miscellaneous`Reflections ärea 
restatement and critical discussion of all the major ideas'that 
are contained`in the««other pieces. The"order'in which these 
works were placed inthe Characteristics"is as follows: 
1. A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm'`. ... '(1708) 
2. - Sensus Communis .... ' 
(1709) 
3. Soliloquy". **** (1710) 
4. An Inquiry'Concerning Virtue*or Merit (1699) 
5. ' The Moralists .... (1709) 
6.. Miscellaneous Reflections .... 
(1711) 
During the eighteenth, century'the work was very popular and* 
went through twelve"editions'up to 1790: (1711,1714,1723, 
1727,1732,1733,1737-38,1743-45,1749,1757,1773, and 1790). 
When looking at Shaftesbury's published work as a whole, 
it is in the last-two'essays - The'Moralists and the Sölilo u- 
that we are given the'clearest expression of what has come to 
be'recognised as the most original element in his writings. It 
is here that we find the deliberate combination of ethics and 
aesthetics. '' This use of aesthetic concepts and aesthetic 
(xii) 
experience asa means of elucidating ethical questions, does not 
suddenly appear in Shaftesbury. There is evidence of it in all 
his writings. However, it would seem that his interest turned 
more and more towards the creative arts as he got older, and 
this can be seen if we look at the chronological sequence, of 
his works. In the last years of his life (1711-1713) his time 
was taken up in concentrating upon the moral character of 
artistic pieces. Between leaving for Naples and his death on 
February 4,1713, he wrote two short works in which art is the 
central theme. These were, A Notion of the. Historical Draught 
of Hercules (included in the 1714 edition of the Characteristics} 
which discusses the style and content of a painting in which 
Hercules is the-main character; and A, Letter Concerning Design 
(published for the first time in the 1732 edition of the 
Characteristics). 
We see that Shaftesbury's literary output was largely con- 
fined to the years after his retirement` from public life up to 
his premature death atýthe'age of forty-one., In addition to 
the works outlined above there are various other sources of 
material which have been utilised for the present study. A 
complete list of primary sources is as follows: 
(xiii) 
1. ' Preface to'the Select Sermons-of Dr. 'Whichcot;, London, 
1698. 
2. Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times Etc. 
-Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by J. M. Robertson. 
Two volumes. Glouc., Mass., 1963. 
3. Letters of the Earl of Shaftesbury. London, 1746. 
Included are aLetters of the Earl of`Shaftesbur toýa 
Student at the University (first published 1716), 
b) Letters from the Right-, Honourable the Late Earl of 
Shaftes ur to Robert Molesworth, Es first published 
1721), and c) Letter sent from Ita y, with the Notion 
of the. Jud ement of Hercules &c., to My Lord ****, the 
mysterious nobleman again being Lor Somers. 
4. The Ori inal. Letters of . Locke, 
Sidne , and Shaftesbur , (e d. T. Forster), London, -V830. Included here are Shaftes- 
bury's letters to Mr. Furley of=Rotterdam and to his son, 
Arent Furley. 
5. The Life, Unpublished Letters, and Philosophical Regimen 
of Anthony,, Earl of Shaftesbur (ed. B. Rand) Lon on, 
1900. T The Life here was written by Shaftesbury's son, the 
fourth-Earl. The, Philosophical Regimen is Shaftesbury's 
private philosophical notebook. 
6. Second Characters, or The Language of Forms,. (ed. B. Rand), 
Cambridge, 1914. As well as containing te Letter 
Concerning Desi nand. the Notion, this publication includes 
the notes tat were made. by Shaftesbury in, preparation for . 
a treatise which was to be called, Plastics, or The Original_ 
Power and Progress of Designatory Art. 
7: " Shaftesbur -Pa ers,.: which are tofbe found, in the"°Public Records Office in London. Ref. PRO 30/24. 
In considering the moral'and political philosophy of these 
writings, the present work does not attempt to enter into a 
S II(Xiv) 
philosophical dialogue with fithe thirdEarl: -'I have sought 
rather to analyse the meaning, relationship between, and impli- 
cations of Shaftesbury's central ideas. In this task: criticisms 
of Shaftesbury have been limited to pointing out the logical 
opposition of some of his ideas and approaches. His analyses 
and recommendations find neither acclamation nor condemnation, 
the attempt here being to understand them in the light of his 
own conceptual framework. 
In the first chapter the reader is introduced to what is in 
Shaftesbury's philosophy an undifferentiated appeal to both 
reason and emotion as the basis of moral approbation and dis- 
approbation. These are seen by the author of this work to 
constitute two distinct approaches to moral subjects -a dis- 
tinction not made by Shaftesbury himself. Using this distinction 
as a basis for analysis, the "rational" elements of Shaftesbury's 
moral theories are isolated and discussed in Chapters Two, Three, 
and Four. Chapter Five discusses the non-rational or "emotional" 
theory of morality. Common to both of these approaches are the 
beliefs that 
a) the cosmos (universe or Nature) is a perfectly 
organised whole. 
b)- the individual-behaves morally when he consciously 
pursues the public welfare, and 
(xv) 
c) the individual finds happiness when he behaves 
morally. 
In Chapter Two, where Shaftesbury's debt to the rational 
theology of the Cambridge Platonists is the focal point of 
discussion, Shaftesbury is seen to recommend the rational 
independence of all men from any external authority in their 
pursuit of moral and religious truths within the perfect cosmos. 
Chapter Three is centred on Shaftesbury's belief that Nature is 
perfect, and on his view of the role of man in this perfect 
structure. His admiration of the Roman Stoics and his rejection 
of the Epicureans and Hobbes in matters concerning metaphysics, 
morals, and political society find expression here. Chapter 
Four is concerned with some questions that arise out of the 
discussion in previous chapters. An attempt is made to explain 
Shaftesbury's acceptance of the possibility of both "evil" and 
"freedom" within a universe where everything necessarily happens 
for the best. Shaftesbury's theory of moral obligation is also 
discussed. 
Chapter Five considers Shaftesbury's views on man's 
"emotional" ability to distinguish between good and evil. These 
views are seen to find their origin in his belief in the 
equation of "beauty" and "morality", and his belief that man is 
(xvi ). 
attracted topthese#ings by the "moral sense" (which is also 
termed the. "aesthetic-sense". in this work). What Shaftesbury, 
means 'by the term "beauty". and the relationship between beauty 
and. art are both, discussed in this chapter. 
-,, -Chapter Six, re-emphasises Shaftesbury's confusion of. two.. 
logically distinct approaches. to morality. This confusion is 
seen to beýthe product of his explicit desire to avoid being 
"enthusiastic". His recommendation that-we adopt both "ridicule" 
and "good humour" as safeguards against "enthusiasm" is also 
analysed., 
In Chapters-Seven and Eight.. the analysis is directed .. 
towards, an understanding of,, Shaftesbury's political ideas.. It 
should be recognised here that Shaftesbury did not ever attempt 
a. systematic--Presentation-, of apolitical philosophy. It is true 
that he thought, that his ideas., had political 'implications (see 
Chapter Seven, Section I),. and political discussion can be.,. 
found in, his elaboration-of moral argument throughout his writings. 
Also, certain political-, arrangements areseen by him to be a pre- 
requisite to the discovery of moral, truth by. the individual,. and 
a particular-sort of political activity (i. e. activity to 
promote the welfare of the community) is a necessary consequence 
(xvi*i j 
of being moral. However, having outlined what characterises 
a moral individual, and having explained how we can reach this 
condition, Shaftesbury does not go on to discuss the characteris- 
tics of a moral communit Tin`any consistent manner. Instead, he 
seems to have become more interested-in'the relationship between 
the arts`and morality, and was preparing a work on this subject 
at his death (see above). 
Making use of the material that is available to us - much 
of it from his private-correspondence - Chapter Seven discusses 
Shaftesbury's ideas concerning the necessary organisation of 
government in"a'country that hopes to'maintain moral standards 
among its citizens. His'opposition to tyranny (by which he 
meanstany"-form of äuthority, thät denies to the individual the 
means of developingýa moral, -, character), his avoidance of 
"utopias", and his4"conservatism" are-explained in'. this chapter. 
Chapter Eight-considers'Shaftesbury's views on "freedom", 
and the`good'consequences'for-a-society that possesses this 
quality. The distinction between "rationa. l" and "emotional" 
elements in his thought is again seen to be an appropriate means 
for analysing his ideas. -In either case Shaftesbury is seen to 
advocate freedom as a means of improving both the individual and 
(Xviii) 
the society within which he lives. A concern with the "culture" 
of society is seen to be relevant in relation to the emotional 
(aesthetic) element in his thought. The rational element is 
seen to be in favour of religious toleration. However, it is 
stressed that Shaftesbury was a conservative and has less faith 
in the moral, religious, and social abilities of mankind than 
would at times appear. 
In spite of contradictions in his philosophy, Shaftesbury 
seems to have been both influential and popular during the 
eighteenth century. Chapter Nine points to the fact that, in 
addition to contributing to a debate on moral subjects that was 
to continue after his death, Shaftesbury deals with subjects that 
were to remain of interest to British philosophers and their 
public until the last quarter of the eighteenth century. 
Two appendices have been included in this work. "Appendix 
A" is Shaftesbury's "Preface" to Whichcote's Select Sermons 
(1698) mentioned above. "Appendix B" is a letter written to the 
student, Michael Ainsworth, in 1709 - taken from the volume of 
Letters (1746) which is included in the list of primary sources 
above. In this letter there is an interesting rejection of 
Locke's epistemology that is further analysed in Chapter Five 
(xix) 
of this work. 
At the end of each chapter of this work, with the exception 
of the final one, there can be found a summary of the central 
points that have been discussed in any chapter. It is hoped 
that these will'be of use to the reader should he at any point 
wish to remind himself of previous discussion. 
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CHAPTER ONE, .} 
SHAFTESBURY'S-INTELLECTUAL ORIENTATION- 
If we look at the intellectual environment in England 
during the time that Shaftesbury was writing, we find there a 
growing confidence in the rational faculties of man. England 
offered conditions under which those theological writers who 
insisted upon the primacy of the individual's mind and con- 
science were allowed to publish their ideas. These conditions 
were utilised by the Deists, who thought that religious truths 
were rational truths. Charles Blount, in his Summary Account 
of the Deists' Religion (1686), advocated a break with the 
established church and recommended the worship of God by lead- 
ing a life based upon the rational pursuit of morality. Cast- 
ing doubt upon the credibility of the Bible, and rejecting 
miracles outright, he advocated the replacement of faith by 
reason. * John Toland, after first attempting to show that 
there was nothing in'the Bible that is contrary to reason**, 
later turned to a criticism of the Bible on rational grounds. 
+ 
* See also Blounts Oracles of Reason (1693). 
** See Christianity Not Mysterious (1696). 
+ See Nazarenus, or Jewish, Mahometan,. and Gentile 
Christianity (1718). 
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Writers like; Blount, Toland, Anthony Collins, and William Whiston 
all opposed reason to revelation. The name of John Locke with 
all its prestige was. added-to the list of those who looked to 
reason as the source and measure of religious truth when The 
Reasonableness of Christianity was published in 1695. *, In. the 
person of Locke we also have an individual who raised men's 
hopes in reason when he published his Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding (1690). Locke's ".... success in explaining the 
human understanding created the impression that man's reason is 
sufficient to unlock all. the treasures of knowledge. "" This 
confidence in the human intellect received both confirmation 
and impetus from Newton's theory of gravitation which apparently 
explained the complexities of the universal machine by. means of 
an all-embracing formula. ** This was the spirit of the times 
and, Shaftesbury,. could hardly fail to be influenced by. it. 
Shaftesbury can be, seen confidently referring to human reason 
as the means whereby man can acquire knowledge of moral truth. 
What do we mean by "reason" when we use the term in 
-------------------------- --------------------------------- 
* Locke's theological "rationalism" was qualified by an accept- 
ance of irrational elements (such as miracles) upon faith. 
** Newton's Principia mathematica h. iloso hiae naturalis was 
first published in 1687. 
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relation to Shaftesbury? If we look at Shaftesbury's°writings 
we do not find muchhe]p. Reference to reason in justification 
of hiseideas, occurs regularly, but Shaftesbury never clarifies 
what, he means, by reason. , 
However, the fact that he refers to 
it implies: first of, all that Shaftesbury sees the possession 
of something-called reason as a characteristic of-all men (as 
a-. resultýof which Shaftesbury can indiscriminately refer his 
readers to it). - Secondly, it can be said that through their- 
common. possession of, reason, men are capable of forming 
unanimous, opinions concerning what is true*; and it is 
possible to regard Shaftesbury as, a person who. advocated 
reason as, a measure of . truth. in the hope that men might achieve 
a. common measure--(leading to a common knowledge) concerning 
the true and. the false.. --. However, . this 
does. not. help us in 
understanding how reason works. What is the. process of reason- 
ing?,.. For Shaftesbury, when, he uses reason in relation to moral 
* This may be qualified by adding, "in those spheres of 
human enquiry in which reason's standard is thought to 
be relevant. " However,. the characteristic of Shaftesbury's 
age was that all disciplines were being. placed under 
reason's standard -a fact best demonstrated by the 
writings of the Deists. who brought religion, the sphere of 
faith, within reason's spectrum. 
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subjects (which are his main concern), there appears tobe an 
analogy with mathematical reason - that is, the principles which 
he outlines are thought to be either self-evidentýor such as can 
be proved byelogic. Thus, Shaftesbury says of his ideas out- 
lined in the Inquiry Concerning'Virtue or Merit, that "if there 
be no article exceptionable in this scheme of moral arithmetic, 
the subject treated may be said to have an evidence as great as 
that which is found in. numbers or mathematics. "2 This may be 
taken to mean that the',. truths which Shaftesbury presents to us are 
believed by him to be either immediately recognisable as true*, or 
logically derived from such self=evident"truths. As such, reason 
can be referred to-if differences are found between men, either 
as a means of*proving one of them'right (and with whom the 
other will agree because-reason demonstrates that he was pre- 
viously wrong) or to demonstrate. that neither side of a 
* It is possible to introduce at this point a difficulty in 
interpreting Shaftesbury's ideas that will be further 
developed later in the present chapter.. In the immediate 
recognition of a self-evident, moral truth.. Shaftesbury some- 
times appears to be appealing to,. reason, sometimes to a non- 
rational "sense". Shaftesbury himself fails to distinguish 
between the rational and non-rational elements in his 
philosophy, and thus presents. us with the problem: When is 
Shaftesbury talking rationally, and when not? 
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difference is true. For Shaftesbury, reason-is concerned 
with what one man can demonstrate to-others; and with the 
acceptance or rejection of beliefs according to whether or 
not they can'be justified by reason. 
Where reason is thought to be capable of distinguishing 
between the true and the false proposition, it is possible to 
hope and demand that all human beliefs receive examination, 
and that they be pronounced true or false, according to the 
light of reason. This*is. Shaftesbury's viewpoint. For, 
according to him, there is a. distinction between the possi- 
bilities. of rational activity and the actual use to which men 
put their mental faculties... "Men, " he tells us, "are wonder- 
fully happy-in a faculty of deceiving themselves, whenever 
they set heartily about it. "3 They deceive themselves because 
they are not critical enough as to what they believe, and 
their rational capacities are not used to. their fullest extent. 
As Philocles informs us in The Moralists: 
Men love to take party. instantly. They cannot bear 
being kept in suspense. The examination torments them. 
They want to be-rid of it upon the easiest terms. 
'Tis as if men fancied themselves drowning whenever 
they dare trust to the current of reason. They seem 
hurrying away they know not. whither, and are ready 
to catch at the first twig. There they choose after- 
wards to hang, though ever so insecurely, rather 
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than trust their strength to bear them above water. 
He who has got hold of an hypothesis, how slight 
soever, is satisfied. He can presently answer 
every objection, and, with a. few terms of art, give 
an account of everything without trouble-4 
Although "truth is the most powerful thing in the world, "5 
men refuse to pursue it by questioning. their beliefs. In 
their desire for a. certainty which will lend. significance to 
their own existence,. men refuse to question their own 
hypotheses. Without any rational. justification, "Every sect 
has a recipe. When you know it, you. are. master of Nature: 
you solve all her phenomena, you see all her designs, and can 
account for all her operations. " Why is this so? Because 
men "are too lazy and effeminate .... to 
dare to doubt., 6 This 
is the attitude that Shaftesbury condemns in the belief that 
truth will emerge if rational enquiry is used: "Let but the 
search go freely on, and the right measure of-. everything will 
soon be found. "7 As Shaftesbury's most recent critic has 
stated, "With unquestioning faith in reason, Shaftesbury 
advocates that we follow reason wherever: she may lead. "8 
We may say, therefore, that Shaftesbury advocated a 
questioning of all things presented to the mind, and indicated 
that all our beliefs be rationally justifiable. This at times 
7 
appears to lead Shaftesbury into 
question some of our beliefs, we 
There is nothing so foolish 
scepticism. For whilst the 
one side, the certainty gros 
the other. Whilst only one 
ridiculous, the other grows 
scepticism. For if we are to 
must question all our beliefs: 
and deluding as a partial 
doubt is cast only on 
ws so much stronger on 
face of folly appears 
more solemn and deceiving-9 
It is only by examining everything that the human mind can hope 
to gain a sound appreciation of truth - if truth exists at*all 
for man to appreciate. Our critical reason must examine all 
our beliefs, reason being the only grounds for assessing their 
truth or falsity. * What will happen, however, if after 
questioning all things in pursuit of rational certainty, no 
certainty is found? Only doubt will remain, and Shaftesbury 
will be dangerously close to the conclusions reached by 
scepticism. His sceptical questioning of all knowledge in his 
search for truth would conclude by denying the possibility 
of a known truth. Shaftesbury recognised this possibility 
* It was upon this basis that Shaftesbury rejected the 
Pascalian bet concerning the existence of God (without any 
particular reference to Pascal): ".... our reason, which 
knows the cheat, will never rest thoroughly satisfied on 
such a bottom, but turn us often adrift, and toss us in a 
sea of doubt and perplexity .... Characteristics, I, 27. 
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and admitted that,. ".... as in philosophy, so in politics, I 
am but few removes, from mere scepticism. 1110 But he was. 
removed from scepticism, convinced that. his method need not 
lead to this end however we may interpret this element in his 
writings. He tells. his readers that he will ".... try what 
certain knowledge or assurance of things maybe recovered, " and 
thus avoid ".... an endless scepticism introduced. ""' Con- 
sequently, Shaftesbury's attitudes towards scepticism*, and 
the means whereby he thought he had avoided it, must be 
recognised as being important to our understanding of his moral 
ideas. 
* Scepticism, as originated by Pyrrho, (360=290`B. C. ) was an 
expression of weariness with philosophic speculation, in the 
place of which it advocated an attitude of total doubt. With 
reference to knowledge ofkthe empirical world, man is shown 
to be incapable of escaping from the uncertainty of the 
senses. With reference to speculative interpretations of 
reality, and the moral recommendations which may be asso- 
ciated with them, the sceptics claimed that all affirmations 
may be confronted with an opposite which is equally valid. 
As a consequence of this attitude towards the doctrines of 
other schools the sceptic may advocate either continuous dialectical criticism (Diogenes Laertius, II', 487), or the 
suspension of judgement which produces ".... a condition of 
life, peaceable, temperate, and exempt from the agitations 
we receive by the pressure of opinion and. knowledge that we 
think we have of things. " (Montaigne, Essays II, 196. See 
also V. Brochard,.. Les. Sceptiques Grecs, 33). 
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Shaftesbury had agreat deal of sympathy for the constant 
criticism of the sceptics. In conjunction with his-own rational 
orientation, he recognised as correct the sceptic's refusal to 
accept an unjustifiable truth: 
To say truth', I have often wondered to find such a 
disturbance raised about the simple name of sceptic. 
'Tis certain that, in its original and plain signi- 
fication, the word. imports, no more than barely "that 
state or frame of mind in which every one remains on 
every subject of which he is not certain. " -. He who 
is certain, or presumes to say he knows is in that 
particular, whether he be mistaken or in the right, 
a dogmatist. 1, 
This is. Shaftesbury speaking as a rationalist. Before we accept 
anything. as certain there must be an examination of our beliefs 
according to the most, stringent standards. of rational 
criticism. * This attitude, of Shaftesbury towards what we think 
to be true was reinforced through his acquaintance with the 
arch-sceptic of'his day, Pierre Bay. le, with whom Shaftesbury 
* According to the. definition of Shaftesbury's rationalism 
provided above, the questions which the rationalist will 
ask about his beliefs will be - What evidence have I for this belief? Is it rationally self-evident? Is it 
logically derived from that which is rationally self- 
evident? If a, positive answer can not be given in relation 
to one of the latter two questions it can not be said to be rationally justifiable. 
10 
maintained a correspondence after meeting him during his-stay 
in Holland 1698/99. Of Bayle's scepticism Shaftesbury wrote, 
And if that philosophy, whatever 
ing in bounds of decency, examine 
manner, be esteemed injurious to 
and be accordingly banished from 
foresee nothing but darkness and 
follow. 13 
it be, which keep- 
s things after, this 
religion or mankind, 
the world, I can-. 
ignorance that must 
Shaftesbury looked to Bayle's scepticism as a legitimate means 
of preventing the continuance of unjustifiable beliefs, - the 
"darkness and ignorance" mentioned above. However. unlike the 
sceptics, -Shaftesbury did not deny the possibility of a known 
truth. His aim, as we saw. above, was to rescue his philosophy 
from "an endless scepticism introduced. " Although he says 
that Bayle's'scepticism is a guard against "darkness and 
ignorance", when Shaftesbury considers classical scepticism, 
"that mere sceptic, and new Academic", he says that "it had 
no certain precepts, and was an exercise or sophistry rather 
than philosophy. "14 He scorns the classical sceptics because, 
in his view, -they, rejected the possibility of a known truth. 
At the same time, he could admire the scepticism of his friend, 
Bayles because it was "improving": 
Whatever opinion of mine stood not the test of his [Bayle's] 
piercing-reason, Ilearned by degrees either to discard 
as frivolous, or not to rely on them with that boldness 
11 
as'before; but that which bore the trial I prized 
as purest gold. 15 
Scepticism was a 
, 
testing ground, a means of distinguishing 
between the certain and the uncertain. But according to the 
arguments of scepticism, nothing can be certain (not even the 
holding of uncertainty). This being the case, we must go on 
to ask the following questions: How does Shaftesbury escape 
the conclusions of the sceptics (if he does) when he had so 
much sympathy for the rational procedures of scepticism? How 
and where does. Shaftesbury discover the certainty which he 
pursued? Answering these questions will be the task of the 
next section of the present chapter. 
II' -, . 
The argument of the present section will be that as a 
rationalist Shaftesbury was led towards sceptical conclusions 
in questions of epistemology. However, as a moralist, 
Shaftesbury was prepared to regard epistemological questions. 
as irrelevant to his enquiries. He is prepared to recognise 
moral certainty in judgements concerning how we ought to feel 
and act, and he: regards this certainty as unaffected by any 
12 
epistemological doubts that we might have. * 
Shaftesbury suggests that if we are to know anything with 
certainty, it is necessary to understand that part of us which 
thinks. It is necessary to know our minds, how they work, and 
how we can be sure that the mind's thoughts can be trusted. 
Without this prerequisite, we can never be said to know anything 
with certainty: 
.... it must, in strictness, be yielded that all knowledge whatsoever depends upon this previous one 
"and that we can in reality be assured of nothing 
till we are first assured of what we are ourselves. " 
For by this alone we can know what certainty and 
assurance is. 16 
Proceeding then to consider whether or not knowledge of the 
self is possible, Shaftesbury begins by accepting the existence 
of a self: "That there is something undoubtedly which thinks, 
our very doubt itself and scrupulous thought evinces. " However 
although he does not allow sceptical. questioning to deny the 
existence of the mind or self, Shaftesbury is less certain 
concerning what". the mind is. Having accepted the existence of 
something which thinks, Shaftesbury continues, 
* Like the sceptics, Shaftesbury recognised that our knowledge 
of the external (material) world has no rational certainty. 
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But in what subject that thought resides, and how 
that subject is continued one and the same, so as 
to answer 'constantly to the supposed train of thoughts 
or reflections which seem to run so harmoniously 
through a long course of life, with the same relation 
still to one single and self-same person, this is 
not a matter so easily or hastily decided.... 
The reason for his difficulty in the problem of identity is 
that although we know of the mind because we think, our thoughts 
are only memories (which may be false). "We may believe 
we have thought and reflected thus gor thus; but we may be mis- 
taken. We may be conscious of that as truth which perhaps was 
no more than dream. " Consequently, we can be sure of nothing 
more than the fact that the m'ind'exists. We cannot be sure of 
any of i. ts thoughts, nor can we be sure that it is the same 
mind from one day to the next (or even from one moment to the 
next). This, Shaftesbury says, 
is what metaphysicians mean when they say "that 
identity can be proved only by consciousness, but 
that consciousness, withal, may be as well false as 
real in respect of what is past. "17 
If this is true (and Shaftesbury accepts it) then we can have 
no certain knowledge (which depends upon knowledge of what we 
are ourselves). Thus, for Shaftesbury, epistemological enquiry 
provides no certain basis for knowledge,. However, this does not 
lead him to the rejection of the possibility of moral' 
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certainty, As we shall see,. Shaftesbury rejects epistemology 
as unsatisfactory - an insufficient tool which does not take 
into consideration what for Shaftesbury was a central 
characteristic. of the thinking process (viz. that. men act 
upon the knowledge they have as if it were certain). 
Such is Shaftesbury's antipathy towards'epistemological 
enquiries which, `as we'have seen, provide no certainty for 
him - that-where he sees philosophy concentrating upon them, 
it is the "empty regions and shadows of philosophy". He 
states that if one wishes'to "usefully philosophise" it is 
only necessary "to have a knowledge in this part of philosophy 
sufficient to satisfy him that there is no knowledge or wisdom 
to be learnt from it. "18 Having recognised this, one can go 
on to discover something which is "useful". Thus, although he 
accepts the inability of reason to decide the truth of our 
thoughts about the self. 'Shaftesbury continues, 
To the force of this reasoning I confess I must so 
far submit as to declare that, for my own part, I 
take my being upon trust. Let others philosophise 
as they are able: I shall admire their strength 
when, upon this topic, they have refuted what able 
metaphysicians object and Pyrrhonists plead in their 
own behalf. 
Meanwhile there is no impediment, hindrance, or 
suspension of action on account of these wonderfully 
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refined speculations. Argument and debate go on 
still. Conduct is settled. Rules and measures are 
given out and received. Nor do we scruple to act 
as resolutely upon the mere supposition that we are, 
as if we had effectually proved it a thousand times, 
to the full satisfaction of our metaphysical or 
Pyrrhonian antagonist. 19 
Here we see Shaftesbury abandoning any hope of absolute certainty 
for the ideas and opinions which we have in our minds (for he 
confesses that we cannot know enough about the mind itself). 
Consequently, if philosophy is understood to be the pursuit 
of certain knowledge concerning . 
these. ideas, philosophy is 
of no interest to Shaftesbury. Let others philosophise as they 
are able; but he will not participate. His reason for this 
lack of interest is that he does not think that such enquiries 
can ever be brought to. a conclusion, and doubt will be left 
to prevail. On the other hand, if Shaftesbury is to be regarded 
as a philosopher - and he does feel that his writings are 
philosophical - then it must be within the context of his own 
definition of the true purpose of philosophy, which ".... 
raises and-exalts our minds by subduing our Passions to the 
government of Reason and refining 'em by a nice and delicate 
Perception heighten'd by Reflection. 1120 We see that when 
Shaftesbury directs us towards the activity of "usefully 
philosophising", he is concerned with the ethical problem of 
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controlling our desires and directing our actions. He is not 
primarily concerned with the epistemological problems of 
philosophy. In fact, he has declared them irrelevant; for 
meanwhile, as the philosophers argue about these problems, the 
rest of the world settle rules of conduct. As a. "moralist" 
Shaftesbury wishes to understand this latter activity; and in 
contrast to philosophers who are concerned with the discovery 
of ultimate truths, Shaftesbury points to the rest of the world 
continuing to make practical. decisions concerning how to act. 
People arrive at conclusions, about practical concerns as if 
the philosophical problem of identity did not exist. Rather 
than becoming-involved in what he thought to be useless 
philosophical (epistemological) debate,. Shaftesbury turned 
his attention towards a study of the reasons why we act in 
one way rather than another. The title of his collected essays 
is, after all, The, Characteristics of. Men, Manners, Opinions, 
Times,. Etc. This is significant, for it points to the fact 
that Shaftesbury's intention was to examine that which 
characterises the thoughts and activities of all men, not 
just philosophers. All men consider what to do, and how 
to do it, even though the knowledge upon which they reach their 
17 
conclusions has no ultimate rational justification. Shaftesbury 
wished to examine this activity of practical reasoning. 
The first characteristic of practical reasoning is that 
man assumes that'he has an identity, or self. Within the self 
there are 1) desires or appetites, which Shaftesbury terms 
"affections", and'2) opinions concerning. which, appetites, when 
fulfilled, provide us with happiness. This, Shaftesbury. feels. - 
is all that'is*, required to obtain that certainty which is 
evidently lacking in epistemological enquiry. "This to me 
appears. sufficient ground for a'moralist. 'Nor. do I ask more 
21 
when I undertake to prove. the reality of virtue and morals. " 
In order to demonstrate this Shaftesbury begins with the 
affections-, which are emotional reactions to experience des- 
cribed as follows: 
The affections of which Iam conscious are either 
grief or joy, desire or aversion. For whatever 
mere sensationl may experience,. if it amounts to 
neither of these, 'tis. indifferent and no way affects 
me-22 
The presence of some objects provides üs with joy, and these 
we desire; that is, we wish to possess them. Others cause 
grief, as a consequence of which we have an aversion towards 
them. Like and dislike, desire and aversion, are'the two 
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basic desires or affections. However, the satisfaction of 
desire does not necessarily guarantee happiness. For man has 
a multiplicity of affections towards various objects. There- 
fore,. men must make choices between alternative courses of 
action; they must make choices between desires, and judge 
which affections will provide them with maximum happiness 
before they act. Therefore our opinion concerning which affec- 
tions provide happiness. becomes all important: 
So that. the affections of love and hatred, liking 
and dislike, on which the happiness . or. prosperity of the person so much depends, being influenced and 
governed by opinion, the highest good or happiness 
must depend on right opinion and the highest misery be 
derived from wrong. 23 
Because the choice of affections or desires may be based upon 
incorrect opinion, it is possible to like (expect joy from) 
that which is incapable of providing satisfaction, and happiness 
may not be achieved. For happiness can. only be found when we 
have correct opinions concerning which affections will bring 
about the realisation of. joy and avoidance of grief. Shaftes- 
bury's intention is to show where correct opinion lies (i. e. 
which affections towards which objects will provide us with 
happiness). In. so doing, he. also presents us with the claim 
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that those opinions which make us happy are moral opinions, and 
that the affections chosen by right opinion are moral affec- 
tions; that is, to be happy we must be moral. 
In order to show where correct opinion lies, Shaftesbury 
first considers the view that happiness lies in externals, and 
the preference which would be given in this case to desires 
for "plate, jewels, apartments, coronets, patents of honour, 
titles, or precedencies. " This, Shaftesbury tells us, cannot 
be the basis of, happine'ss. For when we act upon desires for 
these objects, there will always be something beyond our 
reach even though we desire it. Unfulfilled desire will then 
mean dissatisfaction and unhappiness-. Also, if our satis- 
faction lies in fulfilling our desires towards external objects, 
we will be constantly plagued by. the fear of losing that which 
we have already attained. Shaftesbury asks, 
.... if the:; passion 'raised. on this opinion 
(call it 
avarice, pride,. vanity, or ambition) be indeed in- 
capable of'any real satisfaction, even under the most 
successful course of fortune; and then too, attended 
with perpetual fears'of disappointment and loss, how 
can the mind be other than miserable when possessed 
by it? 24 
From this it ispossible to-conclude that Shaftesbury thinks 
that we can not be happy when our desires are directed towards 
20 
external things. 
To be happy Shaftesbury says that we must desire something 
which we can be sure of attaining. This will be something with- 
in our control at all times. That which is within our control 
is the. affections and opinions towards externals. It is these 
that must be controlled by 'a higher opinion and a higher 
affection. *, Shaftesbury tells us-that we are able to dis- 
tinguish between moral and non-moral desires, as a consequence 
of which we can say whether or not the opinions which advocate 
the fulfilment of certain desires are right or wrong. If our 
opinion. is that we should choose between moral and non-moral 
desires, it is., possible ; to do . so.. This 
is the higher opinion. 
The higher affection is the placing of our. satisfaction in this 
choice; - that is, that we desireýto act morally, and satisfy 
this, desire when we-control those opinions and affections which 
refer to sensual and other external objects: 
------------------ --------------- --------- ---------- ------------- 
* "In a creature capable of forming general notions of things, 
not only the outward beings which offer themselves to the 
sense are the objects of affection, but the very actions them- 
selves, and the affections of pity, kindness, gratitude, and 
their contraries, being brought into the mind by reflection, 
become objects. So that, by means. of this reflected sense, 
there arises another kind of affection towards those very 
affections themselves, which have been already felt, and are 
now become the subject of, a new liking or dislike. " 
Characteristics I, 251. 
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The method, therefore, required in this my inward 
economy, is to make those fancies themselves the 
objects of my aversion which justly deserve it, by 
being the cause of a wrong estimation and measure 
of good and ill, , and consequently the cause of may unhappiness and disturbance-25 
Happiness becomes for Shaftesbury the possession of a parti- 
cular type of. personality or character, achieved by "placing 
worth or, excellence .... in the affections or sentiments, 
in 
the governing part and inward character .... "26 We must now 
ask, what makes some desires or affections moral, and others 
non-moral? 
Assuming the individual can isolate himself from the 
affections and opinions which determine how we act, Shaftesbury 
tells us (in his Soliloquy)that the individual can 
"apostrophise" them. The individual becomes an observer, 
through introspection, of his own make-up: 
.... by a-certain powerful. jigure of inward rhetoric the mind apostrophises its own fancies, raises them 
in their proper shapes and-personages, and addresses 
them familiarly, without the least ceremony or 
respect. By this means it will soon happen that two 
formed parties will erect themselves within. 27 
As a neutral observer man can study his opinions (fancies) 
concerning his happiness. He will see that these opinions 
are supported by one of two factors (two formed parties) - 
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Appetite and Reason. If they are supported by our appetite they 
will be concerned only with externals. Our opinion will be 
that we should pursue the objects of our immediate desires, 
and "we are necessarily exposed to endless vexation and 
calamity. "28 However, if our opinions are supported by our 
reason, they will. be moral. Reason, therefore, becomes the 
deciding factor*concerning. whether our opinion (and the 
affection to which it relates) should be supported by the 
higher opinion and higher affection. How our reason distin- 
guishes the moral from the. non-moral is. never made clear by 
Shaftesbury. * In relation to this introspective morality which 
recommends that we should place our.. satisfaction. in. the possess- 
ion of moral opinion, it seems that'reason is capable of 
recognising moral truth in an opinion. or desire because it is 
self-evident. We. tan.., "see" the truth when it is placed under 
the critical light, of our reason. There can be no doubt, 
however, that Shaftesbury-believed that. when we allow reason 
to take control, we will be happy: 
* It might. even be suggested that it is. not reason at all 
that distinguishes between good and evil. As we'shall 
see in Section IV of this Chapter, -and in Chapter Five, Shaftesbury also refers us to a non-rational moral sense 
which is seen to be capable of distinguishing between good 
and evil. 
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.... if I join the opinion of good to the possessions 
of the mind, if it be in the affections themselves 
that 
,I place my 
highest joy, and in those objects, 
whatever, they are, of inward worth and beauty (such 
as honesty, faith, integrity, friendship, honour), 
'tis evident I can never possibly, in this respect, 
rejoice amiss or indulge myself too far in the 
enjoyment. 29 
If, as Shaftesbury says, such noble things as beauty and good- 
ness can only be enjoyed "by the help of what is noblest [in 
man], his mind and reason, "30 then the emergence of "my 
highest joy" is dependent upon reason. * The opinions and 
desires that we decide to retain will be rational and moral; * 
for reason will point out that we should not approve of those 
opinions "which justly deserve it, by being the cause of a 
wrong estimation. and measure of good and ill, and consequently 
the cause of my unhappiness and disturbance-01 
Shaftesbury felt that he had found. a means of obtaining 
moral certainty as. a by-product of the pursuit of happiness. ** 
We are told that we will find happiness in the successful 
pursuit of attainable goals (i. e. the control of opinions and 
* It should be added that when Shaftesbury uses the concept 
of"beauty" he is normally referring to something which is 
appreciated by other means than reason. - See Section IV of this chapter. However, Shaftesbury is by no means con- 
sistent in this. 
** Concerning Shaftesbury's attitudes towards happiness as 
the product of morality, see Chapter Five below. 
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affections). .. 
In pursuing these, goals we will know that we are 
being, virtuous. His final answer to. the epistemological argu- 
ments of scepticism is as follows: 
.... let us carry scepticism ever so far, let us doubt, if we can, of everything about. us, we cannot 
doubt of what passes within ourselves. Our passions 
and affections are known'to us. They are certain, 
whatever the objects may be-on which they are employed. 
Nor is it of any concern to our argument how these 
exterior objects, stand: whetherAhey. are realities 
or mere illusions; whether. we wake or dream. For ill 
dreams will. be equally disturbing; and a good dream (if life be nothing else) will be easily and happily 
passed. In this dream of 'life, therefore, our demonstra- 
tions have the same force;. our balance and economy 
hold good, 'and our obligation to virtue is in every 
respect the same. 32 
When Shaftesbury. here states that we cannot doubt of what passes 
within ourselves, he is talking about the, knowledge we have of 
our opinions and affections. However, as we have already seen 
above; "we may believe. we have thought-and reflected thus 
or thus; ' but we maybe mistaken'. " Knowledge"of our opinions 
and'affections is not accepted upon rational grounds, but on 
groünds`. of necessity. It is aýnecessary presupposition which 
all men make when they consider what to do. Being is taken 
"upon trust". Given this, Shaftesbury tells us that we can 
become both moral and happy by making a choice between good and 
bad opinion and desire. These choices are certain and in making 
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them we become virtuous. The uncertainty of our knowledge of 
the external world is irrelevant. Firstly, because we refuse 
to allow the external world to be relevant to our satisfaction. 
Secondly, because virtue, the choice of beliefs and affections 
in the certain knowledge that they are moral, lies in the 
intention rather than. the consequences of our actions. * It 
lies in correct opinion concerning what is to be loved or hated, 
not in the success we have in performing moral actions: 
For if we will suppose 
'a 
man who, being sound and entire 
both in his reason and affection, -has. nevertheless 
so depraved a constitution or frame of body that the 
natural objects are, through. his organs of sense, as 
through ill glasses,. falsely conveyed. and misrepresented, 
'twill be soon observed, in such a person's case, 
that since. his failure is not in his principal or 
leading part, he cannot in himself be esteemed in- 
iquitous or unjust. 33 
I Whether our knowledge of, the. external world is correct or not, 
we-canýstill achieve moral certainty through our ability to 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
* "For wrong is not such action as is barely the cause of 
harm (since at this rate a dutiful son aiming at an enemy, 
but by mistake or ill chance happening to kill his father, 
would do awrong), but when anything is done through 
insufficient or unequal affection (as when a son shows no 
concern for the safety, of a father; or, where there is 
need of succour, prefers an indifferent person to him) 
this is of the nature of wrong. " Characteristics, I, 253. 
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distinguish between good or bad intention within ourselves. 
- III - 
A modern critic of Shaftesbury's philosophy has stated 
that "Shaftesbury's lack of interest in the technical issues 
of epistemology .... is to be explained in part by a streng 
strain of skepticism, " and that "the problem that primarily con- 
cerns him is not the reality but the nature of the self. "34 
Similarly, Sidgwick wrote that, "The appearance of Shaftesbury's 
Characteristics marks a turning point in. the history of English 
ethical thought. .... the consideration of. abstract rational 
principles falls into the background, and its place is taken 
by an introspective study of the human mind .... "35 Shaftesbury's 
reason for taking this approach lies in his recognition of a 
practical (or. moral) reasoning as characteristic to the thinking 
processes of`all men: 
It will be acknowledged that a creature such as man, 
who from several degrees of. reflection has risen to that capacity which we call reason and understanding, 
must in the very use of this his reasoning faculty be forced to receive reflections back into his mind of 
'what passes in itself, as well as in the affections 
or will; in short, of whatsoever relates to his 
" character, , conduct, or behaviour amidst his fellow- creatures in society *36 
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When men do this, the self (the mind and its contents) is 
presupposed; this being a_necessary presupposition which is 
either consciously or unconsciously made by us all: "So far 
are we from being able to be sure when we have a mind [or 
knowledge]; that indeed we can never be thoroughly sure, but 
then only when we can't help it, and find of necessity we must 
be so, whether we will or not. " 
37 Upon the basis of the 
necessary presupposition that we have an identity, Shaftesbury 
attempted to outline. an introspective moral method by means 
of which we can become both virtuous and happy. 
By pointing to the necessary acceptance of the self as a 
basis for formulating_a theory of moral certainty, Shaftesbury 
thought that he had. met the epistemological arguments of 
scepticism. 
'Tis therefore to satisfy such rigid inquirers as 
these [Pyr. rhonists], that we have been necessitated to 
proceed by the inward way; and .... have built only 
on such foundations as are taken from our very percep- 
tions, fancies, appearances, affections and opinions 
themselves, without regard to anything of an exterior 
world, and even on the supposition that there is no 
. such world in being. 38. 
However, this having been done, Shaftesbury leaves us in no 
doubt that there is more to his moral enquiries than the intro- 
spective moral theory outlined in. Section II above. He 
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.. regards his. defence of morality against sceptical arguments 
to have been a "dry task", and considers it easier perhaps 
"to make brick without straw .... than to prove morals with- 
out a world. " In fact, it is ridiculous to think about 
morality, about how we ought to act, without considering the 
environment within which our actions take place. Just as men 
necessarily accept the reality of the mind and its contents 
when they think about'how to act, they also accept. the reality 
of their environment; and Shaftesbury is prepared to do the 
same°: "We are henceforwärd to trust our eyes and take for 
real the whole creation, and the fair forms which lie before 
us. "39 When he does this, Shaftesbury opens to himself a 
whole new field for moral enquiry. 
If we accept the external world (Nature), then it is 
possible, Shaftesbury tells us,, to "inquire what is truly 
natural to each creature. ". For, "To deny there is anything 
properly natural (after the concessions already made) would be 
undoubtedly very preposterous and absurd. "4° Each species of 
animal may therefore be seen'to have a certain "inward dis- 
position" which directs it towards certain forms of activity 
which are natural to it. This "inward disposition" is the 
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presence of certain affections or desires which direct the 
creature towards its natural ends. These ends. are, according 
to Shaftesbury, 'social ends. When a person acts socially he is 
acting naturally:. 
The. social or natural affections, which our author 
considers as essential to the health, wholeness, or 
integrity of the particular creature, are such as 
contribute to the welfare and. prosperity of that 
whole or species, to which he is by Nature joined. 
All the affections of this-kind our author comprehends 
in that single name. of natural. 41 
When a creature acts naturally, it is acting according to the 
precepts of reason. For there. is a rational purpose which 
exists within and controls the whole of Nature: "..... the nature 
of the universe is. intelligent, and therefore there is a 
universal intelligent and provident-principle. "42Being controlled 
by. reason, "all it. [Nature] produces is to its own advantage 
and good, the good of all in general; and what is for the 
good of all in general is just and good. "43* Man, because he 
possesses' reason, can also be moral. He can, as we saw in the 
last section, distinguish between moral and non-moral affections. 
* See below, Chapters Two, Three and Four, for a discussion of 
the reasons why Shaftesbury accepted this interpretation of 
Nature, and for, an analysis. of the implications of this belief. 
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However, moral desires or affections can now be termed natural 
affections. Man can also look beyond himself to the external 
world, and attempt to discover there the rational purposes of 
nature. By studying the external world it is possible to see 
that man's nature is to be a social being, and to conclude from 
this that, "If the affection be equal, sound, and good, and the 
subject of the affection such as may with advantage to society 
be ever in the same manner prosecuted or affected, this must 
necessarily constitute what we call equity and right in any 
action. "44 Affections are good when they pursue the "advantage 
of society" because this is what Nature intended for man. Man 
can appreciate this when he accepts the evidence of the senses 
and studies what is natural to the human species. 
We can now see that as well as moralising independently of 
externals (Sect. II) Shaftesbury also claims that it is possible 
to discover our purpose in. the external world by studying the 
human species. Consequently, it is possible to contrast in 
Shaftesbury an introspective orientation with one that con- 
centrates upon. externals. It might be argued that the two are 
brought together within Shaftesbury's use. of "reason". Reason, 
being `a product of the general mind, can recognise the moral 
(natural) affections in two ways: 
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1)- by introspection reason--"sees" the moral affections. 
As far as we can tell, when Shaftesbury refers to 
reason in this context, its truths are self-evident. 
and 
2) by the study of externals. Reason can recognise 
(self-evidently it, seems) that the moral end of man 
lies in pursuing the good'of the species. From this, 
we can logically, derive that the natural affections 
are those which pursue this end. 
However, Shaftesbury. is by no means consistent in this. In 
discussing . the concept of "reason"-as it is found in Shaftesbury 
in Section I above, mention was made in a , footnote that 
Shaftesbury's means of distinguishing the truth is sometimes 
based upon a non-rational "sense". It is this important contrast 
between the "rational" and "non-rational" elements in Shaftesbury's 
thought which will be discussed in the next section. 
- IV - 
Sir Leslie. Stephen wrote that Shaftesbury's philosophy is 
based upon an appeal to "common sense". English sobriety and 
the Englishman's fear of making a fool of. himself, has checked 
the nation's philosophical ambition - this was Stephen's opinion. 
As a consequence of. this, 
.... in England, attempts at a _priori 
philosophy have 
taken the form of an appeal to common sense. We 
cannot be exposed to ridicule when we are ostensibly 
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endeavouring to confirm everybody's opinion .... This thoroughly English conviction, which thus tries 
to convert the vox opuli into the vox Dei, seems 
to have been first made popular in the eg teenth 
century by Shaftesbury. 45 
According to Stephen, Shaftesbury was writing for an audience 
whom he hoped would appreciate his ideas because they could 
be confirmed by the readers' experience. This is undoubtedly 
true. Within this context his acceptance of both his identity 
and the reality of the external world as appreciated through 
the senses (despite the rational arguments of speptical epis- 
temology) might be said to be based upon common sense. How- 
ever, the vox populi is not for Shaftesbury a basis of moral 
truth, if mere popular assent is all that it refers to. This 
can be seen if we look at the following statement from his 
Sensus Communis: 
If by the word sense we were to understand opinion 
and judgement, and by the word common the generality 
or any considerable part of mankind, 'twould be hard 
.... to discover where the subject of common sense 
could lie. For that which was according to the 
sense of one part of mankind, was against the sense 
of another. And if the majority were to determine 
common sense, it would change as often as men 
changed. That which was according to common sense 
to-day, would be contrary to-morrow, or soon after. 46 
If we accept this definition of common sense (i. e. as the 
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majority opinion or. vox populi),, then it. can not be taken as 
a foundation. of moral truth - unless truth in the moral sphere 
can mean different., things. from. one day to, the next. For 
Shaftesbury, moral truth is something which has permanent 
validity. Consequently, when. Shaftesbury says that a person 
who is "good and honest" is acting according to "common 
sense"47, the term is not being used as the equivalent of 
majority opinion. 
Common'sense is, taken by Shaftesbury'to be a "sense of 
public weal, and ; of the-common interest; ""Ilove of the community 
or society, natural affection, humanity, obligingness, or that 
sort of civility which rises from a just sense of the common 
rights of mankind, and the natural equality there is among 
those of the same species. "48 Common sense. is, `therefore, an 
emotional attraction towards the`"common interest. '. It can 
function as a moral instrument because it is able to recognise 
those affections which direct us towards this common interest. 
As such it may also be described as the moral sense*, 
-------- ------------------------------------------------------ 
* Although'Shaftesbury did not'use 'either of these terms (common 
sense or moral sense) more than a'few times in the whole of 
his writings as his editor Robertson points out,, the ex- 
pression, moral sense, "appears to have been first introduced 
into ethics by Shaftesbury, "(Characteristics, I, 262, footnote); 
and Shaftesbury's disciple, Hutc eso ,, made the idea of a moral sense central to his own ethical writings. 
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providing us with°an attraction towards the moral°opinions 
and affections, and aversion towards the non-moral. * It is 
not rational, =butýemotional (distinguishing between good and 
evil by attraction or; aversion). That it is possessed by all 
men, is-not a rational faculty, and provides us witha means 
ofdistinguishing between the moral-and. non-moral, is evident 
from the following statement: 
.... a common'honest man, whilst left to himself, and. undisturbed, by philosophy and subtle reasonings, 
about his interest, gives, no other answer to the 
thought of villainy than that he cannot possibly 
find in his heart to set about it, or conquer the 
natural aversion he has to it. . 
And this is natural 
and just. 49 
This is Shaftesbury's description of the moral or common sense 
in action; and it is this "sense" which often appears to 
replace reason when Shaftesbury uses the introspective method 
discussed in Section II above - termed by him, "soliloquy", 
or discussion with oneself. Therefore, it is not necessarily 
reason which distinguishes between right and wrong opinion, 
-------------------------------------- ------- --------------- 
* ". That which being present can never leave the mind at 
rest, but must of necessity cause aversion, is its ill. " 
Characteristics, II, 276. 
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but may be an innate* attraction towards that which is moral. 
Consequently, we must conclude that Shaftesbury does not take 
a consistent approach when attempting to justify the possi- 
bility of introspective. moral choices. 
When Shaftesbury approaches the problem of making moral 
choices in an emotional manner, he has a tendency to use 
aesthetic concepts in an attempt to explain how the moral 
sense functions. We-are-told that we can distinguish between 
the moral and the immoral because of. the beauty and harmony 
which are evident in moral opinions and affections. This aspect 
of Shaftesbury's thought will be discussed in Chapter Five below. 
However, at this point it is possible to say that Shaftesbury Is 
use of aesthetic concepts in a theory of morals does not relate 
to the use of reason. 'Appreciation of beauty is a non-rational 
means of distinguishing between moral and non-moral. Because 
of this, there is a tension in Shaftesbury. 's philosophy 
between the claims of the. rational and the claims of the non- 
---------------------------------------- ------ 
*I use the term "innate" at this point because Shaftesbury 
gives. no explanation concerning the source of. the moral 
sense. In Chapter Five we shall see that Shaftesbury did 
think of our attraction towards morality as innate, although 
he preferred the term, "connatural". 
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rational, and. it is possible to conclude that in Shaftesbury's 
writings we find not one, but two theories of morality. The 
first claims to be rational. Reason can distinguish between 
right and. wrong opinion even without reference to the material 
world. Also, if we refer to the external world, reason can 
distinguish between natural and unnatural actions. The second 
is a non-rational theory which refers to what may be called 
,Y 
common sense, or moral sense,. or aesthetic sense. (The last 
of these terms was never used by Shaftesbury himself, but 
conveys his meaning well). The moral sense distinguishes 
between good and bad affections because we have an attraction 
to the beautiful (i. e. the moral) and an aversion to the ugly 
(i. e. the immoral). In the external world the moral sense 
distinguishes between beautiful and ugly 'actions. The 
difficulty` with Shaftesbury, is that he himself does not make a 
distinction between rational and. non-rational approaches. He 
frequently, alternates between the two without, warning the 
reader, and the rational and. the non-rational become irre- 
trievably intermixed. We can suggest two possible reasons for 
this. Firstly, Shaftesbury was possessed with a desire to make 
his writings acceptable to his readers. ' For this reason he 
attempts to avoid being either systematic"or dogmatic, derides 
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the idea of a philosophical.. "system"*,. and tries to avoid a 
strict method (See Chapter Six). **. In this manner-he, hoped-, 
to take moral enquiry out of the philosopher's study and into 
the gentleman's drawing room. Secondly, Shaftesbury's writings 
may be regarded as a prolonged attack upon that form of philo- 
sophy which saw in egoism the; best explanation of human action. 
+ 
Consequently, he draws together as many arguments as possible 
in support of his. claim'that man fulfils his nature when he 
pursues social ends. -Thus, we notethat the moral. or, common"- 
sense is defined as that which directs mankind towards. theý 
social welfare. Therefore, actions directed. by the moral sense 
-------------- ----------- --------- ------ 
* "Men indeed may, in. a. serious way, be-so wrought on and 
confounded, by different modes of opinion', different systems 
and schemes imposed by authority that they. may wholly lose 
all notion or comprehension. of truth. " Characteristics, I, 
65. -. % 
** ".... if rational discourses (especially, those of deeper 
speculation) have lost their credit, and are in disgrace 
because of their formality; there is reason for more allow- 
ance in the way of humour and gaiety. An easier method of 
treating these subjects will make them-more agreeable and 
familiar., " Characteristics, ` I, 54. 
+ That Shaftesbury does not entirely escape from, this orienta- 
tion can be seen from the fact that he associates morality 
with the pursuit of happiness. In Section. II of. 'the present 
Chapter we saw that Shaftesbury presents morality as the means 
of achieving personal happiness. In Chapter Four it will be 
seen that Shaftesbury refers to happiness as a basis for 
moral obligation. 
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pursue the same ends as thosea, which are recommended by his 
rational theory. The difficulty in understanding. Shaftesbury 
is that he refers to both without distinction. - 
- V- 
In addition. to condemning Shaftesbury for his lack of 
consistency in appealing to rational and non-rational principles 
of morality, it is also possible to claim that, despite his 
proclaimed intention to question all things, he is a dogmatic 
thinker. In-the first place, he. disregards epistemological 
problems rather than solving them; and dogmatically states 
that-we-are to'accept'both personal identity and externals. 
Secondly, the'moralýsense (which'is itself non-rational) does 
not äppear'to have any'justification. other than the fact that 
Shaftesbury asserts': that it exists (although he no doubt expects 
us to confirm its ; existence by discovering it within ourselves). 
Thirdly, he develops-: an intricate metaphysics concerning the 
harmony of the cosmos even-though he rejects philosophical 
"sys tems hl _*., a: 
* In Chapter Two -the theolo§ical basis of Shaftesbury's cosmo- logical theories, will be'discussed in the context of hisýrela- 
l"tionshipr. to the Cambridge'Platonists. ` In Chapter Three the 
"rational" aspects of.. -the perfectly organised cosmos are 
analysed. 
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Shaftesbury himself recognised these difficulties, but 
accepted them'rather than attempt'toýresolve them. In the 
Miscellaneous Reflectionsýwe find Shaftesbury criticising him- 
self in the following manner: 
Notwithstanding the high airs of scepticism which 
our author assumes in. the first piece [A Letter 
Concerning Enthusiasm], I cannot, after-57; but 
imagine that even t ere. he. proves"himself. at..., the. bottom 
a real dogmatist, and shows plainly that he has his 
private opinion, belief,. or faith, as strong as any 
devotee or religionist of them all. Though he 
affects perhaps. to strike-at other hypotheses and 
schemes, he has something of his own still in 
reserve, and holds a certain plan. or system peculiar 
to himself, or such at least in which he has at 
present. but few companions or followers-50 
However, in spite of his recognition-of dogmatism in his own 
theories, Shaftesbury felt himself justified because he was 
keeping his assumptions down-to a necessary minimum: ".... and 
though I'may hold some principles perhaps tenaciously, they 
are', -'however', -, so, very, few, plain, and ` simple' that they serve to 
little'purpose towards the great speculations in fashion in the 
world: "51 Shaftesbury is saying that he. is dogmatic, but not 
as dogmatic as most-philosophers. For'the few, plain, and simple 
principles that he accepts are only those which are necessary 
to the formation of a moral outlook -a task undertaken by all 
men. They are the assumptions of practical reason - assumptions 
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which must be. made before. we can think about how we ought to 
act. These may be listed as follows: 
1) 
. acceptance of the self 
(identity). 
2) acceptance of the external world-as appreciated 
through. the senses. 
3) the assumption that we have within us a means of 
distinguishing between the moral and the, non-moral. 
The third of these. assumptions has both rational and non-rational 
aspects in. Shaftesbury's thought, for which reason it is'possible 
to divide. his philosophy into two parts. Common to both these 
orientations is the dual approach-, towards discovering grounds 
for moral. action: 
1") examination of internal ideas and desires (opinions 
and affections). 
2) examinätion. of the external. world', conceived as an 
organised whole. 
It is possible to consider these as, two separate approaches to 
morality. ' Why are they found together in Shaftesbury's. philo- 
sophy?. Who were Shaftesbury's intellectual mentors? In an 
attempt to answer ` these questions, the next chapter will 
consider Shaftesbury as'a product'of post-Renaissance Platonic 
thought. 
----o00ä0--- 
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SUMMARY: 
Beginning with Shaftesbury's "unquestioning faith in reason" 
(Grean) the present chapter has tried to discover how Shaftesbury 
attempted to obtain certain knowledge of moral truth. Convinced 
that many of our ideas are unjustifiable, Shaftesbury advocated 
a constant questioning, criticism, and. doubt which by his own 
admission at times appears to lead him towards scepticism. 
However, Shaftesbury was not prepared to accept the epistemo- 
logical conclusions of scepticism in so far as they, faill, to-, help 
men solve their moral problems. Thus, despite the fact that 
he can not find epistemological grounds for certain knowledge 
(for all is but memory, and memory may be false) Shaftesbury 
accepts as certain the thinking self. There is no epistemological 
justification. for this. But epistemology is not considered by 
Shaftesbury to be relevant. For all men accept the self when 
they consider how they are going to act. In this sphere of what 
I have termed practical reasoning, Shaftesbury thought that it 
was possible to discover how we ought to act. It is possible, 
he tells us, to distinguish between good and bad opinions and 
affections when we examine the sources of action inside our 
minds. By doing this, and choosing the good against the bad, 
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we become virtuous and happy. When we find morality in this 
way, knowledge. of, the external environment is irrelevant because, 
a) virtue is found in the right choice of opinion concerning 
what is moral, in the intention rather than the consequences 
of action; and b) our happiness is made to depend upon moral 
choice within, as a consequence of which externals are 
irrelevant. 
However,. just as the practical reasoner accepts the self, 
Shaftesbury informs us that he accepts the evidence of the 
senses concerning the external world. Shaftesbury does the 
same; and having accepted Nature looks to see what'is natural 
as a. basis for moral action. Shaftesbury's belief that the 
natural is the moral is based upon-his belief that the cosmos 
is a rationally organised whole, and that this rational whole 
is moral. To pursue our end as parts of this whole is to be 
moral. 
Thus we have'a dual basis for morality, internal and 
external., The. ends of both approaches are the same - the 
common good of society. However, there are also "rational" 
and "non-rational" elements' in'Shaftesbury's thought. In his 
concept of the moral or common sense Shaftesbury introduces 
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into his thought a non-rational means of distinguishing between 
the moral and the non-moral. We are presented with a , second 
philosophy in Shaftesbury, and this stands in contrast to the 
one which is based upon reason. Although these two theories 
will be dealt with separately in the present work, it is 
recognised that Shaftesbury never clearly distinguished bet- 
ween the two in his own writings. 
Finally, the present chapter has pointed to the fact that 
Shaftesbury recognised that he was being dogmatic when he makes 
the assumptions upon which he formulates his theory of morality. 
But his dogmatism is only dogmatism when looked at from the 
standpoint of the epistemologist. However, as has been stressed, 
Shaftesbury was not interested in epistemology. He was not con- 
cerned with the question, "What is true, and how can we know it? ". 
For Shaftesbury, the question is, "How can we become virtuous? ". 
To answer this Shaftesbury looks at men as they decide how 
to act. He sees that. all men make certain conscious or 
unconscious assumptions in this practical activity. Personal 
identity, the external world, and the ability to distinguish 
between moral and non-moral, are seen by him to be assumptions 
that are made by all men as they reason practically about how 
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they ought to act. These assumptions are also made by 
Shaftesbury, who'uses them as a basis upon which to build 
his own moral theories. 
---00000--- 
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CHAPTER TWO °-,,; 11 1 
SHAFTESBURY AND'THE CAMBRIDGE'PLATONISTS, - : rte 
_I_. 
Platonism, which concentrates upon what may be discovered 
by means of introspection, produced the belief that Nature is 
necessarily a perfect whole. This occurred when the Christian 
intellect renewed its interest in Platonic writings during the 
fifteenth century and after. In the present chapter Shaftes- 
bury's writings will be considered in the light of this post- 
Renaissance Platonic tradition. 
However, we must begin by remembering that Platonism was 
not the first classical philosophy to capture the imagination 
of Christian writers after the Christian doctrine had been 
developed under the influence of Augustine. During the thir- 
teenth century an attempt was made by Aquinas to introduce the 
philosophy of Aristotle into the body of Christian thought. It 
is as a consequence of the writings of Aquinas that we find in 
the late medieval period two distinct attitudes concerning man's 
ability to distinguish moral rules of conduct by means of his 
reason. The first finds its source in the philosophy of 
Augustine, the second in the philosophy of Aquinas. We shall 
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see below that, in spite of Augustine's admiration of Plato's 
thought, when Platonism renewed its influence; in the fifteenth 
century (with the. rediscovery of Plato's own writings), the 
new Platonists arrived at ethical conclusions which agree more 
with Aquinas than with-the founding father of the Christian 
doctrine. 
In the writings of Augustine we find expressed the view 
that man's corruption by original sin renders him incapable of 
rationally appreciating moral rules of conduct. The. recommenda- 
tion is made that we voluntarily* accept both God. and his will 
as revealed in the Scriptures. This emphasis upon obedience to 
the will of God, and the refusal to accept reason as a guide to 
moral values, is-maintained in the late Middle Ages by the 
Nominalists. For men like Duns Scotus and William of Occam, 
the source of moral law is the will of God, existing only 
"because God so wills. "' 
* The term "voluntarism" is used in this chapter to describe 
the uncritical acceptance of religious and ethical beliefs 
upon the basis of faith alone. Because these beliefs are 
based upon faith, they are not open to rational criticism; 
for reason belongs. to a separate sphere of human activity. 
Upon faith'alone one voluntarily places oneself into un- 
questioning subjugation to the commands. of God. (See also 
next footnote. ) 
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In contrast to the "voluntarist" ethics of the Nominalists, 
Aquinas (under the influence of "the philosopher") introduces 
into his philosophy-the "fundamental intellectualism of Greek 
thought. "* Human reason is seen by, him to be the means where- 
by man can appreciate "natural law" (which. is that part of God's 
"eternal law" that can be appreciated by human reason). God 
is regarded as supremely rational,. as a consequence of which 
man can appreciate some of His wishes by means of his own 
reason: 
Now among all others, 'the rational creature is subject 
to Divine providence in the most excellent way, in 
so far as it partakes of a share'of providence .... Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal Reason, where- 
by it has a naturalr. inclination to its proper act 
and end: and this participation of.. the eternal law 
in the rational creature is called: the natural law. 2 
According to this view moral law is brought within the scope of 
the human intellect. In the mind of, man there can be found 
------------------------------ ----------------- ------------ 
* "The ethical systems developed by-the-Greek thinkers, Socrates 
and Democritus, Plato and Aristotle, Stoics and Epicureans, 
have a common feature. They are all expressions of one and 
the same fundamental intellectualism of Greek thought. It is 
by. rational thought that we are to find the standards of 
moral conduct, and it is reason, and reason alone, that can 
give them their authority. In contrast with this Greek 
intellectualism prophetic religion is characterised by its 
deep and resolute voluntarism. God is a person - and that 
means a will.... It is from God himself, from the revelation 
of his will, not from dialectic, that man has to learn good 
and evil. " Cassirer,. The Myth of the State, 81/2. 
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the "general" principles" of'natural law which can be used as 
assumptions from'which we can deduce maxims concerning moral 
conduct. '* 
Although'ithas been claimed that by the fifteenth century 
"the monks and the ' Schoolmen had ceased tobe a vital intellec- 
tual force, "3 the debate between the "voluntarist" and the 
"intellectual" approaches to morality continued., The "notion 
of the moral law as. the expression of the divine will passed 
over from the Nominalists to the Reförmers - to`Wycliff, and 
later on to Luther and Calvin. "4 Also, the idea that "will" 
rather than "reason" is the source of`common standards finds a 
secular expression in the writings of Hobbes. Hobbes has been 
called "the nominalist of Occam's school, "5 insofar as "his 
conception of law is a Nominalist conception. "6 On the other 
* "The natural law is promulgated by the very fact that God 
instilled it into man's mind so as to be known by him "naturally. " Summa Theologica, I, '995 (II, i- Question 90, 
Art. 4): ",... as on the part of speculative reason .... so too, on the part of practical reason, man has a natural 
participation of the eternal law, according to certain 
general principles, but not as*regards the particular deter- 
minations of individual cases .... Hence the need for human reason to proceed further to sanction them by [human] law. 
Ibid., Is 998 (II, i- Question 91, Art. 3). 
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hand, in the persons of Hooker and Grotius we find a restate- 
ment of man'. s independent`ability"to-find rational moral 
truths in natural law:, "..,.. -the revival'of natural law which 
takes place towards'. "the turn'of-the sixteenth-and seventeenth 
centuries is essentially a rejection of`the 'Nominalist' or 
'voluntarist' theory ofýlaw. "l 
Writing at the; end of the seventeenth century, Shaftesbury 
can also be seen taking an, antitheticalposition to', the post- 
Renaissance Nominalism. However, his form of intellectualism 
finds its source in Platonism. From the-fifteenth century 
Platonism became-an. increasingly important intellectual force 
in Europe,: offering an alternative form of Greek °intellec-' 
tualism" for those thinkers who were opposed to Nominalism in 
either its theological or secular'forms. ° With the Cambridge 
men in England we find an attempt tolfree Protestant thought 
from the limitations of voluntarist ethics that can be com- 
pared with-the attempt maderby, Aquinas to qualify the volun- 
tarism involved in the teachings of Augustine. Like Aquinas 
the Platonists'pointed to what reason could discover within 
the self of the principles which a rational God has implanted 
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into human nature. * 
In spite of the difference between Plato and Aristotle, 
when the Christian mind came under their influence, each gave 
rise to aýsimilar interpretation of the nature, of the finite 
or-temporal world and, the role of man within it; This inter- 
pretation involvesa qualification (if not ,a rejection) of 
Augustine's doctrine, of original sin. According to Augustine, 
the-finite world, with man, is corrupted. Human reason, whilst 
in the civitas ter. rena, cannot hope to'discover anything of 
moral ' significance - unless it is by'negative example. In 
contrast to this, when Christian. thought. comes under the 
influence of either Plato or Aristotle, God. 's will comes to be 
regarded as a. necessarily rational will - to which man is 
related by his. own possession of reason-which allows him to 
appreciate moral truths'. Those thinkers who -take, this 
"intellectual" approach can not accept the 
nominalist claim 
* It could be suggested that in Shaftesbury's conception of 
the "connatural idea". we have an idea: that,, is similar to 
the "general principles" of Aquinas. This will be brought 
to the reader'sfattention in Chapter Five below. However, 
at the moment we are. concerned with the differences between 
voluntarism and intellectualism, not with similarities that 
might exist between Aquinas and Shaftesbury. 
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(made by. Occam). that, God might have, willed the opposite to what 
he did and-it would still be moral (See. also Sections II and 
III below). In addition to this, that*man is allowed to. reason 
his way towards an understanding of moral rules suggests that 
the temporal environment. is, not as deeply entrenched in. corrup- 
tion as Augustine claimed. It might even be suggested that 
the finite realm. is. not corrupt, but is governed by God's 
eternal (rational) law. We certainly find this suggestion in 
Aquinas (although. Aquinas rejects neither original sin nor the 
need for faith which is complementary to, and above, reason): 
..:: all things are'subject to divine providence, not 
only in general, but even in their own individual 
selves.... Hence, corruption and defects in natural 
things are said to be contrary to some particular 
nature; yet they are in'keeping with the plan of 
universal nature; inasmuch as the defect in one 
thing yields to the good of another, or even t-tothe 
universal good: .... Since God, then, provides uni- versally for all being;. it belongs-to His providence 
to permit certain defects in particular effects, that 
the perfect good of the universe may-not, be hindered, 
for if alley {l were prevented, much good would be 
absent from the universe-8 
This belief that God organises Nature according to his "rational" 
will, as a consequence of. which the cosmos evidences perfection 
rather than corruption, can also be found in the writings of 
the Platonists of the post-Renaissance period. Because of 
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this, Shaftesbury can attempt to interpret the, parts of Nature 
according to their purpose without contradicting the intro- 
spective morality 'advocated by the Platonists. In so doing 
Shaftesbury places himself in close affinity to the advocates 
of`a natural law theory of morality, a relationship perhaps 
best shown by his numerous references 'to the writings of the 
Stoics - in'whose philosophy it is possible tö'discover the 
origins of the ideas of natural law. 
9 It should be remembered, 
however, - that Shaftesbury never used the term "natural law" in 
his own writings. 
Finally, ' it should be noted that the adaptation of the 
ideas of Plato 'and Aristotle to Christian theology resulted in 
an emphasis upon the importance of the individual. Emphasis 
is placed upon ' the' individual firstly because, through the 
possession of-reason, each person is made responsible for the 
discovery of those ethical truths in accordance with which he 
should'cönduct his life. " Secondly, by emphasising the ration- 
ality of bath man and God, Christian intellectualism (even if 
the doctrine of original sin was not denied) encouraged the 
view that the individual could achieve salvation independently 
of the dogma-and organisation or a particular church. (This 
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might be said to be more true of Platonism than Aristotelianism 
to the extent that the latter had been adapted to Catholic 
doctrine under the influence. of the Thomists). The tendency 
towards doctrinal independence can be seen In the De Docta 
Ignorantia of Nicolas of Cusa. (c. 1400-1464). Nicolas never 
denied the doctrine of'original'sin,, but stressed at the same 
time'thät man should use his reason in his search for an appre- 
ciatiön of God., `His-reason for this is as follows`: Concerning 
the relationship between God'and main he tells us that`"there'is 
no'gräduation from infinite [God] to finite [man]. "10 As a 
result, we can never" Isüccessfülly comprehend God, for human 
logic and human`symbolism only have reference to the finite. 
Since no finite mind is capable of fully. comprehending the 
divine,. all`explanations of God. are inadequate. Consequently, 
there is no'reason why the individual'shöuld necessarily accept 
the teächings'of the'Chur'ch'"which is only part of the finite 
environment. Each person`must discover his own relationship 
with God through the use of his own faculties. It would be 
wrong to say that Cusanus drew out these conclusions himself. 
However, they are implicit to'the "intellectualism" that is 
found inýhis writings. As, Ernst Cassirer said: 
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Although Cusanus never doubted the doctrine of original 
sin, it seems to have lost"for him the power that it 
had exerted on the whole of medieval thought and on 
its sense of. life. The Pelagian spirit is awakening 
now, that spirit so bitterly fought by Augustine, 
whose polemics became the basis of medieval religious 
doctrine. Cusanus sharply emphasises the doctrine of 
man's freedom .... 11 
When we consider the Cambridge Platonists the spiritual 
independence of the rational Christian from the limitations of 
temporal religious institutions must also be recognised as 
characteristic of their thought. They were not dissenters, but 
they advocated toleration. Theirs was a personal brand of 
religion which stressed the rational. potential of man in both 
morals and religion. Combined with this. is the. belief, out- 
lined above, that Nature is structured in conformity with both 
the reason and the will of God. In the remainder of the chap- 
ter the discussion will be directed. towards an analysis of the 
doctrines of the Cambridgeamen in relation to their influence 
upon the ideas of Shaftesbury. 
- II - 
It is not within. the scope of this work to undertake a 
detailed analysis of the philosophy of the Cambridge Platonists, * 
------ -----------7---------------------------- --------------- 
* The leadin members of the school were Benjamin Whichcote (1609-1683), John Smith (1616-1652), Ralph Cudworth (1617-1685), 
Nathanael Culverwel (c. 1618-1651), and Henry More (1614-1687). 
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or the differences between the particular members of the school. 
However, they deserve a place in the 
are a major source of influence upon 
bury: "This much at least we can as 
that Shaftesbury was fundamentally a 
Indeed, Shaftesbury. 's first literary 
discussion because they 
the writings of Shaftes- 
sert without qualification, 
Cambridge Platonist. "12 
venture was to edit and 
provide the preface for. Whichcote's Select Sermons (1698), and 
throughout his own writings Shaftesbury remains always under 
the influence of the school of which Whichcote is regarded as 
the founder. In the judgement of Ernst°Cassirer, "It is 
principally Shaftesbury who saves the Cambridge School from 
the fate of learned curiosity and pnakes it a philosophic force 
in the centuries to come. 1113 What Shaftesbury preserved of 
the Cambridge Platonist's philosophy may be generally stated 
as: 
1). The Platonic belief that moral truth may be 
discovered by means of introspective analysis. 
2) . The acceptance of the cosmos: as a rationally organised whole (created. by God)^in which all 
the parts are directed towards their particular 
ends in accordance, with. the universal design. 
To be moral, we must discover our natural ends, 
and pursue them. 
Whether he is talking as a rationalist or not, Shaftesbury 
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maintains this dual'approach to moral` questions which is found 
in the Cambridge School. The present section will consider the 
first of these,, the next section the latter. 
In-the words of Pawson, "In England the study of Greek 
humanism had'arrived just in time'to give the Reformation a 
surer basis than the matrimonial'caprices of Henry VIII. "14 
According to'W. R. Inge, Platonism provided a theoretical basis 
for that. independentýattitude of mind which rejected the pre- 
suppositions, 
1) that Christ wished to found a hierarchical 
corporation, with, a divinely guaranteed monopoly 
of certain spiritual benefits. 
2) that this corporation was intended-to be a 
universal Caesarean empire embracing the whole 
world. 15 
In opposition to this the sanctity. of individual reason is 
pronounced. 'Man is to be allowed to search for spiritual 
satisfaction of, his own accord, by means of his reason, not the 
acceptance of the., dogma of a particular school or sect. In the 
sixteenth century this intellectual independence is posited 
against papal dogma. However, the new vitality is above all 
dogma. English. Platonism as. it developed in the Cambridge 
School during'the seventeenth century was aloof from the 
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sectarian disputes of that. period. The Platonists "did not 
form a party., but a school of thought and a rule of life. Its 
adherents kindled no fires at Smithfield, and were seldom sent 
ýý16* to suffer upon them. 
The rational potential ascribed to the individual, which 
allows him to discover moral. truth within himself,, is summed 
up in the following words of Benjamin Whichcote: 
By Mind, and Undertaking, `andWill, he, [i. e. the individual] 
-kath intercourse and communion with God, and things 
invisible; and by these he-is fitted to improving all 
the lower Objects to Heavenly Ends and-Purposes. .... by Sense; Imagination and brutish Affection, we can 
only maintain Acquaintance with this outward and lower 
World. By. this Principle of Reason and Understanding,.. 
we are made capable of Religion. So that Man's pecu- 
-. liar Object and proper Business, is in things of the, Mind; and therefore he ought. to use those high 
Faculties. of his Soul,: to enquire after God, and find 
out Truth, and the Reason of Things; and consequently 
* The Cambridge Platonists ".... felt that the life of the 
spirit was perishing; in the spent air, of polemic. Their 
aim was not to destroy,, but to conserve and reinforce from '.. within what they felt to be vital in the religious tradition.... 
They ...., illustrate .... the tendency öf. advanced Protestant thought, after passing through itst dogmatic, 
post-Reformation phase, to reveal once again its rationalizing 
temper, and to. fall'thus into line with the general movement 
of the century. " Basil-Willey, The Seventeenth-Century 
, Background, 123/25. 
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after such enquiry, 'to determine , himself -in this 
Resolution and Choice, to Things according to their 
intrinsick worth and value. 17 
And John Smith, in his Discourse Concerning the Existence and 
Nature of God writes similarly, 
.... He which reflects upon himself, reflects upon his own rigina , and finds the clearest Impression of some Eternall Nature and Perfect Being stamp'd upon 
Irrhis Soul., And therefore Plato seems sometimes to 
reprove the ruder sort of men in his times for their 
contrivance of Pictures and Images to put themselves' 
in mind of the .... Angelicall. Beings, and exhorts --them to-look into their own souls, which are the 
fairest Images. not onely of the Lower divine Natures, 
'but- of the -Deity it self 
From these two statements we see'-that the frame of mind of the 
Cambridge Platonists is a continuation of Platonic intellec- 
tualism. By means of an isolation of-the spirit from matter, 
man is to'use his-reason introspectively in order to find 
truth within the self. Whichcote teils us that man's proper 
business is in things of the mind. We must reflect upon our 
own souls says Smith. For the human soul, when left to itself, 
will always exhibit rational activity, * which-is to pursue 
knowledge of both morality and God: We alwaies find a restless 
* See Phaedo 66C, 67Ä, 83,94E.: Republic X. 611; Cratylus 403E; 
Politi- cus 272E; Timaeus 42AB, 86,88AB. 
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appetite within our. selves which craves for some Supreme and 
Chief Good, -and will not be satisfied with anything less than 
Infinity it self. "19 
In a similar manner, Shaftesbury writes that his concern 
is with "truth, reason, and right within self.; and how to 
maintain this. "20 By thus concentr. ating. upon the inner self 
we will be able to 'discover, moral truth. We will be able to 
"solve the phenomena In a true sense: not the phenomena of the 
skies or meteors:, not those in, mathematics, mechanics, physics; 
not those which, by solving or unfolding ever so skilfully, one 
, is neither better, nor happier, nor, wiser, nor more ar man of 
sense or worth, ... '. "21 Thus, to 
discover how to act morally, 
one must "Learn to be with self, to talk. with'self. Commune 
with thy own heart; be-that thy . companion. 
"22 Introspection 
will allow the individual to discover that. "sense of right and 
wrong" which "being a first principle in our constitution and 
make, there is. no. speculative, opinion, persuasion, or belief, 
which is capable . immediately or 
directly to exclude or destroy 
it. "23 The essence of human kind - whether it be considered as 
mind, heart, or soul, or any combination of, these - has within 
it the ability to recognise within itself standards by means of 
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which we can gauge the conduct of our lives. 
In order to. justify the discovery of truth within the 
self, the Cambridge Platonists revived the Platonic doctrine, 
of anamnesis. Advocating the use of reason upon the divine 
part within the self -, the soul - the Cambridge Platonists tell 
us that we, may, see the reflection of. God and-discover his moral 
(and rational) laws. This is. their basis for rejecting the 
ethical theories of. Hobbes, * against which ".... Whichcote, 
Smith, More, -and, Cudworth all take up the same line of defence - 
the belief that there are 'innate ideas'** of right and wrong, 
primary and. ineradicable. " God has imprinted certain truths 24 
upon our souls-which, our reason is capable of discovering. 
Divine, reason discovers the-divine law within. At times the 
Cambridge men even suggest that man is capable of attaining 
comprehension of God himself. Smith stated that the soul is 
capable of flying upwards'"till it be'beyond all orbe of 
Finite Being, swallowed. up'in the boundless Abysss of Divinity. "25 
(Smith). This, however, is not general. The reason of man is 
* For Shaftesbury', s antipathy towards the ideas of Hobbes see 
also Section III of. this. Chapter and. Chapter Three below. 
** I will have more to say about the place of "innate ideas" in Shaftesbury's philosophy in Chapter Five below. 
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merely the "candle of the Lord", too weak to enable the 
individual to'transcend his own consciousness and comprehend 
God. Man is only finite and, as such, can never fully compre- 
hend the infinite. The reflected light of reason is unable to 
shine as strongly as its source, which is God, and is therefore 
unable to appreciate God in his entirety. Even so, by accept- 
ing as much as they did in relation to the power of reason, the 
Cambridge men become exponents of-the intellectual autonomy of 
the individual in spiritual and moral affairs. 
The principles of the Platonic-doctrine, of anamnesis are 
also applied by Shaftesbury, and he even goes so far as to- 
compare the teacher`of'moral philosophy.. with a midwife. In 
The Moralists Shaftesbury says (through the mouth-of Theocles), 
You do well .... to give me ' theImidwife's part only; for the mind conceiving of itself, can only be, as 
you say, assisted, in the birth. Its pregnancy is 
from its-nature. Nor could. i t. ever, have been thus 
impregnated, by any other mind than that which formed 
it. at, the beginning ...; 26 
(Compare with the Theäetetus 
150 CD). 
Knowledge of morality exists within man as a potential which 
can. be brought to. light by introspection. By studying the 
contents of our minds we will be able to discern the principles 
of good and'evil. Actions will be made according to knowledge 
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which is found within the self, and which is independent of 
all other considerations'. 
This expression of confidence in the ability of the 
rational individual to discover moral truth implies for both 
Shaftesbury and the Cambridge men a rejection of "command" in 
relation to moral activity. We are not moral just by doing as 
we are told - even if it is God, who is doing the telling. 
According°to Shaftesbury,, any man who "cannot reflect on what 
he himself does, or sees others do, so as to take notice of 
what is worthy or honest .... has'not the character of 
being 
virtuous. "27 The onus is on the individual to recognise "what 
is good or ill in, the-species or society. For of the reality 
of such a goodfand, ill, 'no rational creature can possibly be 
insensible. "28 It is not God's command which makes something 
good, but its moral character. In this the Cambridge Platonists 
are in full agreement., Ralph Cudworth had written, 
For wisdom in it self hath the nature of a rule and 
measure, it being a most determinate and inflexible 
thing; .... to make wisdom, knowledge and truth, to be arbitrarily determined by°°will, and to be 
regulated by such a plumbean and flexible rule as that is, is quite to destroy the nature of It. " 29* 
* The quotation here is taken from Cudworth's Treatise 
(Continue overleaf) 
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Reason is inflexible and must always operate in the same way. 
Therefore, if morality is rational (which is what the Cambridge 
Platonists assume), it must be unchanging and not dependent 
upon the fickle movements of a will: ".... the natures of' 
justice and injustice cannot be arbitrarious things, that may 
be applicable by will indifferently to any actions or dis- 
positions whatsoever. 1130 . (Cudworth). Morality 
is not based 
upon the will and command of God, but upon rationality. God's 
law is moral because God always acts rationally. Shaftesbury 
writes that, "If theYmere will, decree, or law of God be said 
absolutely to constitute right and wrong, then are these latter 
words of no significancy at all. "31 Virtue is not to be found 
in obedience to commands of the "supreme will", but in com- 
prehension and acceptance of moral truth. In The Moralists 
Shaftesbury refers to his Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit 
and says that in the latter work he was trying to show 
(Continued from previous page) 
Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, written before 
1688, but only published in 1731, eighteen years after 
Shaftesbury's death. However, as representative of the 
stream of Cambridge'thought,. I think that reference to this 
work is legitimate in the present context. 
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.... that it [i. e. virtue] is. really something. in itself, and in the nature of things; not arbitrary or 
factitious (if I may so speak); not constituted 
from without, or dependent on custom, fancy, or will; 
not even on the supreme will itself, which can no 
way govern it; but being necessarily good, is 
governed by it and ever uniform with it. 32 
Even the Almighty*is governed'by moral law; and for the 
individual living within the finite realm, the existence of a 
rational, ethics would appear to have more significance than 
the existence of God. Moral insight is even seen to be 
available to those who do not recognise the existence of God. 
Any creature with, a "reflecting faculty" is capable of achiev- 
ing moral knowledge and virtue. * However, it should be noted 
that, as with the Cambridge Platonists, religion and morality 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
* "That it is possible for a creature capable of. using. reflec- 
tion to have a liking or dislike of moral actions, and con- 
sequently a sense of right and wrong, before such time as he 
may have any settled notion of ,a God, 
is what will hardly be 
questioned; it being a, thing not expected, or any way possible, 
that a creature such'as man, arising from his childhood slowly 
and gradually to several degrees of reason and reflection, 
should at the very first be taken up with those speculations 
or more refined sort of reflections, about the subject of 
God's existence. 
.... Before the time, therefore, that a creature can have 
any plain or positive notion one way or other concerning the 
subject of a God, he. may be supposed to have an apprehension 
or sense of right and wrong, and be possessed of virtue and 
vice in different degrees ... Characteristics I, 266. 
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tend to be two sides of the same coin for Shaftesbury. * 
4 We do not become. virtuous by obeying the, commands of God. 
Virtue depends upon our distinguishing between the, moral and,. 
non-moral ideas we have. within by means of our reason - (for 
Shaftesbury, as we saw-in the last chapter, the moral method 
is sometimes non-rational). - Also, just aswe , 
do not, act morally 
in obedience to God, we'do, not act morally-through fear of Him. 
Shaftesbury writes in-his "Preface" to the 1698 edition of. 
Whichcote's sermons: 
.... it is strange'to conceive, how Men'who pretend 
a Notion and Belief. of a, Su ream Power acting with 
the greatest Goodness, an wit out any Inducement 
but that*of Love and Good-will;, would think it un- 
suitable to a Rational Creature, derived from Him, 
to act after,. His example; and to. find Pleasure and 
Contentment in Works of Goodness and Bounty, without 
other Prospect. _. 
But, what is, yet more unaccountable, 
is, that Men who 'profess aReligion where Love is 
. chiefly enjoin'd ..... should combine, 
to'degrade the 
principle of Good-nature, and'refer all to Reward; 
which being made the only motive in Men's Actions, 
must exclude all worthy and generous Disposition--, -33 
RT 
* "But this is certain, that it can be no great strengthen- 
ing to the moral affection,, no great support to the pure 
love of. goodness and virtue, to suppose there is neither 
goodness nor beauty., in the Whole itself;. nor any. example 
or precedent of good affection-in any superior Being. " 
Characteristics I, 276.. 
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Hope of reward, or fear of punishment, distributed by the 
divine hand of God either before or after death, are not for 
Shaftesbury the source of virtuous action. * Virtue is depend- 
ent upon'recognising, the good within ourselves and acting upon 
it without hope, of reward. 
By postulating a-relationship through reason between God 
I 
and man the Cambridge Platonists'allowed personal "intercourse 
and communion with God. " However, they did not use this as a 
basis for a mystical rejection of the material world. They 
believed that knowledge of. moral truth, which can be discovered 
within, went hand in hand-with-moral action. Hence, when 
Whichcote and his followers advocate-the use of reason in an 
attempt to appreciate. God, "it is'so that man may "determine him- 
self in his Resolution and Choice, to Things according to their 
intrinsick worth'and value, " by. means of which "he is fitted to 
improving all the lower Objects to Heavenly Ends and Purposes. " 
(Whichcote - quoted above). The'Cambridge Platonists do not 
--------------------- --------------- ------------------------- 
* '"There is no more rectitude, piety, or sanctity in a 
creature thus reformed', than-there is meekness or gentleness 
in a tiger strongly chained, or innocence and sobriety in 
a monkey under discipline of the whip. " Characteristics Is 
267. 
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recommend that contemplative indifference to the material-world 
which overtook Aquinas towards, the end of his'life. Reason, 
which-is "the Divine Governor of Man's. Life;.. '... the very 
Voice of, God, "34T(Whichcote) enables us to discover practical 
moral rules within ourselves: 'Tobe religious means that'we 
live , our lives according to the moral truths-which we find 
within. "Religion, " writes-Whichcote, ".... is not a Notion; 
but the Frame and Temper of our Minds, and the Rule of our 
Lives. "35 The Cambridge men'. turn their attention away from 
heavenly things towards the world of men, and define religion 
as the pursuit of, those activities which are defined as moral 
by the divine part, reason, within us. Also, moral knowledge 
that reason discovers is seen to necessitate moral action in 
the'Socratic sense. *ý '' - 
That'Shäftesbury was.: concerned with practical knowledge 
which will help'usto conduct our lives along moral lines was 
---------------------- ------------- ------------ 
* "For'us, "being able to 'define' 'courage' or 'justice' is not 
even essentially connected with 
_býein9 
courageous or just, so 
that-intellectual clearness would bring men necessarily to 
the practice of virtue. For Socrates, however, these two 
things were essentially linked with . one another. " C. de 
Vogel, 
"Who Was Socrates? ", 
-Journal of 
the History of Philosophy_ (1963), 147. 
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outlined in Chapter One of. this work. . In so far as Shaftesbury 
is a theological writer; he also emphasises this point and insists 
that religion must be concerned with man's discovery, and the 
putting into practice, of. moral truth. In the "Preface" to 
Whichcote. 's sermons (1698) Shaftesbury discusses-the relationship 
between the moral, character of. man ("Good-nature"). and religion. 
These, he says,, can never be-opposed: 
Asýif Good-nature-; -and-Religion, were Enemies: - Thing, indeed, so unthought of, amongst the Heathens; 
that PIETY (which was their best Word to signs ie 
Religion) had more than half its Sence,. in Natural 
and Good Affection; and stood not only, for the 
Adoration and Worship of God; but for the Natural 
Affections of Parents, to`their Children, 'and of 
Children to. their Parents; of'Men to their Native 
Country; and, indeed, of all Men in their several 
Relations one to another. 36 
With Shaftesbury, , the natural affections are those which are 
distinguished by'reason, (or,. alternatively,. by the "moral sense") 
as moral. *. In this quotation he_is. saying that religion must 
not : deny, man, the possibility of discovering these affections 
within-himself. - Also, as with the Cambridge Platonists, 
---------------------------==------------------------------------ 
* More will be`said about,, Shaftesbury's categorisation of the 
affections in Chapter Three below. 
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Shaftesbury believed that the possibility of moral knowledge 
implied the necessity of a consequent moral action. Immoral 
action is seen to be the result of a lack of knowledge: ".... 
every immorality and enormity of life can only happen from a 
partial and narrow view of happiness and good. "37 For ".... 
worth and virtue depend on a knowledge of right and wrong, and 
on a use of reason, sufficient to'secure a right application of 
the affections. "38 Knowledge allows us to apply our affections 
and so act, in a moral way. 
Thus we see that Shaftesbury's ideas correspond closely to 
those of the Cambridge Platonists concerning the ability of man 
to find moral truth within, the moral independence (from God) 
which reason gives to man, and the belief that reason must be 
used to direct our actions towards moral ends in the temporal 
environment. In the next section we will look at, the belief 
that the temporal world is rationally organised, and that when 
we behave morally we'are contributing to that rational 
organisation. 
- III - 
According to the acknowledged founder of the Cambridge 
school, morality does not depend upon the will of God: "The 
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Laws of God are not Impositions of Will or Power and Pleasure; 
but the Resolutions of Truth, Reason and. Justice. '. '39 (Whichcote). 
As a consequence of this, 'as we saw in the last section, the 
concept of God as the supreme Will is qualified; the essence of 
God being rationality, he comes to be seen as the supreme 
rational will. Man is allowed to meet God half-way because of 
his ability to seek and find God's laws through his own rational 
capacity. Moral law discovered after this fashion-is still God's 
law, but as rational law it may be said to be natural to all 
rational beings. Consequently, man may be said to behave 
morally when he follows the dictates of his nature:. "Vice is 
contrary to, the Nature of. Man,. as Man;, for it is contrary to 
the order of Reason, the peculiar and highest Principle in 
Man. "40 (Whichcote). Therefore, when man behaves naturally he 
behaves morally, and. to. do otherwise is against both reason and 
God. 
Shaftesbury accepts this theory of man's nature, and des- 
cribes Whichcote as a "truly Christian Philosopher; whom, for 
his appearing thus in Defence of Natural. Goodness, we may call 
the Preacher of Good-nature. "41 In contrast to this praise for 
the Cambridge man is Shaftesbury's criticism of Hobbes. 
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Concerning Hobbes, "however other pIarts of Philosophy may be 
obliged to him, Ethicks will appear to have no'great share in 
this Obligation. "-(Shaftesbury). - For Hobbes did-not allow to 
man the unselfish, moral opinions and affections: 
This'is He who reckoning up the Passions, or Affec- 
tions, 
-by which. 
Men are held together in Society, 
live in Peace, or have any Correspondence one with 
,,;,. 
another, forgot'to mention Kindness, Friendship, 
Sociableness, Love of Company and Converse, 
Natural Affection, or any thing of this kind; I 
say Forgot, because I can scarcely think so ill of 
any Man, as. that he has not by experience found any 
of these Affections in himself, and consequently, 
that he believes none of them tobe in others. 42 
If we will but study ourselves we will find morality within us. 
This was what'Hobbes "forgot"'= that man-has within his nature 
the principles of moral action. 
According°to'the Cambridge Platonists, because God always 
acts rationally, °our. 'own reason can distinguish the moral law 
within. However, from the belief that God always acts ration- 
ally, and is incapable of doing otherwise, one may also con- 
clude that the Creation must also be based upon principles of 
reason. This, at least, *would appear to be the implication of 
the following statement: 
For as God cannot know himself to be any thing other 
then what indeed he s; so neither can he will 
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himself to be any thing else. then what he is, or that 
any thing else should swerve from those Laws which his own Eternall Nature prescribes to it-43 (Smith). 
As a result of this (viz., the ability of God to will only that 
which is like himself), the universe must be conceived of as a 
rational whole, the Creation being an act of the supremely 
rational God. As such, the universe or macrocosm is the 
reflection of the divine. It is because of this that Platonism 
(which is an introspective philosophy) turns its eyes towards. 
the material world when the Christian minds of the Cambridge 
men adopt the pagan philosophy as. a basis for a rational 
theology. As a reflection of the divine the material world is 
significant-in two ways-. Firstly, the cosmos becomes the 
highest intelligible concept by means of which we may be 
objectively conscious of the Creator. The finite whole 
provides the best available means whereby the finite concepts 
of man can appreciate the infinity of God. * Secondly, not only 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
* Concerning the "perfection of the one common and universal 
system" Shaftesbury writes, ".... if what he [i. e. Shaftes- 
bury] advances in this respect be real, or at least the most 
probable by far of any scheme or representation which can be 
made of the universal nature and Cause of things; it will 
follow 'that since man has been so. constituted, by means of 
his rational part, as to be conscious of this his more 
(continued overleaf) 
73 
will the individual be able to perform right action, but he 
will be able to comprehend himself'as part oVa larger movement 
which encompasses the whole species. 'Knowing that Nature is 
rationally organised he, will be able to study-mankind's role, 
and from the knowledge he gains from this study make his own 
ends complement the end of the species. Consequently, although 
the cosmos provides us with knowledge concerning God, that 
cosmos replaces God. For'Nature provides the justification for 
moral prescription, not God who cannot be comprehended by the 
finite mind. God is now relegated to the unknown and replaced 
by dependence upon Nature: 
.... if the interest of nature call, I forsake every- thing else and follow nature, without murmuring, 
without complaint. In what way, therefore, shall I 
---------------------------------------------------- 
* (Continued from previous page) 
`immediate'relation to the universal system and principle of 
order and. intelligence; he is not only by Nature sociable 
within the limits of his own'species or kind, but-in a yet 
more generous and extensive manner. He is not only born to 
virtue, friendship, honesty, and faith; ' but'to religion, 
piety, -adoration, and a generous surrender of 
his mind to 
whatever happens-from that Supreme Cause or order'of things, 
which he [Shaftesbury] acknowledges entirely just and perfect. '" 
Characteristics, II, 294/5. An this passage we see Shaftes- 
bury acknowledging the order of the cosmos as a basis for 
appreciation of both moral and religious truths. The accept- 
ance of "whatever happens" as for the best will be discussed 
in Chapter Four. 
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love my children or relations? As-strongly and 
affectionately as is possible for me to love them, 
but so as that nature may be accused; so as that, 
whatever happens, I may still adhere to nature and 
accept and embrace whatsoever nature sends. This 
is the foundation. This is all. Consider this, 
and it will be easy to find the true measure of all 
affection, and what, discipline. and rules must be 
followed to reduce our affection to nature and to 
affect as becomes a rational creature"44 
To "follow nature". as Shaftesbury here recommends: 'involves the 
control of our affections.; by reason-after distinguishing human 
ends by the study of man in his relation to his environment and 
fellow beings. This-approach to morality stands in contrast to 
the introspective method discussed in the last section. 
-Both the . Cambridge. men 'and Shaftesbury agree 
that all 
species. of animals are directed towards ends that are dictated 
by their particular natures. , In' this manner Nature subordinates 
her parts to the structure of the whole and ensures that the 
whole .is' perfect. 
This, theory of the cosmos in which the whole 
is seen-to be prior to°the parts can be-found in the writings 
of Ralph Cudworth. In his True'Intellectual System Cudworth 
. develops the concept of an incorporeal-"Plastick Nature" which 
is a vital'energy directing'all. things towards their natural 
purpose; Plastic Nature is "an Energetical and Effectual_ 
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Principle,. constituted by the Deity, for the bringing of things 
decreed to pass, " and "may be said to be the True and Proper 
Fate of Matter, or Corporeal World. "45 There is, in other words,, 
a movement, of matter towards "that Apt Coherent. Frame and Harmony 
of the whole'Universe. "46 Plastic Nature ensures that the 
rational will of: God. is, fulfilled, acting "Regularly and Arti- 
ficially, according to the direction of Mind and Understanding, 
Reason and Wisdom, for Ends,. or in Order to Good .... operating 
Fatally and. Sympathetically, according to Laws and Commands, 
prescribed to'it by a Perfect Intellect .... 
07 The will of 
God, which'is Reason, is working-itself out in the world-by 
means of Plastic Nature. Within the human species, the Plastic 
Nature of the individual (the "natural. affections" for Shaftes- 
bury), directs him-towards his natural end as a social being. * 
* "A human infant is of, all. the most helpless, weak, senseless, 
and longest' continues so. And wherefore should it not have 
been thus ordered? .... Does not 
this refer man yet more 
strongly to society, and force'him to own that he is purposely 
and not by accident made rational and sociable, and cannot 
otherwise increase or subsist but`1in and by society? Is not 
conjugal affection, natural affection to parents, duty to 
magistrates, love of a common city, community, or country, 
with the other duties and social parts of life, deduced from 
hence and founded in these very wants? " Rand (ed. ) Life, 
Letters, and Philosophical Regimen, 188 (Nature). 
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1$ 
When we make a conscious effort to understand this purpose, and 
rationally control our affections and actions, then we become 
moral: 
For Shaftesbury, as for the Cambridge Platonists, man is 
by Nature a social being, and by his nature a social and moral 
being. In the former case he conforms (consciously or other- 
wise) to the rational movement of the overall design of the 
cosmos through Plastic Nature. In the-latter case his reason 
distinguishes the moral affections (with or without reference to 
the external world) and he is governed by certain rules of con- 
duct in relation to his fellow beings. However, as was pointed 
out in Chapter One, Shaftesbury's writings also exhibit non- 
rational aspects that can be said to stand in contrast to the 
rational dependence of the Cambridge men. To point. to, this 
difference between them is in most cases justified. The concept 
of the "moral sense". in Shaftesbury, which is the non-rational 
attraction or aversion towards the moral and the immoral which 
we are all supposed to feel, is usually thought to be Shaftes- 
bury's original contribution to moral theory. However,, if we 
turn to-the Divine Dialogues of the Platonist, Henry More, we 
can find there a reference to something which appears to be 
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similar to that which Shaftesbury conceptualises as the common 
or moral sense. In Chapter XVIII of the second dialogue, the 
philosopher Hylobares discusses the "Animal Functions and 
Passions. " The dialogue runs as follows: 
Hylobares: That there is no Poison or harm in any-of the Animal Functions and Passions, 'I easily grant .... For I was before convinced by Philotheus that there 
is nothing substantially evil in the Worid. But .... the exercise of the Animal Functions and Passions, 
though good in themselves, yet if. they be either set 
tonhigh, or exercised upon. undue Objects or in un- 
fitting circumstances, become very nauseously evil. 
To demonstrate his point he goes on to ask, 
.... how do you like this Instance of the exercise 
of. the Animal Functions,. That Men and Women should 
stale and dung .... in any Room or Company they came into? 
When. we. consider this prospect. we, feel an immediate aversion 
towards it, so "stinkingly naught" is-it. This aversion is not 
rational. _ It 
is the, result of our sense of. smell. Hylobares 
continues:. 
And were that quicker sense, revived; in us whereby 
we discern Moral good and evil; Adultery, Drunkenness, 
Murther, Fraud, Extortion, Perfidiousnous, and, the 
like, all these would have infinitely a worse xent, 
than this which you. say is so stinkingly evil can have 
to our Noses. 
There is a non-rational rejection Pof evil desires and actions, 
which results from our immediate sense of right and wrong (which 
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is compared with our ability to distinguish between pleasant 
and unpleasant smells). Thus, Sophron replies to'Hylobares'as 
follows: 
Excellently well argued, N lobares! and it was as 
seasonably, intimated at first, That there is a sense 
in a Man, if it were awakened, to which these moral 
incongruities. are as. harsh and displeasing as any 
incongruous Object, be it never so nauseous, is to 
the outward Senses-48 
Here is the non-rational element'which Shaftesbury was to 
develop in his own philosophy and of which more will be said 
in Chapter Five. ' It has been-introduced at this point to show 
that even the Cambridge Platonist, More, was'not beyond intro- 
ducing an element into his philosophy'-, which stands in contrast 
to the general rational orientation of the Cambridge school; 
and also to strengthen the argument of the present chapter that 
Shaftesbury derived many of his ideas from the writings of the 
Cambridge Platonists. Also, it. is worth mentioning at this 
point that More's Divine Dialogues bridge a further gap between 
Shaftesbury and the Cambridge men; that is, in. relation to style. 
As will be shown, in Chapter Six, Shaftesbury's-philosophy is 
one'that advocated both ridicule and good humour as legitimate 
tools for moral enquiry, and he attempted to present his own 
79 
ideas in a light-hearted manner. The theological writings of 
the Cambridge men are much more serious and systematic in their 
manner and form. However, in More's dialogues (a form of 
presentation which Shaftesbury admired) the style is lighter 
(although he does not recommend ridicule) and comes closer to 
that which was favoured by Shaftesbury. * 
However, the writings of the Cambridge Platonists usually 
refer to reason as the basis of morality, and their writings 
are presented In 
,a 
more serious manner than those of Shaftesbury. 
But when we have taken this into account, it is still evident 
that the rational theology of the Cambridge school did much to 
influence Shaftesbury's thought. In so far as Shaftesbury is 
a rational thinker, the Cambridge men'were his immediate 
* Concerning literary style, we find Shaftesbury praising the 
style of the "ancients", the Greeks and the Romans, saying 
that "The manner indeed in which they treated the very gravest 
subjects was somewhat'different, from that of our days. Their 
treatises were generally in'free and familiar style. They 
chose to give us the, repr. esentation of real discourse and con- 
verse, by. treating their subjects in. the'way of dialogue and 
free debate. The scene was commonly laid at table, or in the 
public walks 'or meeting-places; ' and the -usual wit and humour 
of their real discourses appeared in those of their own com- 
posing. And this was fair. For, without wit. and humour, reason 
can hardly have its proof or be distinguished. ", Characteristics, 
Is 51/2. 
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Intellectual 'forbear`s : '` In` their writings reason is seen to 
provide knowledge of morality because it is the uniting link 
between God, the cosmos, and the individual. - Shaftesbury accepted 
this theory; and as a consequence of this it is not surprising 
to discover that Shaftesbury was also drawn towards the ethical 
theories of the Stoics.. This will be, seen. in the next chapter 
when Shaftesbury's theory of nature will be discussed in more 
detail. 
---ooboo--- 
{ 
SUMMARY: 
1 
The aim of the present chapter has been to demonstrate 
Shaftesbury's`relätionship and intellectual debt to the rational 
theology of the Cambridge Platonists. In order to do this, a 
description'of'the influence of Greek thought: upon' Christianity 
was provided in Section'I. There we see: 
1'. 
. 
that Greek philosophy (Aristotelian) provided the 
basis for an "intellectual" morality . 
(in Aquinas) 
that stood in opposition to the "voluntarism" of r` = Augustine and the Nominalists. 
Mv 
2. that in'taking. a'standpoint in the debate between 
"nominalism"-and "intellectualism" that continued 
during the Renaissance and after, Shaftesbury 
supported the latter. 
3. that the Christian-Aristotelianism. of Aquinas, and 
the Christian-Platonism of the Cambridge men and 
Shaftesbury, both saw the universe, as the rational 
creation of the rational God. 
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4. that the-"intellectualism" of both the Aristotelians 
and Platonists stresses the independence, of the 
individual: 
a) in his ability to find moral . 
truths through 
"reason" rather than through blind-obedience 
to the will of God. 
b) in his ability to find. his own salvation in- 
dependently of. the doctrines of an institution- 
alised church. 
Having outlined the orientation that Platonism and Aristotelianism 
gave to Christianity; Sections II: and III proceed to discuss the 
similarities '- between' the. rational theology of the Cambridge 
Platonists -and 
, the' philosophy of °Shaftesbury. - These are 
divided 
into 
1. those fi deas that yrel ate . 
to their common belief that 
moral truths can-be discovered by examining that 
which we can find within the self. 
2. . those ideas that relate to their common belief that the cosmos is rat ionally. organised, and thatAall the 
parts of the cosmos are directed towards their natural 
ends as part of the universal design., 
Section II considers the following points in relation to their 
common attempt to derive'morality from a study of the self: 
1. that both sa that, moral truth can be found within 
the self. 
2. that both look to innate factors which can be 
'discovered by reason; and=in so doing revive the 
Platonic doctrine of, anamnesis. 
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3. ' that both' 'relate the discoverable 'moral 'truth `to' 
reason rather than'to the will or commands of God. 
4. that as a consequence of the rational basis of 
morality, Shaftesbury believed that virtue can not 
be found if we only. obey the rational laws of God 
`because we fear Him, and hope for rewards from Him. 
5. '`that both see-religious activity as necessarily 
involving moral activity within the temporal 
situation, and that this activity is implied when- 
ever we have knowledge of morality. 
Section III then turns to consider the concept of "nature" of 
the Platonists and Shaftesbury. It is noted there, 
1. that because the nature of man is rational, and 
rational man. is moral, both the Cambridge men and 
Shaftesbury conclude that the nature of man is to 
be a moral being. 
2. that this interpretation of man places Shaftesbury 
in a position from which he can criticise the 
Hobbesian belief that men-are by nature egoistic. 
3. that for both the Cambridge men and Shaftesbury the 
cosmos or whole of Nature is ordered according to 
principles of reason, is a reflection of the divine, 
and a source of moral knowledge for those who wish 
to study its parts. 
4. that for both the Cambridge men and Shaftesbury each 
species in Nature has a natural end to which it is 
drawn by its own particular nature. 
Finally, the present chapter points to the fact that although 
the Cambridge Platonists typically refer only to reason as a 
basis of moral knowledge, in More'. s' Divine Dialogues we find 
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reference to a'concept which is similar to Shaftesbury's non- 
rational moral sense., However, it is as'rationalists that the 
Cambridge men have been considered in this Chapter; and when 
Shaftesbury refers, to. reason as the basis,. of truth, the ideas . 
of this school must always be considered as relevant'to 
Shaftesbury's meaning. 
--=00000--- 
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" .,, -i CHAPTER. -THREE-, - 
THE INDIVIDUAL AND HIS PURPOSE WITHIN THE RATIONAL- COSMOS 
x4In 
-ýI - 
In the last chapter we considered Shaftesbury's'ideas in 
relationýto Cambridge Platonism, and saw that his belief that 
reason can discover moral truth either by studying the mind it- 
self, or`by studying Nature, finds precedent in the'writings of 
the Cambridge men. " However, although the writings of the' 
Cambridge men are of'significänce'tö Shaftesbury, and although 
this school may be'regärded'as'part of an intellectual tradition 
to which Shaftesbury belonged, when Shaftesbury acknowledges 
sources for his inspiration, these sources are usually classical. 
According to Ernst Cassirer, Shaftesbury was antipathetic to the 
"problems affecting his own era. " We are told that, 
Shaftesbury .... did not pattern 
his philosophy after 
any models which he could find immediately in his own 
age .... He feels no kinship with contemporary philo- sophy but seeks other intellectual and historical 
models. It is only necessary to open Shaftesbury's 
philosophical diary [i. e. the'Philoso hical Regimen 
edited by Benjämin Rand and published in 1900] to 
become aware of this aloofness to his own time. There 
is scarcely an echo here of the problems affecting his 
era, or of the intellectual and practical decisions 
with which this era is confronted. 1* 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
* From this statement it should not be thought that Cassirer 
(Continued overleaf) 
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In-line with-this judgement, 'in a letter to Locke written in 
1698, Shaftesbury wrote, "I hope the time is not long ere I 
shall change the unprofitable and ungrateful study of these 
"2 moderns of ours for a hearty application to the ancients.... 
Eleven years later in a letter to General (later Earl) Stanhope, 
he aimed his polemic "even against my old tutor and governor, 
whose name is so established in the world, " and suggested that 
Locke would have been a better philosopher if "he had known but 
ever so little of'antiquity, or. been tolerably learned in the 
state of philosophy with the ancients. "3* 
However, this preference for<the-ancients by no means 
necessitates an "aloofness to his own time, " as Cassirer suggests, 
except in the, most limited sense. For Shaftesbury thought that 
certain trends. of'thought had emerged during the seventeenth. 
century which had given rise to social and ethical principles 
which were destructive of all morality. The arch-demon of this 
------------------------------------------ w ---------------------- 
(continued from previous page) ignores the significance of the 
Cambridge Platonists for Shaftesbury. In The Platonic 
Renaissance in England Shaftesbury is treated y Cassirer as 
* 
part of the Cambridge movement., 
The reasons why Shaftesbury condemned Locke's ideas as con- 
tained in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding will be 
discussed in Chapter Five below. 
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process.. he, saw as Hobbes, -and it was, in order to deny the 
relevance of the Hobbesian-type of philosophy that Shaftesbury 
turned to the philosophy of-the ancients. Thus, it can be said 
that it was in order to deal. with what he considered tobe.. 
important-contemporary problems, not to become aloof from them, 
that: Shaftesbury turned¬away from contemporary modes, of thought. 
Where in classical-philosophy did Shaftesbury discover the 
ideas, that he required? We can discover this-if-we look at a 
two-fold-classification which he gives us in a letter written 
to Pierre Coste in°1706; In this letter he distinguishes 
classical philosophies into two major groups. The first is 
derived from Socrates, '"passing into the Academic, the Peripatetic, 
and Stoic. " The second is "derived in reality from Democritus, 
and passing into Cyrenaic and Epicurean. " Of these two groups, 
The first : '., recommended action, concernment in 
civil affairs, religion. The second derided all, 
and advised inaction and retreat, 'and with good 
, reason. 
For the first maintained that society, 
right, and wrong was founded in Nature, and that 
Nature-had a meaning, and was herself, that is to 
say in her wits, well governed and administered by 
one simple and perfect intelligence. The second 
again derided this, and made Providence and Dame 
Nature not so sensible as a doting old woman. 4 
The validity of this analysis may well be doubted, and it is made 
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"for distinction sake" alone. Nevertheless, we are presented 
with two opposed theories of Nature -, the social (as evidenced 
by Stoicism)* and the anti-social (as evidenced-by-Epicureanism). 
Having made this distinction, Shaftesbury places-himself firmly 
within the Stoic camp. Epicureanism was considered by himtto 
be the classical parallel to Hobbes's philosophy - to-which he 
bore a consistent antipathy. 
In Stoicism Shaftesbury found that combination of faith in 
reason and belief in the perfect structure of the cosmos that, 
we have seen Christian thought adopt under the influence of 
classical thought. In Epicureanism Shaftesbury saw a classical 
expression of the moral arguments of Hobbes, to which he was 
opposed. How Shaftesbury opposed Epicureanism by consciously 
appealing to Stoic ideas will become clear as this chapter 
progresses. However, before entering upon this task, let us 
clear the ground of unsophisiticated hedonism, that maxi- 
misation of sensual pleasure which, Epicureanism is capable of 
-------- ----------------------- -------------------------------- 
* "The Mind of the universe is social. At all events, it has 
created the lower forms to serve the higher, and then linked 
together the higher inrta mutual dependence on each other. 
Observe how some are subjected, others are connected, each 
. 
and all are given their just due, and the more eminent among 
them are combined in mutual accord. " Marcus Aurelius, 
Meditations, V, xxx. 
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prescribing when approached by the sensualist. Not only does 
this contradict those ends to, which the natural affections lead 
us. (see below), but it is also contradictory even to our 
immediate happiness; for "the palls or. nabseatings which con- 
tinually intervene are of the worst and most hateful kind of 
sensation, " and ".... 'tis easy to conclude 'that luxury, riot, 
and debauch are contrary to real interest, and to the true 
enjoyment of life. "'5 That this is true would not be denied by 
any person living according to the true spirit of Epicureanism, 
as we can see from the following words of Epicurus himself: 
.... it is not continuous drinkings. and revellings, 
nor the satisfaction of lusts .... which produce a 
pleasant life, but sober reasoning, searching out 
the. motives for all choice and avoidance, and banish- 
ing mere opinions, to which are due the greatest 
disturbance of the. spirit. 6 
This was recognised by: Shaftesbury when he wrote that-; ".... 
even Epicurus himself, made that favourable report of 
temperance, 'so different from his modern disciples .... "7 What 
then are the differences-, between-Shaftesbury's ideas and the 
ideas of 'the Epicureans?, These differences, which were considered 
by Shaftesbury to be of great importance, become evident when we 
consider their. respective positions in relation to a) metaphysics, 
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b) morality, and c) the basis of political society. A 
comparison between their beliefs in these three fields will be 
the object of the next three sections of this chapter, during 
the course of which Shaftesbury's rejection of Hobbes's philo- 
sophy will become equally evident. 
- II - 
If we consider the respective metaphysical beliefs of the 
Epicureans and of Shaftesbury we begin to see the difference 
between the two. The Epicureans believe that the structure of 
the cosmos is atomic. In the words of Lucretius, 
.... our world has been made by nature through the 
spontaneous and casual collision and the multi- 
farious, accidental, random and purposeless con- 
gregation and coalescence of atoms .... 8 
Shaftesbury, who looked towards Nature as a source of moral 
guidance, found this interpretation'impossible to accept. If 
everything in Nature is "accidental" then Nature lacks a 
rational purpose that we'can look to as a standard of right. 
"Nothing, " says Shaftesbury, "can be more melancholy than the 
thought of living in ä distracted universe. " Such a belief, 
he adds, "may by degrees embitter the temper, and not only make 
the love of virtue to be less felt, but help to impair and ruin 
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the very principle of virtue, viz, natural and kind affection. 119 
In opposition to the atomistic metaphysics, Shaftesbury puts 
forward the idea'of a perfectly harmonious cosmos in the tradi- 
tion of classical Roman Stoicism. * For the Stoic, the cosmos 
is an "organism", with a-general mind, in which the subordinate 
parts are only significant in so far as they complement the 
end of'the whole. ** At, times, especially in his Philosophical 
Regimen (in'which'there'is constant' reference' to the writings 
of Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus), Shaftesbury appears to accept 
the organic concept. ' He says thät, '"A body of the whole there 
is, and to this body'an'order; and to this order a mind: a 
general mind of this general body. "10" At other times, Shaftes- 
bury talks about a'"design" or. a-"universal system", in'which 
all the parts are directed-towards a universal rational end. 
However, in either-case, Shaftesbury regards each part of Nature 
as'subordinate"to the whole, believes that each part of Nature 
---------------- --------------------- ---- ---------------------- 
* "Matter in the universe is supple, and compliant, and the Reason 
which controls it has-no motive for ill-doing. " Marcus 
Aurelius, Meditations, VI, i. 
** "Always think of the universe as one living organism, with 
a single substance and a single soul; and observe how all 
things are submitted to the single perceptivity of this one 
whole ..., " Ibid., IV, xl. 
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has a purpose which is rational and which is dictated by the 
universal telos,. and considers the rational structure of the 
whole as just. It-is this aspect of Stoic thought that Shaftes- 
bury considered tobe necessary to. the formulation of ethical 
maxims. Consequently, when we, talk of a Stoic element'in 
Shaftesbury's writings we are discussing the doctrine after its 
simplification under the Roman Empire and its development from 
an elitist intellectualism into a philosophy of universal appeal; 
it is Stoicism. as an essentially moral philosophy which no longer 
finds the Chrysippean Logic and Physics of any significance; it 
is the doctrine after its metamorphosis from the discipline of 
a school to'something approaching a religious dogma: -a dogma 
that considers, Nature to be a perfect whole which has given to 
each of its subordinate parts a role which is rational, just, 
and necessary., Shaftesbury reiterated the basic assumption of 
this dogma when he wrote: 
.... whatsoever happens in the economy of the whole is necessary for the happiness, perfection, and 
establishment of the whole, that it should have been; 
and to have annulled this (if it had been possible) 
must have been to have annulled and made void that 
economy of the whole by which its happiness and 
perfection are maintained.,, 
The natural is good, and man must use his-reason to appreciate 
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the ends which Nature has given to man if he wishes to become 
virtuous. Man can do this because his mind is part of the 
general mind which controls the. overall design of the cosmos: 
Consider, then, what am I? what is the self? a 
part of this general mind, governing a part of this 
general'body, itself and body both, governed by the 
universal governing mind, which, if it willing be, 
it is the. säme as to govern with it. It is one with 
it, partakes of it, and is in the highest sense 
', related to it. 12 
How the mind governs both itself and the body will be seen below. 
However, at this point we may consider how Shaftesbury 
justifies his belief in a rationally organised Nature. In the 
last chapter we saw that the belief in a harmonious cosmos can 
be based upon faith in a God whose every act is rational. 
Shaftesbury takes this line when he says that, "all is faith, 
and without'faith. all must be Atheism. "13 . He 
defines an atheist 
as a person who does not regard the cosmos as a rational whole, * 
the acceptance of which is necessary to all who believe in a God: 
------------ ----------------------------------- . ------ ------------ 
* "TO believe 'thereföre that everything is`governed, ordered, 
or regulated for the' best, by a- designing principle W mind, ' 
necessarily good and permanent, is to be a perfect Theist. 
To believe nothing of a designing principle or mind, nor 
any cause, measure, or rule of things, but chance, so that in 
Nature neither the interest of the whole nor of any particulars 
can be said to be in the least designed, pursued, or aimed at, is to be a perfect Atheist. " Characteristics I, 240. 
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If there be Deity, there is no chance or contrary ill design. If all be from one wise and good design, 
then all is one and the same end, and nothing is 
supernumerary or unnecessary .... 
If there be a supreme reason of the whole, then every- 
- thing happens according to that reason. 14 
However, the use of human reason in recognising the order of 
the cosmos is not to be ignored. We are told by Shaftesbury 
to "Imagine these two [faith and philosophy], not as separate 
but going together; and this latter as a confirmation of the 
former. "15 Shaftesbury tells us to look at the interdependence 
between things in Nature änd, we will be able to see that "All 
things in'this world are united, for as the branch is united 
and'is'as one with the tree, so is'the tree with the earth, air, 
and water which feed it, and with the flies, worms, and insects 
which it feeds ., "16 Also, +if* we l ook at the 
'"innumerable parts 
of creation"'we can see perfection in the parts. We can, for 
instance,, admire-the spider's' ability to weave the web so 
necessary if. it`is'to-catch the flies which it needs for sus- 
tenance. Such perfection must'have a source. "Can you induce 
yourself ever to`believe or think, " wrote Shaftesbury, "that 
.... where inferior and private natures are often found so 
perfect, the universal one should-want perfection... .?,, 
17 Thus, 
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the source of particular harmony which reason sees (self- 
evidently one*'assumes), is the harmony of the whole (logically 
derived). Finally, this recognition by reason of order in the 
finite world is taken by Shaftesbury as evidence of the existence 
of 'God : 
To whom therefore the. laws of this universe and its 
--government appear just and uniform, to him they speak the government of one Just One; to him they reveal 
and witness a God .... 18 
Faith in God"justifies-belief in a rationally organised Nature; 
and our recognition -of an'organised'Nature -justifies belief in 
God. The Epicurean's belief that the world is a product of 
chance, and that there is no such thing as a natural "purpose", 
is rejected. * 
Shaftesbury accepts a teleological interpretation of Nature, 
accepts the cry, "Follow Nature! ", in the belief that both the 
I ------ ---- ------------------ -------=------------------ 
* "In fact, ndthin' in our" bodies was ' born, in order that we 
might be able to use it, but-the thing creates t euse. 
.... you, must banish the belief tat they cou have been 
created for the purpose of performing particular functions. " 
Lucreti, us,, The Nature of the Universe, 156/7. In contrast 
to this, Shaftesbury wrote, '.... to what end the many 
proportions and' various'shapes'of'parts in many creatures 
actually serve, we, are"able, by the help of study and 
observation, to. demonsträte with great exactness. " 
Characteristics I, 243. 
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parts and`the whole are organised for the best. Man is seen 
to be`}a subordinate part of the ordered whole. His-purpose as 
a rational-being is to, pursue ends of Nature as they are dis- 
covered in the workings of the cosmos and'in the natural 
affections within himself. This will be'discussed in the next 
section. However, before progressing to discuss Shaftesbury's 
moral theories in their Stoic, anti-Epicurean context, we must 
consider, Shaftesbury's metaphysical beliefs in relation to his 
rejection of. metaphysical enquiries. 
In Chapter One we saw that Shaftesbury disregarded epis- 
temological enquiries, considering them to be of no relevance 
to the discovery of moral truths. He held the same opinion in 
relation to metaphysical. enquiries. -What Shaftesbury means 
when he uses the term'"metaphysics" is'never explained by him- 
self. He does not regard himself'as a metaphysician, and uses 
the term in a derogatory way. This is because metaphysics does 
not help us improve ourselves in a moral way. This is'because - 
and here I think we discover what'Shaftesbury meant by the 
, term - metaphysics is concerned with speculations concerning 
thek h sical nature, of. reality, and the place of man and the 
other animals and things within it. It looks at. structures 
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without seeing purpose. This, for Shaftesbury, is not philosophy, 
the known province-of which is 
to teach us ourselves, keep us the self-same persons, 
and so regulate our governing fancies, passions, 
and humours, as to make us comprehensible to'our- 
selves, and knowable by other features than those of 
bare countenance 
, 
191" 
This quotation is taken fromlthe Soliloquy, where Shaftesbury 
presents us with his most clear exposition of the limitations 
of metaphysics. Having described the purpose of philosophy as 
the pursuit of moral cotjtrol over our affections,, he says of 
metaphysics: 
As for metaphysics .... I shall willingly allow 
it 
to pass for philosophy when by any real effects it is 
proved capable'to refine our spirits, improve our 
understandings, or mend ourmanners. But if the 
defining material and immaterial substances, and dis- 
tinguishing their properties and modes, is recommended 
to us as the right. manner of proceeding in the dis- 
covery of our natures, I`shall be apt to suspect such 
a study as the more delusive and infatuating on 
account of its magnificent pretension. 20 
Shaftesbury dislikes descriptions of nature because they attempt 
to explain everything within a "system", and "The most ingenious 
way of becoming foolish is by ä system. " Shaftesbury dislikes 
the "pretended knowledge of the machine of this world" because 
he can not see "to what purpose such a philosophy can serve, 
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except only to shut the door against better knowledge .... "21 
Shaftesbury decides that he must confront-"this super- 
speculative philosophy with a more practical sort, which relates 
chiefly to our acquaintance, friendship, and-good correspondence 
with ourselves. "22 He demands-, "Philosopher, let me hear con- 
And, that which--is of cerning what is of, some moment to me. "23 
some moment to him is. that, which will provide him with, what he 
considers to be a real insight into the problems of morality, 
and allow him to answer_"practical" problems... He does not 
think that metaphysics,. as he understands it, can do this. 
Consequently, -in an advisory letter to the student, 
Michael Ainsworth (wr. itten in 1709),, Shaftesbury can be found 
condemning metaphysical systems in general:, 
... for alas! all that we call-improvement of our 
minds, in dry and empty speculation; all learning or 
whatever-'else. -either in theology or other science, 
which has not a direct ten ency to render us honester, 
milder; , 
tuster, and better, is far from being justly so 
ca And even all that philosophy, which is built 
on the comparison and compounding of ideas, complex, 
implex, reflex, and all that din and noise of meta- 
physicks; all'that-pretended study and science of 
nature call'd natural philosophy, Aristotelean, 
Cartesian, or whatever else it be; all tose high 
contemplations of stars and spheres and planets; and 
all the other inquisitive curious parts of learning, 
are so far from being necessary improvements of the 
mind, that without the utmost care they serve only to 
blow it up in conceit and folly, and render men more 
stiff in their ignorance and vices. 24 
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Where then does Shaftesbury's acceptance of the Stoic idea of 
the rationally organised cosmos stand in relation to this 
attitude? r 
Firstly, '-we must recognise that for Shaftesbury "metaphysics" 
is concerned with the description of Nature and its parts in 
terms of a-relationship of "material and immaterial substances". 
Metaphysics, by Shaftesbury's definition, does not attempt to 
discover purpose. Both Epicurus's description of atomic struc- 
tures-and Descartes' description öf the mechanical structures of 
animals25 can be condemned as metaphysics by Shaftesbury Upon 
this basis. To describe man's position in the world°in such a 
manner is like understanding how a watch works yet not knowing 
that its purpose is to tell the time. - 
26 
ý Stoicism does not do 
this. Stoicism gives to man a moral purpose. - Consequently, it 
does not fall within the field of metaphysics as it isdefined, 
by Shaftesbury, even though Stoicism does have a theory of the 
nature of reality, and man's place within it. 
Secondly, Shaftesbury's own theory of nature can be seen 
not as an actual description of'reality, but as a necessary belief 
for the practical reasoner. We saw in Chapter One, Shaftesbury 
was interested in, what characterises the moral activity of man. 
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We saw him dismiss espistemological enquiry as irrelevant to 
this activity in so far-as all men make certain assumptions. 
which have,. no ultimate rational justification. Despite his, 
attempts to justify the existence-of a. cosmos which is rationally 
organised for moral ends, 'it is possible to place this belief in 
the same light... There is no doubt that Shaftesbury considered 
the idea of a moral and rationally organised Nature as a 
necessary belief fora moral being -for to live'in a world which 
has only structure and no purpose is, as was stated-above, to 
"help to impair and ruin thetvery principle of virtue. " That 
it is also a belief that can not be rationally proven will now 
be shown. 
Seeing it as a characteristic of man'that he will consider 
his position in relation to the whole, Shaftesbury presents us 
with a choice: `"Either atoms or Deity. No medium. That multi- 
plicity or this simplicity. No compromise - anarchy, or 
monarchy. "27 The moral man-will accept the idea of a God, and 
the belief that the world is organised for moral -ends. --This is 
a necessary concomitant to morality, assumed for the purpose of 
making practical decisions about how we ought to act. It is a 
conviction, which we can find within us but for which we have 
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no absolute proof. * It is'ýa matter of faith for which we can 
find no rational justification, for which there is no lo'gicäl* 
certainty. ** We can see this if we look at Shaftesbury's idea 
of the role of faithin our belief in God (a belief, äs we have 
seen, that always implies the idea of a rationally organised 
cosmos with moral ends): 
Faith in Deity, and justly so called. For is it not 
in, eed faith? implicit faith? implicit belief? .... How else adhere to anything? how else constant, 
stable, self-consistent, but by this faith? Strive, 
however, to need it the least that is possible; pre- 
serving the chain of thought and affections 
uninterrupted. 28 
As far as we can rationally know, the structure of the cosmos, may 
not have a moral purpose - "sophistry, of wit" may even, demonstrate 
* "No matter whether the universe is a confusion of atoms or-a 
natural growth, let my first conviction be that I am part of 
a Whole which is under Nature's governance; °and my second, 
that a bond of kinship exists between myself and all other 
similar parts. " Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, X, vi. 
**".. my conviction is not°lo ical, but'moral certainty; and 
since it rests on subjective grounds (of the moral sentiment), 
I must not even say: It is morally certain that there is a 
God, &c., but: I am morally certain, that is, my belief-in 
God .... is so interwoven with my moral nature, thatJ am under as little apprehension of having the former torn from 
me as of losing the latter. " Immanuel Kant, Critique of 
Pure Reason, 502. 
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an alternative. However, we believe in God (and, " by implication, 
the organised cosmos), in order'to be "self-consistent" in moral 
questions. With such a belief it does not even matter whether 
the ordered cosmos really exists or not. As long as we act as 
if this were the case, we will be moral, '- it will. be an ideal 
towards which we can direct our activities, and which will sooth 
us in times of distress. In this case, the Stoic metaphysics,. of 
Shaftesbury need not be an attempt at describing the true nature 
of , reality, 
but the provision, of a necessary presupposition for 
moral thought and activity. * However, Shaftesbury was concerned 
that ideas of God and a perfect Creation do not dominate the 
thoughts of man. Man must not forget that he is concerned with 
the practical activity of, controlling his affections. Shaftesbury 
'therefore bids us refer to the idea of faith as little as 
possible, and concentrate upon a continuous control=of our affec- 
tions, thus "preserving the chain of thought and affections 
-------------------------------------------- ----------------------- 
* "Now if the subject and ground of this divine passion [i. e. 
our desire to believe in 'the order of the world'] be not 
. really 
just or adequate (the hypothesis of theism being 
supposed false) the passion still in itself is so far natural 
and good, as it proves an advantage to virtue and goodness.... " 
Characteristics, I, 279. 
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uninterrupted. " How he. does this within the context of. his 
Stoic beliefs will be the next subject of discussion. 
- III - 
As we saw in Chapter One, morality for Shaftesbury is 
concerned with the choice of natural affections. * These natural 
affections'. must be distinguished from other types of affection, 
as we see most clearly in An Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit, 
where Shaftesbury developed a threefold categorisation of the 
affections that can be. found, in man: 
The affections or passions which must influence and 
govern the animal are either - 
------------------------ -------------------- ------------------- 
* It is possible to find in the Discourses of Epictetus the 
idea that natural action is based upon a synthesis of 
affection and reason. 
Epictetus presents us with the following dialogue: 
"Doth'affection seem to you to be a right and a natural thing? 
How should It be otherwise? 
Well; and is affection natural. and right, and reason not so? 
By no means. 
Is there any opposition,. then, between reason and affection? 
I think not. 
If there was, of two opposites if one be natural, the other 
must necessarily be unnatural, must it not? 
It must. 
What we find, then, at once affectionate and reasonable, 
that we may safely pronounce to be right and good. " 
Epictetus, Discourses, Is xi, 2. 
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1. The natural affections, which lead to the good 
of the public. 
2. Or the self affections, which lead only to the 
good of the private. 
3. Or such as are neither of these, nor tending 
either to any good of the public or private, but con- 
trary-wise; and which may therefore be justly styled 
unnatural affections. 29 
As we have already seen, the natural affections are for Shaftes- 
bury the moral affections. These are directed towards the 
welfare of'a. higher system to which the individual belongs* 
(i. e. the species), and ultimately to the good of the whole 
cosmos. A person is "supposed good when the good or i11 of the 
system to which he has relation . is the 
immediate object of some 
passion or affection moving'him. "30 However, an individual can- 
not stay moral if he does not stay alive. Consequently he must 
also have self-affections; but these must not be, so strong 
as to prevent*'the'full application of the natural affections. 
Each man must strike a balance between the natural and self 
----------- -- --------------------------------------------- 
* ".:.. should'there be anywhere in nature a system, of which 
this living creature was to be considered as a part, then 
could'he nowise be allowed good; 'whilst he plainly appeared 
to be such a part as made rather to the'harm than good of 
that system or whole in which he was included. " 
Characteristics, I, 244. 
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affections, whilst at the same time eliminating the unnatural 
affections. * When he does this, he will be virtuous. In order 
to do this he must use his reason: 
Thus is virtue shared in different degrees by rational 
creatures, such at least as are called rational, but 
who come short of that sound and well-established 
reason which alone can constitute a just affection, 
a uniform and steady will and resolution-31 
Not all men are virtuous. But if they will use their reason 
they can be; for reason allows them to follow the ends given 
to man by Nature. 
It was because he thought that men can discover universal 
moral truths in Nature that Shaftesbury condemned both the 
Epicureans and Hobbes. For the Epicurean, good and bad are 
expressions of pain and pleasure caused in the human frame by 
the collision of atoms. To seek good is to pursue the absence 
of pain and fear. ** Justice for the Epicurean-is equated with 
* The idea of balance in the affections will be discussed Yin 
Chapter Four below. 
** "Do you not see that nature is clamouring for , two things only, a body free from'pain, a mind released from worry and fear for 
the enjoyment of pleasurable sensations? " Lucretius, 0p. 'cit., 60. 
0 
I 
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the agreements whichIndividuals make with each other in order 
to achieve security from pain and fear. * For Höbbes also, good 
and evil are'not definitions of universal moral truth, but names 
which the individual gives. to his affections** and their 
objects. + As with the Epicureans, EHobbes's concept. of justice 
relates. to the equilibrium which men succeed in creating amongst 
themselves in their search for security++ from pain and death. 
M 
* "Justice never. is anything in itself, but in the dealings of 
,,. men with one another in-any place whatever and at any 
time 
it is a kind of compact not to harm or be-harmed. " Epicurus, 
Extant Remains. (ed., Bailey), 103. 
** "Good, and evil, are names that signify our appetites, and 
aversions; which in different tempers, customs, and doctrines 
of men, are,. different. '! Hobbes, Leviathan, 104 (ed. 
Oakeshott). 
+ "But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, 
thatoi, s it which he for his part calleth good: and the 
object. of his hate and aversion, evil .... "'. Ibid., 32. 
++ "For where no covenant'häth'preceded, there hath no right been 
transferred, and every man , 
has rightfito every thing; and 
consequently, no'action can be unjust. But when a covenant is 
made, then to' , break 
it is unjust: and the definition of , INJUSTICE, is no other than'tie not performance of covenant. " 
Ibid., 94. 
In his attitude to death Hobbes differed from the Epicureans. 
For Hobbes, man's lot was, to' constantly fear and attempt to 
avoid this inevitable event, whereas the Epicureans'taught 
that man could dispel his'fears. through'wisdom. The-Epicur- 
ean, although he takes action to avoid death, will not fear 
death in itself. With an understanding of the atomic 
(Continued overleaf) 
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Shaftesbury regarded Hobbes as a "reviver" of the "narrow- 
minded" philosophy öf'the Epicureans. 32 Hobbes represents that 
form of philosophy which 
would have vice itself appear as natural as virtue, 
and from , the, worst examples would represent-, to us "that all actions are naturally indifferent; that they have 
no note or character of good or ill in. themselves; but 
are distinguished by mere fashion, law, or abitrary 
decree. " Wonderful philosophy! raised from the dregs 
of an illiterate mean kind, which was ever despised 
among the great ancients and rejected by all men of 
action or sound erudition. 33 
Morality for Shaftesbury is not the avoidance of that which gives 
us private discomfort. Moral names are more than definitions 
of the varying likes of different men indifferent situations at 
different times. When Shaftesbury calls something good he wants 
it to have universal application without respect to individual, 
time, or place. In order to do this he turns to the concept of 
a"rationally organised, moral Nature within which we can find 
moral purpose. In'place of' the-descriptive'philosophy of the 
materialists - who, essentially, were only attempting to describe 
what they thought were the physical causes-of particular human 
--------------------- -------------------------- 
(Continued from previous page) 
functioning of the universe, the wise man will cease to be 
concerned. For,. after death, he knows that there is no pain, 
and, therefore, there Is no reason to be concerned. 
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actions and modes of conduct T- Shaftesbury attempted to provide 
a prescriptive morality, based upon the acceptance of immanent 
ethical ends, assumed to be present in the whole and in-the 
parts which constitute the whole. In man, these ends are deter- 
mined by, the natural affections. The individual can be good 
according, ito universal-principles if he follows the natural 
affections, and does-not allow them to'lose-their force because 
of the increasing influence, of the self and unnatural affections. 
''Although Epicureanism has been called a descriptive theory 
in the'last paragraph, it does make certain'recommendations for 
the-ordering of°-our1ives. Taking as their guiding principle 
theAoctr. ine öf"necessary pleasure, * the Epicureans recommend 
that we avoid political activity ** and avoid unnecessary social 
obligations. t For Shaftesbury, this is to avoid our nature as 
* Of desires, all that. do not lead to 'a sense of pain, if they 
are not satisfied, are not necessary, but involve a craving 
which is easily dispelled ..:. " Epicurus, Op. Cit., 
101. 
** "We must release o rselves 
politics, " Ibid., 115. 
from the prison of affairs'and 
+ "As many as-possessthe power to procure complete immunity 
from their neighbours, these also live most pleasantly with 
one another, since they have-the'most certain pledge of security 
.... " Ibid., 105. 
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men by-failing to'recognise'that we have natural affections 
which direct us towards social ends. He, says of Epicureanism 
that,, "There was no way to be truly a disciple of this philosophy, 
but to leave family, friends, country, and society .... ý134 
According, to Shaftesbury, we can recognise natural activity not 
here, in, selfishness'and the avoiding of human'relationships, * 
but in the pursuit of the welfare of higher ends than the self. 
This is to follow the, natural affections, which allow us to 
fulfil-the role which has-been given to us, by Nature. The 
natural affections, as was seen in ChapterlOne, "are such as 
contribute to the welfare and prosperity of that whole or species, 
to which he -is' by Nature 'joined. "35 The , nature of man 
being social,, 
.... we may, with`justice surely place it as a principle, That if anything be natural, in any creature, or any 
kind, 'tis that which is preservative of the kind it- 
self,. and conducing to its welfare and support. "36 
The natural affections, which all of us have within us to some 
* Despite Shaftesbury 's'interpretation, which may be logically 
derived from Epicurean principles, we should remember that 
Epicurus stated that, "Of all'the things which wisdom acquires 
to produce the blessedness of the complete life, far the 
greatest is the possession of friendship. " 
Ibid., 101'. 
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degree, * involve him in a host of unselfish human relationships. 
When we follow the natural affections, we behave naturally, 
rationally, and morally. These public affections are evident 
in all virtuous persons. What of the other affections listed 
at the beginning of the present section? ' We see their role 
when we consider Shaftesbury's definition of "vice" as existing, 
1. "When either the public affections are weak or 
deficient. 
2. "Or the private and 'self affections too strong. 
3. "Or that such affections arise as are neither 
of these, nor in any degree tending to the support 
either of the public or private system. "37** 
To avoid falling into vice. it is necessaryto eliminate from 
* "So strong and uncongberable, aýthing is human nature: .... It is impossible -, 't,,;. for a human creature entirely to lose human 
affections. But even those who have undergonea mutilation 
cannot have their inclinations also mutilated: and so 
Epicurus, when he had mutilated all the offices of-. a man, 
of a master of'a family, 'of a'citizen, and of a friend, did 
not mutilate the inclinations of-, humanity, for he could not, 
any more than the idle Academics [i. e. the Sceptics] can throw 
away, or blind their own senses, though this be, of all others, 
the point they labour most. " Epictetus, Op. cit., II, xx, 3. 
** In addition to-this, Shaftesbury also suggests that to have 
natural affection "beyond acertain degree .... is undoubtedly vi'cious.. For thus over-great tenderness destroys the effect 
of love, and excessive pity renders us incapable of giving 
succour" -Characteristics, I, 250. 
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within ourselves all desires which'do not conform with our 
natural end as social individuals. In doing this the signifi- 
cance of the self affections, in so far as they contribute to 
our moral nature, is that they allow us to better pursue the 
common good. ' The-common good of society is the constant stan- 
dard, and the-natural affections are-always primary. 
And thus if there be found in any creature a more than 
ordinary self-concernment or, regard to private good, 
which is inconsistent with the interest of the species 
or public, this must in every respect be esteemed an 
ill and vicious affection. 38 
A good creature'is such a one'as by"the'natural temper 
or bent of his affections is carried primarily and 
immediately, and not secondarily and accidentally, to 
good and against ill. 39 
The natural affections are for Shaftesbury always superior, 
and it is necessary for them to dominate in all circumstances 
if the individual is to be continuously virtuous. The self 
affections are only necessary in so far as they complement the 
social or natural affections. Natural affections are directed 
towards family, friends, and community. The self affections* 
r.. n. ---------.... ---.. -------. -----------------`------------------- 
* The self affections "relate to the private interest or separate 
economy of the creature, such as love of life; resentment of 
injury; pleasüre, 'or'appetite towards nourishment and'the 
means. of generation; interest, or desire of those conveniences 
by which we are'well'provided for and maintained; emulation, 
or love of praise and honour; indolence, or love of ease and 
rest. These are the affections which relate to the private 
system and constitute whatever we call interestedness or self- 
love. " Characteristics, I, 317. 
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are to be allowed only in so far as they allow'social action 
(based upon the natural affections) to be more effective. For 
example, a self affection by Shaftesbury's definition (see foot- 
note) is the desire for food in order that we should not die of 
malnutrition. Now since it is necessary for the community to 
prosper that there should be a population which is healthy in 
both body and mind, this self affection complements the good 
of the community. If the self affection becomes extreme (e. g. 
one eats too much) then not only will it cease to be for our 
welfare as we open ourselves to the dangers of coronary throm- 
bosis, but it also ceases to be'advantageous to the community. 
An unhealthy person cannot fulfil his obligations to the 
community. In'this manner, the self affections for Shaftesbury 
are only acceptable when they complement the good of the 
community. Whenever'the self affections oppose the natural 
affections, opposing man's end as asocial being, they are 
unacceptable and it-is possible to regard them as unnatural. 
However, Shaftesbury does. not apply the term "unnatural" 
to any affections but those which ought not to be present in any 
degree whatsoever. An unnatural passion is evil as it always 
ft contradicts. the social ends of man. As examples of these 
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unnatural affections he' refers us to sadism, destructiveness, 
malice, envy, hatred 0f mankind, inhumanity resulting from 
superstitition, all=consuming ambition, and ingratitude. 
If we remove these from within ourselves, and prevent the self 
affections from becoming too strong, opposition will be 
removed to the natural affections which will then pursue the 
common good. 
Having categorised the various sorts of affections, it is 
possible to bring them into order according to the principle 
of the common good. If we do this we will always act virtuously, 
which is to act according to the ends of-man in Nature. The 
measure is the social good: 
If the affection be equal, sound, and good, and the 
subject of the affection'such as may with advantage 
to society be ever in the same manner prosecuted or 
affected, this must necessarily constitute what we 
call equity and right in any action-41 
We are virtuous if the intentions of our actions (and the affec- 
tions upon which they are based) are towards the public good. 
However, reference to the public good is by no means 
essential to the rational creature. Because his mind is part 
of the general mind, he can recognise the intentions of the 
latter as they refer to himself without considering the higher 
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system of the"-species or the whole of Nature. Shaftesbury 
suggests that our reason can immediately recognise as self- 
evident (i. e. an intuitive recognition) the right and the 
wrong. Within the Stoic context, it is possible to refer to 
Epictetus, who stated 
.... it is the very nature of the understanding to 
agree to truth,. toebewdissatisfied with falsehood,. 
and to suspend its belief in doubtful cases-42 
Without referring to purpose we can distinguish between the 
good and the bad. In Shaftesbury's words: 
Some moral and philosophical truths there are withal 
so evident in themselves, that 'twould be easier to 
imagine half mankind to have run mad, and joined 
precisely in one and the same species of folly, than 
to admit anything as truth which should be advanced 
against such natural knowledge, fundamental reason, 
and common sense. 43 
Here we see that'ambiguity, 'present in much of Shaftesbury's writings, 
which was discussed in Chapter One. There, the term "common 
sense" was pointed to'as a non-rational means whereby man can 
distinguish between moral'and, non-moral. It can'also be inter- 
preted, as we see'here, as human reason making such a distinction. 
By so doing, Shaftesbury agrees with the definition of common 
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sense presented by Epictetus within the rational framework of 
Stoic philosophy: 
As that may be called a common ear which distinguishes 
only sounds, but that which distinguishes notes an 
artificial one; so there are some{things which men 
not totally perverted discern by their common natural 
powers; and such`a disposition is called common 
sense. 44 
If common sense is understood as. rational intuition,. then reason 
for Shaftesbury can, distinguish the natural affections of its 
own accord. (But Shaftesbury is rarely unambiguous--in his 
use of the term "reason". In the present context he appears to 
be adapting., a popular idea - i. e.. that truth is rational - to 
his own ideas, . which. often seem to 
be appealing to something 
which is not rational.. That non-rational element will be 
discussed in Chapter Five below. ) 
As a rationalist, appealing to reason as a means of 
discovering moral truths, Shaftesbury is closely aligned with 
the Stoics. We'are told that it is in the nature of all "rational" 
beings. to recognise and accept the natural. affections which can 
be found within the self. "Reason" can recognise the natural 
(moral) affections for, our' family, our community, our country, 
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and finally for all human beings - as a citizen of the world. 
This is to be a man. This the nature of man signifies. " 
45* 
"Reason" presents us with moral, aims without necessary reference 
to natural purposes. However, if we. recognise natural purposes, 
then reason can use natural ends as aýmeasure against which to 
plan and judge', actions. We can judge those. affections which ful- 
fil higher-ends-than thoseof the mere self. In a rationally 
organised and, moral cosmos, the highest end is that of the whole 
world. This. "remote-philosophical object .... falls not easily 
under the eye. "46 However, we should attempt to pursue the 
welfare of as high a proportion of mankind'as possible. Con- 
sciously pursuing the ends of the°, ýspecies we become involved in 
* This, claim that'man has by nature an affiliation with the 
whole'species, and is thereby 'a citizen of the world, finds 
its source in the Stoic doctrine of the universal brother- 
hood of men through'their possession of reason. It is 
egalitarian, in -that. al1men possess., reason: 
".... 'rational 
creatures . '... 'alone are qualified to partake of a 
communi- 
cation with the. deity, being connected with him by reason: 
why may not'such a one call himself a citizen of the world? " 
Epictetus, Op. cit.,: I, ix,. l. It is ethical in that reason 
enables man to -appreciate his. natural (and therefore moral) 
end: "He does not forget the brotherhood of all rational 
beings, nor that a concern for every man is proper to 
humanity. " Marcus Aurelius,. Op. cit., III9 iv. 
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a higher purpose, and the intentions of our actions are more 
general - thus coming closer to the general moral. end of then 
whole. "When in general all the affections or passions are 
suited to the public good, or good of the'species, .... then is 
the natural temper entirely good. "47 Those affections which 
are "the most truly natural, generous and noble are those which 
tend towards public service and the interest of the society. at 
large. "48 Whether he be citizen or statesman, the aim of the 
moral being must be to serve that portion of humanity over which 
he has influence. 
By looking at the affections within ourselves we can dis- 
tinguish between the moral and'the non-moral by use of reason. 
By looking at men in their relationship with others, we can 
distinguish a moral purpose which is dictated and controlled by 
the general mind of, Nature. 'Thus, upon a difference in inter- 
pretation of the nature of man, both as a person with rationally 
distinguishable'moral affections and as a member of a species 
whose moral end he should pursue if he wishes to be moral, *' 
* Concerning Shaftesbury's attitude towards the human obli- 
gation towards moral action, see Chapter Four below. 
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Shaftesbury and the materialist philosophies of the Epicureans 
and Hobbes come into conflict. The one presents us with a 
philosophy of universal moral standards; the other with a 
physical description of the structure of man, an explanation of 
moral terminology in terms of. pain and pleasure, and (with the 
Epicureans) recommendations concerning how we can maximise 
pleasure and minimise pain. 
Taking his belief that all men have within them natural 
affections,. which direct them towards their ends as part of a 
universal design, Shaftesbury went on to criticise the ideas 
of the Epicureans and Hobbes concerning the origins of politi- 
cal society. In so doing, he formulated his own theory of 
society, which will be outlined in the next section. 
- IV - 
In his Leviathan Hobbes presents us with the idea of a 
"state of nature" in'which equal, selfish individuals pursue 
security from pain and death. Men formulate laws of nature in 
an attempt to protect themselves from each other, but will not 
obey them unless they are compelled to do so. * The basis of 
----------------------------------------------------------- ----- 
"For the laws of nature, as 'use tice, 'e uit , modesty , merc , and, in sum, -doing to others, as we would be done to, of them- 
selves, without the terror of some, power, to cause them to be 
observed, are contrary to our natural passions .... " Leviathan, 109. 
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political society is the provision of compulsion in the person 
of a sovereign power. The possibility of men living together, 
according to fixed modes of conduct, is dependent upon this 
artifact, the basis'-of which is fear. 
Taking the state of nature as though it, were a real 
historical condition, '* 'Lucretius states that there was a time 
when men had "no notion of the mutual restraint of morals and 
laws. , 49 *Men made mutual alliances in an attempt to protect 
themselves from violence., However, the situation was insecure, 
and remained so until, 
Mankind, worn out by a life of violence and enfeebled 
by feuds, was"the more ready to submit of its own 
free will to the bondage of laws and institutions .... Ever since then the enjoyment of life's prizes has 
been tempered by the fear of punishment. °50 
The logical steps of Hobbes are thus found historically conceived 
in the writings of Lucretius. Both conclude that mankind is 
incapable of living sociably together without the ippetus pro- 
vided by a constant fear of punishment. 
* In this he'differs from Hobbes who wrote, "It may peradven- 
ture be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition 
of war as this; and I believe it was never generally so, 
over all the world: but there are many places, where they 
live so now. " Ibid., 83. 
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As we have seen, Shaftesbury-is opposed to the idea that 
the natural bent of man is one of anti-social egoism. Because 
Nature-is-for-Shaftesbury an organised whole, the individual 
can not be considered in isolation from the rest of his species. 
For man's purpose is. to pursue the common good, which is to act 
upon the impetus of-the social or natural affections. In The 
Moralists we find, Shaftesbury saying (through the mouth of 
Theocl es) ,. s. , 
even, on the supposal "that there was ever such a con- 
dition or state of men, when as yet they were 
unassociated, unacquainted, and consequently without, 
any language or. form of art" ... "that it was their 
natural state to live thus separately, " can never 
without absurdity be allowed.,.... So might you call 
the human egg or embryo the man. The bug which 
breeds the butterfly is more properly a fly, though 
without wings, than this imaginary creature is a man. 
For though his outward shape were human, his passions, 
appetites, and organs must be wholly different. His 
whole inward make must be reversed, to fit him for 
such a recluse economy and separate subsistence-51 
Natural man. is social man, in possession of natural affections 
which Hobbes had denied., It is because of this attitude that 
Shaftesbury could reject the theory that the existence of a 
stable social situation is based upon expediential agreements 
which are enforced by fear of punishment. Each part of the 
cosmos is regarded as contributing to the harmony of the whole, 
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as a result of which we accept that mankind has, a telos. This 
telos is, according to Shaftesbury, both social and moral: 
The end or design of nature in man is society. .... Now, if°the ultimate design and end of nature in the 
constitution of man be, that he be framed and fitted 
for society,, and if it be the perfection of human 
nature to be thus fitted, how should not this, which 
is the end and perfection of human nature, be also 
the; good of man? 52 
Because Shaftesbury believes that man is naturally social and 
good, the'`logical basis of society is not selfishness, but 
sociability. We have evidence of this when we look at how our 
natural affections bring us into union with our'fellow men in 
an attempt to support the'species. * Consequently, as an 
alternative to the contract theory, Shaftesbury presents us with 
the independent emergence of society as a necessary consequence 
of the human condition: 
* "Is it natural for a parent to love the offspring, or for 
a creature of any, kind to affect more particularly ` 
his own species or kind? If this be called natural, what 
else is understood but that the preservation and support 
of such a certain species is designed by nature, and 
after this manner, and by these means? This therefore 
is the design and will of nature, that'by the natural and 
good affectionof creatures towards their own species the 
species should be preserved and be prosperous. " Rand (ed. ) 
Life, Letters, and Philosophical Regimen, 3. 
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If any appetite or sense be natural, the sense of 
fellowship is the same. If there be anything of 
nature in that affection which is between the sexes, 
the affection is certainly as natural towards the 
consequent offspring; and so again between the off- 
spring themselves, as kindred and companions, bred 
under the same discipline and economy. And thus a 
clan or tribe is gradually formed; a public is 
recognised .... 
How the. wit of. man should so puzzle-this cause as 
to make civil government and society appear a kind 
of invention and creature of art, I know not. 53 
Just as the birds fly south for winter; ' just as the'acorn grows 
into"the oak tree, man's natural drive is to exist socially 
within human communities. Society implies a government and 
laws which aid the citizens in the organisation of their lives. 
Government is not Hobbes's sovereign power, restraining selfish- 
ness (although this is part of its task); but the means of 
providing a situation in which the natural affections find 
greater scope for development (See Chapters Seven and Eight). 
Nature directs man towards the fulfilment of his 
potential as a member of society. When deciding upon the 
course of his actions the individual, if he is to be moral, 
should consider himself as partaking in this process. He will, 
as a consequence, pursue the good of the community, thereby 
giving moral significance to his actions. There may be 
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individuals who do-not attain this ethical condition, and who 
live their lives according to Hobbesian precepts. ' In this case, 
Shaftesbury would draw our attention to the following` statement 
by Benjamin" Whichcote: "'We must 'seek the laws of ' Nature only 
amongst'those that live according to Nature. "54 For Shaftes- 
bury, the natural man is one who creates a more meaningful 
ethical medium than the merely individual consciousness. 
Natural man is seen to be part of the'higher natural end of 
society within which he finds himself, and to which he'is 
directed by-'his natural1affe6tions. 
---00000--- 
SUMMARY: 
The present chapter begins by recognising Shaftesbury's 
attraction to classical writings, especially those, of Stoicism. 
In Stoicism Shaftesbury found elaboration of similar ideas to 
those which he found attractive in the writings of the Cambridge 
Platonists. He found there the belief that man has morality 
within his nature, which can be discovered by reason. He found 
there the belief that the cosmos is rationally organised, that 
man has amoral purpose within the cosmos, and that man can 
find evidence of his purpose by recognising the "natural" actions 
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of himself and others. The concept of, an organised cosmos, and 
his idea of-a natural, social man, were used by Shaftesbury to 
contradict the philosophy of Epicurus (opposed also by the Stoics) 
and of Hobbes, both of whom were thought by Shaftesbury to have 
made the same mistaken assumptions. Referring frequently to 
parallel ideas between Shaftesbury and those of. Marcus Aurelius 
and Epictetus (to whom Shaftesbury often refers himself), the 
differences between Shaftesbury and the ideas of the Epicureans 
and Hobbes are outlined. These are discussed under the categories 
of metaphysics, morality, and the origins of political society. 
In so doing that element in Shaftesbury's writings which may be 
termed "rational" also finds further elaboration, complementing 
what has already been stated in Chapters One and Two. 
Section II, which is concerned with the category, 
"metaphysics", shows: 
T. that in opposition to the atomic metaphysics of 
the Epicureans, Shaftesbury, accepts the idea of 
an. organised cosmos within which all the parts 
have a predetermined moral purpose. 
2. that Shaftesbury 
, uses 
both faith and reason to 
justify, the rationally organised cosmos and its 
source, which is God. 
3. that Shaftesbury has an antipathy towards "meta- 
physical" enquiries, by which he understands des- 
criptions of the physical structure of man and the 
world which do not refer to natural purposes. 
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4. that 
. 
by this definition`, Stoic , hypotheses 'con- 
cerning man and his role in Nature are not 
"metaphysical" speculations. 
5. that Shaftesbury's concept of Nature need not be 
regarded as a true description of reality, but 
can be seen as 'a necessary idea which is produced 
by the mind in its pursuit of moral truth - without 
reference toý'ank"truth* that can' be absolutely 
proved. 
6. that the real nature of philosophY'is to teach us 
to control the affections, and that we should not 
take up our time in useless speculations about 
the nature of God or the universe - advice which 
Shaftesbury does not always follow himself. 
In Section III, which has as its basis the differences 
between Shaftesbury's theory of morality and that of Hobbes and 
the Epicureans, we are introduced to Shaftesbury's classification 
of the affections as provided'in his Inquiry Concerning Virtue 
or Merit. These are the natural affections, the self affections, 
and the unnatural affections. ' In'relation to this classifica- 
tion it'is noted: 
1. that all men are capable of appreciating the 
same moral code by using reason to distinguish 
between, change the degree of, or eliminate from 
within ourselves, the various` affections. 
2. that in opposition to Hobbes and Epicurus, for 
whom moral terminology refers only to that which 
provides pain or pleasure to an entirely selfish 
mankind (and may consequently vary in meaning 
according to individual, time, or place), 
Shaftesbury looks to a universal moral standard. 
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3, that this moral standard is provided by the 
natural or social affections - the existence of 
which are denied by the Epicureans and Hobbes - 
which direct man towards that purpose given to 
him by Nature. 
4. that the-natural affections direct man towards 
the unselfish pursuit of the "welfare and 
prosperity of that whole or species, to which 
he is by Nature joined. " 
5. that, using the common good of society as the 
measure of good affection or action, the self 
affections are only acceptable in so far as they 
allow us to contribute to this end (i. e. make us 
more capable of fulfilling our social role). 
6. -that: the. unnatural affections must be completely 
eliminated in so far as they provide nothing 
which contributes either to personal welfare or 
to the welfare of society. 
7. that Shaftesbury believed it was possible to dis- 
tinguish between good and bad affections by 
reason alone, without reference to the common 
good. 
8. that when he does this we can never be sure 
whether he is referring to a rational or non- 
rational capacity in man. In the Stoic sense 
it must be regarded as the divine rational spark 
which all men share with God and/or the general 
mind of 'Nature. 
Section IV, which deals with Shaftesbury's attitude con- 
cerning the origins of political society begins with a brief 
description of the similarities between the ideas of Hobbes and 
those of the Epicurean poet, Lucretius. Shaftesbury, because 
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he accepts the Stoic belief that the nature of man leads him 
to pursue the welfare of the species, cannot accept the claims 
1. that it is the insecurity created by universal 
selfishness that necessitates political society, 
2. that political society is an artifact, and 
3. that men can only live together peaceably under 
the threat of violence. 
In opposition to this, Shaftesbury says that because natural 
man possesses social affections, he is a social being. 
Shaftesbury presents us with an evolutionary theory of society, 
developing from the family, as part of which men must find 
their natural (moral) fulfilment. 
---00000--- 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
NECESSITY, FREEDOM, AND MORAL OBLIGATION 
-I- 
A recurring theme in Shaftesbury's philosophy is the idea 
that Nature is a system in which all the parts are controlled 
and related by a rational power which, after the manner of the 
Stoics, Shaftesbury terms the general mind. This idea of a* 
"system of the whole" was first discussed in Chapter One of the 
present work in relation to Shaftesbury's belief that the 
natural and the moral are equivalent terms. In Chapter Two we 
saw that the idea finds justification in Shaftesbury's belief 
in a consistently rational and moral Deity; and in the last 
chapter we saw how Shaftesbury consciously used the idea in oppo- 
sition to the ideas of both Hobbes and the Epicureans as a basis 
for the acceptance of a universal system of values. 
If, as Shaftesbury believed, the organisation of the cosmos 
is both rational and for the best, then whatever occurs is for 
the good of the whole. If all things are guided by the general 
mind, human misfortune should be accepted without complaint 
because it must be in conformity with moral purposes which are 
superior to any claims that the individual may make with regard 
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to himself. To-be moral is to accept all that Providence has 
to offer us as being necessary to the harmony'of Nature. 
However, in addition to accepting the inevitable, Shaftes- 
bury wants us to be satisfied with it. Man is part of a 
greater whole which, when its larger ends are achieved, ensures 
that man (either as an individual or a race) also fulfils his 
natural purpose - whether the individual realises it or not. 
Consequently, there is no such thing as absolute misfortune. 
Misfortune only exists because of a relative interpretation 
of the facts by the human mind. If we are to consider the 
whole, that which appears to be ill always has a higher purpose. 
In this knowledge we should rest content, and in order that the 
individual may do so Shaftesbury begs him to remember three 
things: 
(1) How vain and ridiculous the thing is itself, 
considering the vastness of time and substance .... 
Individuals and particulars are insignificant when compared with 
the whole universe - "the vastness of .... substance"; the 
human life span is insignificant when compared with the "vastness 
of time". 
(2) That this was necessary, from causes necessary, 
and (whether Providence or atoms) could be thus only, 
and could not have been otherwise. 
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Whatever occurs must occur, from necessity and is therefore 
unavoidable. °Whether. we believe in amoral end towards which 
all, movement and change is directed, or a completely unconscious 
necessity Which is dependent only upon physical causation - 
"whether Providence or atoms" - the individual is incapable of 
changing the-course of. events., 
(3)r! -That this is not only what was necessary, but 
what was best, since the mind or reason of the universe 
cannot act against itself; and what is best for itself, 
itself surely best knows. What I know and am assured 
of, is, that If it= be best for the whole, it is. what 
should have been, and is perfect, just and good .... 1 
Here Shaftesbury, can be seen opting for a moral determinism. 
It is because that which happens is "best for the whole" and 
"should have, been", that,. the individual should accept his lot 
with humility, and be happy in the knowledge that his situation, 
pleasant or otherwise, contributes to the universal harmony 
which is governed by the general mind. To do this is to 
support one's own, best interests as well as to conform with 
Nature: 
If there be an order and economy for the good of'the 
whole, then nothing can happen to me except from that 
economy which provided for me in particular the best 
that was possible, and had respect to my good. If I 
am convinced of this, I must naturally love whatever 
happens to me from that economy. 2 
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Man-, will find tranquillity, by thus accepting his part in the 
universal design and, whatever appearances may be, realising 
that whatever fortune cares to offer is essential to the 
necessarily perfect whole. * 
To be satisfied with whatever happens. to us, regarding it 
as. necessary and good,, involves a particular attitude which 
the individual must take towards his body. According to Shaftes- 
bury, the mind or soul, and the body, are to be treated as 
completely discrete objects. ** In this distinction, it is the 
* This agrees with the Stoic writings of Marcus Aurelius who wrote that because "mutual integration is a universal 
principle .... a myriad-causes combine into the single Cause which is destiny. .... Let us accept such things, 
then, 
as we. accept the prescriptions of an. Aesculapius. " 
Meditations V, viii. Shaftesbury merely repeats these 
sentiments when he says, "I .... will join my applause to what God has for the best decreed. For to will against that 
, which 
is best, and to will what is impossible, what else 
were this but to be wicked and miserable. " Rand (ed. ), 
Life, Letters, and Philosophical Regimen, 91/2 (Necessity) 
** Neither the Stoics nor Shaftesbury every systematised their 
ideas concerning the separation and relationship of a mind 
and a soul as two separate things within the individual. The 
means by which either of them appreciate moral truths appears 
to be immediate and, intuitive, and they often appear to be 
concepts which refer to the same thing. The important dis- 
tinction is between the mind (or soul) and the body, which 
are regarded by Shaftesbury as having contradictory satis- 
factions: 
(Continued overleaf) 
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former concept which Shaftesbury considers to. be relevant to 
moral theory. =,,, The latter, with its associated pains and 
pleasures, is irrelevant. Man must find his satisfaction in 
things of the mind (see below), and the "truly wise man thinks 
his body no part of himself nor belonging to him even whilst in 
it. "3 When we face life with this belief, then it will be 
easier to accept, that every -misfortune is a necessary contri- 
bution, to the welfare of, a higher system of ends (i-. e. of the 
society, the species, or, the whole, of Nature). Physical pain 
and pleasure will be regarded as irrelevant,, - (thus conceiving 
a human attitude which stands in contrast to the Epicurean and 
Hobbesian-descriptions of men and their reasons for action) - 
and whatever fortune may, offer us we will be content in the 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
(Continued from previous page) 
".... as the activity of the mind and operations of the soul 
are the, causes-of the sensual pleasures being less felt, .... 
on the other side, is sensuality the obstruction of this 
good which is in a mind. .... Therefore, 
if the highest 
degree of this sort of, good (viz., of a mind), be not 
attainable but by the loss'of, the other, then that other, 
as the meaner good must be sacrificed to this greater, 
and the only true and real good is the enjoyment of a soul 
and mind freed from the incitements, commotions, and 
disorders of sense. " 
Ibid., 57/8 (Good and I11) 
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knowledge that it was willed by the general mind and is there- 
fore for the best: "When I think I am hurt by any of these 
accidents that happen to a carcase, or to anything without my 
mind and real self, I"am then out of my reason, and am not 
myself. "4 When we can thus ignore physical pain, we can wish 
for that which is, and be content in the knowledge that our 
desires are being satisfied. This can be done if we create for 
ourselves, within ourselves, the Stoic character which sees 
sensual factors as irrelevant in the knowledge. that everything 
occurs according to the rational principles which pervade a 
Nature controlled by the general mind. 
Nature is governed by reason and everything happens for 
the best. We can be content with this if we ignore our bodies 
and seek satisfaction in things of the mind (see above Chapter 
One). By desiring a moral character we can find total satis- 
faction; for we will desire to conform with Nature, whose 
general mind arranges all things for the best. When we find 
contentment in what is, whether our actions succeed or fail in 
their intent can make no difference to our satisfaction with 
the turn of events. For if, as, Shaftesbury stated, ".... 
whatsoever happens in the economy of the whole is necessary 
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for the happiness, perfection, and establishment of the whole, 
that it should have been, "5evil is merely a figment of the 
imagination, the human mind misreading reality. Unable to con- 
sider things in relation to the whole, such a mind might not 
see that goodness and evil must be considered in larger terms 
than the individual, or the species, or anything less than the 
whole universe. In relation to the whole, there is no such 
thing as evil. 
However, to accept that evil is a concept which has no 
meaning in reality is to destroy the need for any moral philo- 
sophy; yet the need for the reform of both the self and 
society is central to Shaftesbury's writings. According to him, 
the individual may become possessed by unnatural affections, 
which by contradicting Nature are evil both in themselves and 
in the consequential actions which are based upon such desires. 
Thus, as we saw in Chapter Three above, Shaftesbury wished us 
to remove these unnatural and evil affections from our characters 
or personalities. Also, it is only imperfect men who make the 
laws which govern human society (however natural society itself 
may be thought). Consequently, laws and customs may exist which 
contradict, the, end given to man by the general mind of the cosmos. 
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"So that 'tis hard-'to find in any region a human society which 
has human laws. No wonder if in such societies 'tis so hard to 
find a. man who lives naturally and as a man. 116 The perfect 
world with which we have been presented by Shaftesbury rapidly 
disintegrates when he begins to stress the need for moral 
reform. There are three points thät'can be made"in relation to 
this presence'of evil within-what Shaftesbury has told us is a 
perfect whole. 
Firstly, 'as was, stated above, evil can be seen as a concept 
created by men tö expl'ain those things which affect them 
advei^sely, "büt which, when considered from the viewpoint of a 
higher system, are seen to be necessary to a more general good. 
"Therefore if any being`be wholly-and really ill, it must be 
ill with respect to the universal system; .... But if the ill 
of'one private system bethe g6od', of others .... then is the 
ill 
of that 'private system no real 'i 11' i n' i tsel f .... 
Secondly, Shaftesbury was not writing to explain the world's 
structure. ' As we saw in Chapter Three he had an aversion to 
metaphysical enquiry. ý'"shaftesbury's aim was to impress upon his 
readers the fact that life"upön this'earth is not a game of 
chance to be played outkwithout reference to a higher truth. 
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Life for Shaftesbury had ameaning which he thought would be 
denied if we accept the mechanical or atomistic theories of 
Nature. Where there is merely matter in motion, where there is 
no general mind, ".... it must be confessed there can nothing 
happen in the course of things to. deserve either our admiration 
and love or our anger and abhorrence. "$. For this reason, 
Epicureanism was rejected by him as an explanation of the world 
merely in terms of material structure, which made morality 
efficacious to the well-being of the-body rather than something 
that conforms with permanent standards of thought and action. 
In order to-obtain a moral theory--that will have universal 
applicability, Shaftesbury postulates, a general mind within a 
harmonious. whole. As we saw in Section II of Chapter Three, 
this is regarded by-Shaftesbury asa concept necessary to moral 
thoughwhich need not necessarily apply to empirical reality. 
As such, it might also be seen as a pragmatic hypothesis which 
persuades men to pursue the common goodias a moral end. This 
would appear tobe-the case when Shaftesbury discusses the 
"hypothesis" of, "perfect theism" (the belief in a rationally 
organised whole) in his Inquiry Concerning Virtue Or Merit: 
For whatsoever is the'occasion or means of more 
affectionately uniting a rational creature to his 
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part in. society,, and causes him-to-prosecute the 
public good or interest of his species with more 
zeal and affection than ordinary, is undoubtedly 
the cause of more than ordinary virtue in such 
a person. 9 
Evil may still exist in the'world, but the individual can'gain 
moral strength from the belief that the world'is controlled by 
a general mind and that he is not dominated by the forces of 
evil or indifference. 
The third point to be made in relation to the existence of 
evil within a rationally organised cosmos, like the second, 
involves a. rejection of the idea of a perfect whole as applicable 
to empirical reality. If we now consider the universal telos 
not as a necessary coordination of all the particular parts in 
a preordained design,, but as an overall tendency which need not 
necessarily be fulfilled, the contradiction which was at first 
apparent (between the perfect cosmos and the existence of evil) 
disappears. Alternative conditions, which deviate from perfec- 
tion, are. offered. The source of this deviation will lie in 
the activities of men which contradict Nature; - and evil will 
be seen as the product of, those activities. Thus, even though. 
Nature's end is, that man should be a social being and pursue 
the common welfare of. the. species, this need not necessarily be 
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the case. This is implied by Shaftesbury when he states that 
"..... 1 whatever the order of the world produces, is in the main 
both' just and g6od. "1° This is the'tendency which men-sometimes 
contradict. How this contradiction occurs will be discussed in 
the next section An relation to the idea of "freedom" in 
Shaftesbury's ethical writings. 
- II - 
Putting aside the idea of the perfect cosmos as a moral 
concept which need not apply to empirical reality, and leaving 
that interpretation of Nature which sees tendency rather than 
necessity in human development, we must ask ourselves the 
question - How can freedom exist within a world in which all 
things occur'according to the will of the general mind? The 
will of the individual can mean little when his decision can in 
no way affect his environment. Yet Shaftesbury claims that the 
individual becomes free when he is moral. 
When Shaftesbury refers'to freedom within the context of 
a totally controlled Naturehe is not referring to freedom to 
act in such ,a way that the course of events is changed. Every- 
thing that happens is for the best, and the freedom which 
results from morality exists only for those who accept this theory. 
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Freedom for Shaftesbury appears to be freedom from disturbance 
caused to the mind -by the body and its desires. Man is always 
in a condition of, "either the mind working upon the fancies, 
or fancies-governing the work of the mind .... "11 It is only 
when'the mind governs the irrational impulse, the animal 
desires, that true freedom-is'attained. We can then be free 
from physical considerations when we attempt to formulate 
principles-of action;. -and-, -, free from disappointment if the results 
of action lead tol, <discomfort. We can be happy in the knowledge 
thatýweAattempted to act-according to.: Nature, and that that 
which-occurs-is necessarily according to Nature. Epictetus had 
stated that byidiscounting the body "you have in this topic a 
choice-incapable'of being-restrained or compelled or hindered., 
12 
That choice is°to. actýrationally or otherwise. We are free to 
follow nature by controlling our affections and using reason to 
direct our actions. Similarly, Shaftesbury wrote, 
In the determinations' of 11 f e, and in the choice and 
government of actions he alone is free who has within 
himself no hindrance or control in acting what he 
himself, by. his, best judgement and most deliberate 
choice, ' approves. .... Reason and virtue alone can bestow liberty. Vice is unworthy, and, unhappy on 
this account only, "that it is slavish and debasing. "13 
In this statement the words "within self" are of primary 
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importance. By isolating the inner self, freedom of will is 
acquired whereby one may always act morally (which is to act 
rationally) despite-the disadvantages. of the environment within 
which the body may-find itself. Freedom becomes control of our 
attitude towards the body and its, -environment in the knowledge 
that everything-which occurs is desirable (because it comes 
from the rational will of the general mind) - before the event 
if we successfully comprehend the course-of Nature; after the 
event-df: nöt. Whatever the case, Shaftesbury, like the Stoics 
before him, -was determined never to be disappointed. 
By leaving the concept of-a rationally organised cosmos in 
which all. things are necessarily directed towards their ends, 
and turning to, the concept of Nature as either a potentiality or 
a non-empirical hypothesis (see above),, we find an expansion of 
the concept of freedom. If man stops being part of an inevitable 
sequence of events he can stop feeling that all his actions must 
come up against-the determinism of the cosmological design. The 
individual becomes a free agent in the sense that he can make 
rational choices between alternative courses of action and pro- 
duce results which would not1have occurred if he had not taken 
that action. Emphasis-is switched from the creativity of the 
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general mind to the creativity of, the.. individual mind. - 
When the universal design is regarded as. a potentiality 
rather than a necessity, Shaftesbury presents us with a picture 
of man in whom there is-an ever, present tendency to-natural 
(social) action because"of the presence within, him. of- natural 
affections. However, as we saw in the last chapter, self and 
unnatural affections are also present in the human character. 
Whether or not the natural, affections are given primacy (within 
the context outlined in Section III of the last chapter) depends 
upon his interpretation ofthe affections, and the rational 
choice between good (social) or bad (anti-social) affections. 
Some individuals may succeed better than others in this task. 
"And thus vice and virtue are found variously mixed, and alter- 
natively prevalent in the several characters of mankind. " 
14 In 
the context of, the present discussion, moral freedom can be 
reinterpreted as the freedom which is possessed by the rational 
individual to be. either good or evil - the choice is his. The, 
rational individual can examine his affections and organise them 
according to moral principles if he so*desires. Shaftesbury hoped 
that he-could create this desire within his readers - the desire 
to discover moral truth within themselves, to eliminate evil from 
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their characters, and direct their energies'towärds an appli- 
cation of their social affections in their dealings with others. 
But to do this, Shaftesbury had to provide his readers with a 
reason for acting morally. He must answer the question, What 
obliges me to act morally (i. e. to use my reason to choose the 
natural affections in preference to others)? 
- III - 
If we were to accept Shaftesbury's statements that Nature 
is controlled by a general mind which arranges everything for 
the best, it would be possible to recommend moral indifference; 
for the result must necessarily be the same according to this 
hypothesis. whether we act according to moral precepts or not. 
In opposition to this, Shaftesbury claims that it is character= 
istic of man that he pursue moral rules, that it is this activity 
which distinguishes man from the animals (i. e. the rational 
pursuit of moral purpose), and that he only fulfils his purpose 
in Nature when he consciously attempts to act in accordance with 
Nature: 
Providence has given me means .... to know both 
it 
and myself, and to be conscious for what and to what 
I was born. If I use these I am a man, and as such 
Providence will use me. If I use them not I am a 
mere animal (let my shape be ever so much of a man), 
and as an animal Providence will use me, even as we 
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men use other animals, making them willingly or 
unwillingly serve our purposes. 15* 
Shaftesbury is here saying that even if every occurrence is 
predetermined, we must still attempt to be good by following 
our natural affections. The obligation lies in the individual's 
responsibility to himself as a rational being who recognises 
that he has a role to play in Nature's design.. In Chapter, One 
we saw Shaftesbury saying that it. is characteristic of men that 
they think about how to act. In Chapter Two we saw that 
Shaftesbury believed the, Socratic, claim that moral knowledge 
implied moral action. Now we see that Shaftesbury thought that 
even if we believe that we cannot change the', course of events, 
we must not declare these two propositions irrelevant. For 
virtue lies in the intentions rather than the results of any 
action (see Chapter One) and man should still attempt to fulfil 
his moral potentialvif he wishes to be more than a mere function- 
ing mass of flesh, skin, and bone. What of the claim that our 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
* ".... God hath introduced"man as a spectator of himself and 
his works; and not only as'a spectator, but an interpreter 
of them. It is therefore shameful that man should begin and 
end where irrational creatures do. He is indeed rather to 
begin there, but to end where nature itself hath fixed our 
end; and that is in contemplation and understanding, and in a 
scheme of life conformable to nature. " Epictetus, Op, clt., 
I. vi, 4. 
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very thoughts themselves will be subject-to the "necessity" 
that governs all things, and therefore beyond our control? - It 
would be possible to answer that, because man's mind is part of 
the general mind, its thoughts may be regarded as independent 
of-the necessity that is seen by Shaftesbury to be characteristic 
of, the rest of- Nature. 
However, Shaftesbury does not'appear to have been satisfied 
with this. explanation of why we ought to attempt to act morally. 
Indeed; it is not an explanation of obligation so much as a 
statement-toý-the effect that. "rational beings do think about 
right and wrong, and should act upon their conclusions. " Thus, 
all we know about Shaftesbury's theory, of moral obligation so 
far"is, that he thoughtthat obligation to act morally was relevant 
to a situation-in which the individual could not possibly alter 
the course of,. events. * To, discover w he should do this we 
-------------------------------------------------- 
* Within the-context of an optimistic interpretation"of"the 
universe, this means that we must attempt to act in conformity 
with Nature, but always be satisfied with what occurs as being inevitable and for the. best. However, if evil is given exist- 
ence within the world (as it is by Shaftesbury) then this insistence upon moral action even when there is no apparent 
hope of changing things leads to a moral attitude'inýwhich 
personal considerations are subordinated to the pursuit of 
right. This is made easier if the body is disregarded as insignificant (see earlier in this chapter) and satisfaction is sought for in the mental pleasures (see this section). 
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must-look, at ShaftesbUry's'views'on happiness. In Part II of 
his'Inquiry"Concerning Virtue-or Merit, Shaftesbury undertakes 
to'demonstrate our obligation, to`virtue, and does so by showing 
that we maximise our happiness'by being virtuous (acting upon 
the impulse'of those affections which allow us to fulfil'our 
natural end as ' social' beings). In the last änalysis, ýhappiness 
is the basis of all moral obligation in Shaftesbury's ethical 
, theories. 
Shaftesbury wrote that ".... 'in this we should all agree, 
that happiness was-to-be pursued, and in fact was always-sought 
after .::. "16 However, happiness°is to be found only if°we are 
moral. 'In order to showýthis, yShaftesbury sets out to prove 
'three things concerning the affections' that can be found in 
men.. These are, 
1. , "That to have the natural, kindly, or generous 
affections strong and powerful towards the good of 
the public, is to have the chief means and power of 
self-enjoyment"; and "that. to.. want them, is certain 
misery and ill. " 
2. That to have the private'or self affections 
.. 
too strong,. or,. beyond their degree of subordinacy to 
the'kindly and natural, is also miserable. " 
3. And "that to have the unnatural affections (viz. 
such as are neither founded on the interest of the 
kind or public, nor of the private person or creature 
himself) is to be miserable in the highest degree. "17 
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In attempting to demonstrate the first proposition Shaftesbury 
begins by stating that all pleasures are "either of the body or 
of the mind. " Further, the "satisfactions" which relate to the 
mind are superior to those of the body. We can see that this is 
so by the example of those persons who "embrace any manner of 
hardship, and defy torments and death"18 for their ideals. They 
would rather possess the mental object (which is a moral principle 
according to which they condition their actions) than forsake 
principle in favour of physical security. 
If the mental enjoyments are superior to the sensual, then 
that which creates them should be pursued if we wish to be happy. 
That which will make us happy in this way is the natural affec- 
tions, the relation of which to mental pleasure is as follows: 
Now the mental enjoyments are either actually the 
very natural affections themselves in their immediate 
operation, or they wholly in a manner proceed from 
them, and are no other-than their effects-19 
That, the natural affections are mental pleasure Shaftesbury feels 
there is "little need of proving ... to any one of human 
kind 
who has ever known the condition of the mind under a lively 
affection of love, gratitude", bounty, generosity, pity, succour, 
or whatever else is of a social or friendly sort. "20 The warm 
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feeling which is traditionally felt by the person who 
performs a kind action is the enjoyment of "the natural 
affections themselves in their immediate operation. " Further 
mental pleasures proceed from the natural affections "as 
their natural effects. " This can be seen if we consider 
the pleasure which we gain from friendship, which is"an 
enjoyment of good by communication, " and "a'pleasing conscious= 
ness of the actual love, merited esteem, or approbation of 
others. "21 All men, we are told, aim at friendship, * but 
only those who follow the natural affections ever achieve it 
or the mental pleasures associated with it. The individual who 
does not accept his moral purpose, and ignores the natural 
affections in favour of the pursuit of money, power, or sensual 
pleasure, may or may not enjoy a sort of friendship. However 
* "'Tis to this soothing hope and expectation of friendship 
that almost, all our actions have some reference. 'Tis 
this which goes through our whole lives, and mixes itself 
even with most of-our vices. .... were pleasure to be 
computed in the same way as other things commonly are, it 
might properly be said, that-out of these two branches 
(viz. community or participation in the pleasures of others, 
and belief of meriting well from others) would arise more 
than nine-tenths of whatever is enjoyed in life. " 
Characteristics, I, 299. 
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friendship not based on the natural affections will be unsatis- 
factory, and will not provide the pleasure upon which our 
happiness depends. Friendship which results from actions not 
based on the natural affections will be recognised as either 
hypocritical-or unmerited. The individual would be informed by 
his conscience that his actions are not moral, as a result of 
which he will be miserable. For "every reasoning or reflecting 
creature is by his nature forced to endure the review of his own 
mind and actions-, "22 as a result of which, "no creature can 
maliciously and intentionally do ill without being sensible at 
the same time that he deserves ill. And in this'respect, every 
sensible creature may be said to'have conscience. " 
23 Because 
of the conscience, only the individual who follows the natural 
affections can avoid guilt and misery, and enjoy his friendship 
to the full. 
It, is interesting to"note that the mental pleasures derived 
from performing moral actions are regarded by Shaftesbury as 
superior to the pleasure derived from contemplation alone. As 
we saw in Chapter One, Shaftesbury, is concerned with how to 
"usefully philosophise" by using what I termed there "practical 
reason". This form of reason involves action. As for that 
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philosophy which is not concerned with practical activity, the 
pleasure we derive from it can never be as satisfying: 
But this speculative pleasure, however considerable 
and valuable it may be, or however superior to any motion 
of mere sense, must yet be far surpassed by virtuous 
motion, and the exercise of benignity and goodness, 
where, -together with the most delightful affection of 
the soul, there-is joined a pleasing assent and appro- 
bation of the mind to what is acted in this good 
disposition and honest, bent. 24 
The highest mental pleasure is obtained from the presence and 
application of the'natural affections. 
The second part of Shaftesbury's attempt to persuade us 
to act according to the moral knowledge which we can discover 
by the use of our reason concerns the self affections. The 
self affections, * if "tob intense or strong, .... become 
cowardice, revengefulness, luxury, avarice, vanity and ambition, 
* Those "home-affections" which Shaftesbury deals with in the 
Inquiry, and which lead to the"vicious and ill" affections, 
11 are, ..., love of life; resentment of injury; pleasure, or appetite towards nourishment and the means of generation; 
interest, or desire of those conveniences by which we are 
well provided for and maintained; emulation, or love of 
praise and honour; indolence, or love of ease and rest. " 
Characteristics, I, 317. If held "in an extreme degree", 
these affections 'lead to vice (i. e. contradict the common 
good), and make us unhappy. 
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sloth; and as such are owned vicious and ill with respect to 
human 
. society. 
"25 However,, in. addition to being anti-social, 
these pervertedaffections. also make. us unhappy. - a condition, 
that can be. amended only by, reducing the intensity of these 
affections. How the presence of over-strong self affections 
makesus unhappy. is described by Shaftesbury as follows: 
a). Cowardice is an over-strong presence of love of life. It 
fails to make us happy because it is both ineffective (fear 
destroying the ability to'protect ourselves, effectively) and 
makes.. us hate-ourselves when. we.. reflect upon our actions. 
Shaftesbury says that "there is no one surely. so disingenuous 
as not to allow that life in. this. case becomes a sorry purchase, 
and is passed with little freedom or satisfaction. 1126 
b) Revengefulness is an over-strong presence of resentment of 
injury. Shaftesbury sees the presence of the latter passion as 
a deterrent to those-who would injure us. However, as revenge 
it becomes self-destructive making: us ignore danger to ourselves 
in pursuit of its. end., Also, the satisfaction of revenge is no 
real pleasure, being nothing more than the ceasing of pain felt 
by deep resentment towards other persons. Revenge is dependent 
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upon "our preceding anguish and incumbent pain" which can be 
negated by the°act of-vengeance;; and the greater the pain has 
been, 'the greater the pleasure obtained by the act. ` Therefore, 
to achieve happiness we must pursue a prior pain; and "to be 
subject to such a. passion..... is in reality to be very unhappy, " 
because it is : 'only a'perpetual assuaging of anger perpetually 
renewed" within an "envenomed malignant disposition acting at 
its liberty. "27 
S 
c) Luxury is pursued when there is an over-strong presence of 
the ! 'appetite towards nourishment and means of generation", the 
proper end of which'Shaftesbury terms "pleasure". Concerning 
food and drink, over-indulgence destroys the ability to appre- 
ciate either. "Tis plain, " writes Shaftesbury, "that by urging 
Nature, forcing the appetite, and inciting sense, the keenness 
of the. natural sensations is. lost. "28 Also, the result of un- 
restrained desire in this sphere leads to disease, the sacrifice 
of honour and fortune, and the destruction of our physical 
health. Similarly, the other side, of "pleasure", which is a 
product of sexual desire, destroys both our ability to enjoy 
the activity and the health of our mind and body (when over- 
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indulged). * 
d)' Avarice is'an over-strong presence of'"interest" ("desire 
of'those conveniences by-which`we are well provided for and 
maintained")'. If not too strong, 
The public as well as`private system is advanced by 
the industry which this affection excites. But if 
it grows at length into a real passion, the injury 
and mischief it does-the public is not greater. than 
that which it creates to the person himself. Such 
-a one is in reality a4self-oppressor, and lies heavier on himself than he can ever do on mankind. 29 
When interest (self-interest) becomes avarice men will place 
their advantage in external objects in which they can never find 
satisfaction, for they will always desire some further object 
which is beyond their reach, and fear for the loss of what is 
already possessed. (See Chapter One above. ) 
---------- --------------------------------- --------- ----------- 
* Concerning the enjoyment appreciated by persons with either a 
normal or an excessive presence of'the desire for the culinary 
and sexual delights". Shaftesbury writes that, "were both 
these sensations to be experimentally compared; that of a 
virtuous course which belonged to one'who lived a'natural and 
regular life, and that of a vicious course which belonged to 
one who was relaxed and dissolute; there is no question but 
judgement would be given in favour of the former.... As to 
the consequences of this: vice [i. e. over-indulgence], with 
respect to the health and vigour of the body, there is no need 
to mention anything. The injury it does to the mind`, though 
less noticed, is yet greater. The hindrance of all improvement, 
.: 4-, the wretched waste of time, .... the disorder and looseness of a thousand passions through such a relaxation and enervating of 
the mind, are all of them effects sufficiently apparent when 
reflected on. " Characteristics, I, 325. 
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e) Similarly, when-emulation becomes vanity and ambition, 
one lives in fear of losing what has been, gained. A man should 
wish to be "fitted to every station in society"a not for personal 
glory, but as a moral being. If positions of influence are 
pursued for their own sake, and not for the common good, "all 
rest and security as 
tentedness, and ease 
aspiring passions of 
f) Indolence is an 
necessary to keep ou, 
to what is future, and all peace, con- 
as-to what is present, is forfeited by the 
this emulous kind ..,,, 1130 
over-strong love of ease, in itself 
bodies healthy. Over-indulgence in this 
affection leads ' to destruction of'health in both the mind and 
the body through 1\äck"of exercise. In the body we become uncom- 
fortable. In the mind there`isdiscomfort because of an 
imbalance of the affections described by Shaftesbury as follows: 
.... in a soul or mind unexercised, and which languishes for want of proper action and employment, the thoughts 
and affections being obstructed in their due course, 
and deprived of, their natural energy, raise disquiet, 
and foment a rancorous eagerness and tormenting 
Irritatson., 31 
In this manner, laiiness not only makes us incapable'of acting 
for -thecommon good, but'makes us' also incapable of enjoying 
the pleasures of the mind which, as we saw above, are found in 
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the proper application of the natural affections. 
In the six cases outlined here, Shaftesbury attempts to 
show how the self-affections, if too strong, make us unhappy. 
At the same time, if we are over-indulgent in this manner, we 
weaken the natural affections. 
Upon these, termsawe must of course. endeavour to 
silence and suppress our natural and good affec- 
tions, since they are such as would carry us to 
the good of society against what we fondly conceive 
to be our private good and interest .... 32 
By, thus denying the natural'affections we will deny ourselves 
the mental` pleasüresassociated with them'(and outlined above). 
In this way Shaftesbury persuades us that weýshould keep our 
self affections'within the'bounds of morality dictated'to us 
by reason in its choice of the natural affections. 
Finally; in his enquiry-into "what obligation there is to 
virtue,. or what'reason to embrace it, "33 Shaftesbury turns to a 
consideration of the misery which ' is' caused by the presence of 
unnatural affections (outlined'in Chapter Three above). These 
affections are a`pro, duct of the natural affections being weakened 
by an over-strong presence of the self affections: 
.... 'tis evident that they [the self affections 
when they are too strong] must be the certain means 
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. of-losing us the chief enjoyment of life, and raising in us those horrid and unnatural passions, and that 
savageness of temper,. which makes the greatest of 
miseries and the most wretched state of life """"ýý34 
There will be misery if. we. are dominated by these affections 
because of_-the absence of, the pleasures of the natural affec- 
tions, and fear , of all mankind 
towards whom the individual 
will feel only alienatjon, '! divided from everything, and at 
defiance and war with the rest of Nature. "35 Indeed, the man 
whois under the, domination of the, unnatu'ral äffections is the 
sort, ofaperson whom. Shaftesbury regarded as the Hobbesian 
natural man. Although disagreeing with Hobbes in that he saw 
this as the, most unnatural condition,. he would have agreed that 
life under these conditions would be-nasty, brutish, and very. 
miserable. 
This, then, is Shaftesbury's own professed theory of moral 
obligation, which can be summed up in the words, a moral 
character and moral'actions will make you happy. Preserving 
the eudaemonistic outlook, of antiquity (present also in his 
intellectual forbears, the Stoics*) Shaftesbury states that 
-------------- ------------------ ---------------- --------------- 
* ".... you were not born-to be depressed and unhappy along with 
others, but to be happy along with them. And if any one is 
unhappy, remember that he is so for himself; for God made all 
men to enjoy felicity and a settled good condition. " 
Epictetus, Op. cit., III, xxiv, 1. 
155 
".... there, is a necessity for., the preservation of. virtue, that 
it should be thought to have no quarrel with true interest and 
self enjoyment. "36.. Because of this, we are faced with a paradox 
in Shaftesbury's ethical theories in that he justifies obli- 
gation. towards an unselfish pursuit of the common good by 
appealing to each individual's selfish desire to be happy. How 
does this differ from the selfish motivation to morality which 
sees obligation in fear-of God and hopes of rewards from the 
Almighty?, - which, as'we saw-in'Chapter Two above, was condemned 
by Shaftesbury. Shaftesbury introduces rewards into his theories 
when he tells usrthat we should be moral so that we can be happy, 
for happiness' itself maybe regarded as a reward. * Shaftesbury 
nowhere. solves. this,; contradiction. On the. other hand, Shaftes- 
bury did not suggest: that we pursue-happiness, as good in itself. 
We are not to pursue happiness, but universal moral rules. 
Happiness is merely'a, by-product of. the pursuit of virtue; and a 
highly intellectual form of happiness at that, denying as it 
does the relevance of, physical pleasures in the face of superior 
-------------------------------------- mm ----------------------- 
*. ".... notwithstanding the injury which the principle of virtue 
may possibly suffer by the increase of the selfish passion .... 'tis certain, on. the. other side, that the principle of fear of 
future punishment, and hope of future reward, how mercenary or 
servile soever it may be accounted, is yet in many circum- 
stances a great advantage, security, and support to virtue. " 
Characteristics I, 270. 
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mental enjoyments. As a-consequence of this, the reader cannot 
help but feel thatShaftesbury's attempt to formulate a theory 
of moral obligation which is based upon the attainment of 
happiness is merely sugar on the pill of a theory that forbids 
us to consider personal welfare in our pursuit of higher social 
purposes. 
Thus the wisdom of what rules, and is first'`and chief 
in Nature, has made it`to be according to the private 
interest and good of every one to work towards the 
general good, which if a creature ceases to promote, 
he is actually so far wanting to himself, and ceases 
to promote his own happiness and welfare. He is on 
this account'directly his own enemy, nor can he any 
otherwise be good or useful to himself than as he 
continues good to society, and to, that whole of which 
he is himself a part. 37 
. 
Here, in the Cbnclüsion to the Inquiry, we are left in no doubt 
that in Shaftesbury's scale of values, the individual (and his 
happiness) can only have significance'in the context of his 
pursuit of the public interest, in relation to which his private 
interests are always secondary. 
Finally, in relation to Shaftesbury's theory of moral 
obligation as outlined in this section, we may note that Shaftes- 
bury has been accused of not taking into account the authority 
of "conscience" when outlining the reasons as to why men ought 
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to follow the moral road. We find this criticism in the 
preface to Butler's Fifteen Sermons, where Butler's belief 
that "the very constitution of our nature requires, that we 
bring our whole conduct before this'superior faculty.... "38 is 
contrasted with the following interpretation of Shaftesbury: 
The not taking into consideration this authority, 
which is implied in the idea of reflex approbation 
or disapprobation, seems a material deficiency or 
omission in Lord Shaftesbury's Inquiry concerning 
Virtue. He has shown beyond all contradiction, that 
virtue is naturally the interest or happiness, and 
vice the misery of such a'creature as man, placed in 
the circumstances which we are in this world. But 
suppose there are particular exceptions; a case 
which this author was unwilling to put, and yet 
surely it is to be put: or suppose a case which he 
has put and determined, that of a sceptic not con- 
vinced of this happy tendency of virtue, or being 
of a contrary opinion. His determination is, that 
it would be-without remedy. One may say more ex- 
plicitly, -that eav ng out the authority of reflex 
approbation or disapprobation, such an one would be 
under an obligation to act viciously; since interest, 
one's own happiness, is a manifest obligation. 39 
Butler is saying that conscience should°be used as a means of 
directing us towards moral action even if we think our happiness 
lies in another direction;, and he condemns Shaftesbury for not 
stressing this function of conscience, and the possibility of 
the formation of a moral character which is independent of 
eudaemonistic considerations. 
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Butler's comments should not be taken to mean that 
Shaftesbury 
. 
ignores human conscience. Shaftesbury writes that 
:... no creature can-maliciously and intentionally do ill without being sensible at the same time that 
he deserves ill. And in this respect, every 
sensible creature may be said to have conscience. 40 
When Shaftesbury discusses conscience, it is in terms of the 
moral obligation that it creates in us, because of its relation- 
ship to happiness. Conscience, the "natural sense, of the 
odiousness of crime and injustice, " is, possessed by allrational 
creatures. 41 It both distinguishes good from bad, and makes 
the presence of good'in ourselves pleasurable (and of bad, 
uncomfortable).. However, it is not required as an independent 
moral authority* insofar as reason can distinguish between the 
affections in man's pursuit of that happiness that is the pro- 
duct of a virtuous life. In contrast to this, Butler was less 
optimistic than Shaftesbury concerning human reason, and stressed 
the need for a moral authority that is above our rational pursuit 
-------------------- --------------------------------------!, 
* Butl'er's,, -"reflex', -approbation or disapprobation", which is the 
conscience, might, be said to have been taken into account by 
Shaftesbury in his concept of the moral sense. This is 
because the. moral sense and the conscience have similar 
functions for Shaftesbury. 
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of happiness. * Butler sees conscience as a moral guide and 
authority which solves the problem of "particular exceptions" 
to Shaftesbury's scheme, such as the possibility of our believ- 
ing that our happiness is best served by acting in a non-moral 
way. That Shaftesbury does not consider "particular exceptions" 
suggests that for him such exceptions do not exist. What of the 
person who believes that his happiness is best pursued through 
immörälity? ='Such a person will remain unhappy until he applies 
his reason to the control of his affections towards natural ends. 
Therefore, the situation will not be "without remedy". Made 
unhappy by his conscience, the' individual will attempt to amend 
his ethical failing's by using his reason to direct his actions 
towards moral ends. 
- IV - 
To pursue the natural affections, keeping the self 
affections within their proper limits, and eliminating the 
unnatural affections, will allow us to be happy in the pursuit 
* ".... one of these principles of action, conscience ... " plainly bears upon it marks of authority over all the rest, 
and claims the absolute direction of them all, to allow or 
forbid their gratification. " 
Butler, Fifteen Sermons. "Preface". See Raphael (ed. ) 
British Mora ists, I, 330. 
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of virtuous'ends', Given this, the final question which this 
chapter will seek, to answer is, What is the relationship between 
the various affections within a person who successfully controls 
his affections; follows Nature's purpose, and attains happiness? 
When'-. Shaftesbury discusses the relationship between the 
affections-he refers to a. "balance". Thus, when he discusses 
the "united structure and fabric of the mind" he says that 
in this constitution the"impairing of any part must 
instantly tend to the disorder and ruin of other 
parts, and of the whole itself, through'the necessary 
F, -,.,.. connection andßbalance. of, the affections ... 042 
The term',: balance here means nothing more than the ratio of the 
affections which may vary from person to person. However, given 
a balance-within-a-`particular person, Shaftesbury claims that 
the strength of one affection cannot be changed without affect- 
ing the strength of'the'others. A weakening of the natural 
affections will make the self affections both relatively and 
quantitatively stronger within the mind of any individual. This 
is their-Necessary connection and balance. " 
The-correct balance of the affections within any person 
maybe said to exist when his actions (which are a product of 
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his passions or affections*) are directed towards the moral 
goals. which are dictated by Nature. This will be a'balance 
between the natural or social affections and the self affections; 
the unnatural affections being absent (see above Chapter Three). 
Whatever, the strength of the self and natural affections in 
any person, the correct balance for any individual will be when 
his actions are directed towards the common good of society. 
Thus, the strength of any affection must be determined by looking 
at man's higher end as' a social being. Because this is the 
measure, even the natural affections may have to be limited; for 
they must not be allowed to weaken the individual's ability to 
pursue the public good', "as when pity is so overcoming as to 
destroy its own end, 'and'prevent-the succour and relief 
required .... "48° However, as was stated in the last chapter, 
the 
natural affections are always'superior within a moral individual 
because their immediate end is the'system of society, which is a 
higher end than that of the'individual alone. Also, as we have 
seen in the present chapter, to be happy we must pursue the 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
* "Whatsoever therefore is done or acted by any animal as such, 
is done only through some affection or passion, as of fear, 
love, or hatred moving him. " 
Characteristics, I, 285. 
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mental pleasures which are derived from the natural affections. 
Because of the "necessary"connection and balance of the 
affections", tobe thus happy involves a conscious effort to 
make the self-affections-serve our social (natural) purpose. *' 
In the pursuit of our self-interest-(if defined as our happiness) 
we-, must'-pursue the public interest. By pursuing the one, we 
automatically pursue the other, if we"are successful in our 
pursuit of either. 
Concerning the' relationship between self-interest and public 
interest Stanley-Grean has written, 
1, The problem is not'. one of either self-interest or, 
public interest,, but. rather o -F-self-interest am 
public interest. Since, in'Shaftesbury's system, 
men have diverse interests and a variety of. motiva- 
tions, it is his. conviction that it`is always 
possible to work out, effectual and satisfying 
combinations of private and public interest. In the 
kind of universe he believed in this is not only the 
ethical ideal, it is the ideal possibility"44 
As we have seen above, Grean is correct when he says that for 
----------------------------=---------------------------------- 
* "And thus the affections towards private good become 
necessary and essential'to goodness: .... since 
it is 
impossible"thýt-the public good or good of`the system can 
be preserved without them, it follows that a creature 
really wanting in-them is in reality wanting in some 
degree to goodness and natural rectitude.... " 
Characteristics, I, 288. 
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Shaftesbury ' the 'problem' (of moral choice) is one' of self-interest 
and public- interest. In Shaftesbury's`philosophy`the one does 
not contradict the other. ' However, because Shaftesbury talks in 
terms 'of a balance between the self and social affections, this 
does not, mean he was searching for a satisfactory balance or 
combination of the self and public-interests. There is no 
necessary relationship between self affections and self interest, 
and between social affections and public interest (as Grean 
appears to assume) in Shaftesbury's philosophy. Self-interest is 
not solely a product of the self affections, but a product of 
a combination of self and social affections. This combination 
of affections also pursues the public interest. Thus, self- 
interest and public interest are not opposed in the same way 
that self affections and public affections may be, * they are 
not attained by separate modes of thought and action, and it is 
* It must be remembered that "self-interest" and "public 
interest" are for Shaftesbury pejorative terms which refer 
to the products of'the affections of that individual in 
whom there is a correct, moral balance between the self 
and natural affections. Thus, when Shaftesbury uses the 
term "self-interest" he is referring to our "real" self- 
interest; as opposed to mistaken ideas concerning where 
our interest lies. 
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not necessary to make a, choice between them. * Both self and 
social or public interests are-the simultaneous product of 
the same balance of'affections and the consequent actions. 
The individual who recognises himself as a person who should 
follow those affections which contribute to the overall design 
of Nature, is the person in whom this connection of interests 
will find realisation. 
---00000--- 
SUMMARY: 
Beginning with a recognition of the central role that the 
idea of an. ordered cosmos, plays in Shaftesbury's philosophy, the 
first two-sections of. this chapter are concerned with some of 
-------------------- -------- 
* "If there can possibly be supposed in a creature such an 
affection towards self-good as is actually, 'in its natural 
degree, conducing to his private interest, and at the same 
time inconsistent' with-the public good, this may indeed be 
called still a vicious affection; and on this supposition 
a creature' cannot really be good and natural in respect of 
his society or public, without being ill and unnatural towards 
himself. " Shaftesbury cannot accept this hypothesis. Dis- 
tinguishing between self-interest and selfishness he writes, 
"And thus if there be found in any creature a more than 
ordinary self-'concernment or regard to private good, which 
is inconsistent with the interest of the species or public, 
this must in every respect be esteemed an ill and vicious 
affection. " It is this which makes us immoral and unhappy 
(see above) and "this is what we commonly call selfishness, 
and disapprove so much in whatever creature we happen to 
discover it. " Characteristics, Is 247-8. 
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the implications of this concept. Section I'-directs-our 
attention to the following points in relation to Shaftesbury's 
writings: 
1) That the optimistic interpretation involves an 
acceptance of all', tmisfortune as necessary to the 
welfare of the whole. 
2) 
, 
That misfortune is only thought to exist when-we 
misinterpret events. Shaftesbury recommends that we 
be content with all that occurs in the recognition 
that the general mind pursues our own best interest as 
well as that of the whole. 
3) That to help us maintain this attitude recommended 
in 2), we should always remember that the body, with its pains and pleasures, has no moral significance. 
4) That just as there is no misfortune, there is no, 
evil in. the universe. 
However, in relation. to the last point here, it is recognised 
that Shaftesbury also, "contradictorily, recognises the exist- 
ence of'evil in the world*when-he advocates moral reform'. 
Three explanations of this contradiction are: 
1) That evil,. even when recognised by Shaftesbury , 
remains, a human, relative concept with no absolute 
validity., 
2) That the perfect cosmos is a "hypothesis", not 
necessarily true, which serves to encourage men in 
their pursuit of virtue-and the rejection of evil. 
3)' That the perfection of Nature, in which all 
things are directed. towards natural ends, is a 
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tendency. rather-than a, necessity.: Evil may exist 
when men choose to contradict Nature. 
ýý f- 
Given these possibilities in Shaftesbury's thought, when in 
Section II we turn to a consideration of moral freedom in his 
writings,, we see two possibilities in formulating a definition: 
1) . If there. As no evil. and , all things are necessarily perfect, then freedom is the freedom of 
the mind from all physical considerations in its 
attempt to conform with the will of Nature's general 
mind. This is the freedom to choose between follow- 
ing Nature willingly'or'being forced to conform with 
Nature's plan'against one's will. 
2) ' Within the context of'a'cosmos in which there 
is evil, 'the individual is free to choose between 
alternative actions which will affect the environ- 
mental situation. The individual is granted a freedom 
to create not only a moral character, but a moral 
environment where none would otherwise have existed. 
Given the possibility of an individual both knowing and pursuing 
moral ends, Section III considers the question of why man 
should attempt to act morally; that is, we look at Shaftesbury's 
explanation of moraliobligation. * Shaftesbury stresses that 
-----------------------=------------------------------------- Two points relevant, to moral obligation in Shaftesbury's philo- 
sophy were made earlier'in'Chapter Two. Firstly, we should 
not pursue virtue through fear of God. Secondly, because 
moral knowledge implies moral"action, the question of obliga- 
tion to moral action need not-arise. . We will automatically 
be virtuous in our actions' if we perceive moral truth. How- 
ever, that Shaftesbury was not entirely satisfied with this 
second explanation is demonstrated by the elaborate explana- 
tion of happiness as a product of virtuous thoughts and actions 
as outlined in the present chapter. 
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even if we accept all things as predetermined"in a perfect 
whole, we must still pursue moral action. This is because of 
our sense of responsibility as rational beings. ' However, this 
is not Shaftesbury's explanation of obligation which, as out- 
lined in the Inquiry, -, is-.! based-upon the individuals pursuit 
of happiness. 'Referring to the affections, Shaftesbury 
attempts to show that, - 
1) The mental pleasures of the. natural affections 
provides us with our greatest happiness. 
2) Over-indulgence in the self affections creates 
unhappiness. 
3) Any presence of the unnatural affections creates 
unhappiness. 
Upon these conclusions Shaftesbury recommends that we follow the 
natural affections, which direct us towards moral ends. It is 
a recommendation which is made on grounds of self-interest. If 
we are to realise'our self-interest (i. e. our happiness) we must 
also realise the common good. It is noted that, as a consequence 
of this proclaimed unity between happiness (self-interest) and 
morality, Shaftesbury wäs condemned by Butler for denying the 
authority of the conscience - which would come into effect if 
our happiness were seen by us to involve immorality. 
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Section IV. considers Shaftesbury's belief that when we 
pursue our self-interest, the balance created between the 
affections will be such as will effect a pursuit of the public 
interest. The point is stressed that, for Shaftesbury, the 
self and public interests are not alternatives, nor are they 
achieved by different sorts of action. The pursuit of either 
interest involves the satisfaction of both, although, as is 
stated in Section III, for Shaftesbury the public interest 
appears to be of greater significance and the private interest 
(personal happiness)°subordinate to it. 
---00000--- 
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k CHAPTER FIVE .I 
n- BEAUTY AND-MORALITY IN SHAFTESBURY'S, THOUGHT 
_I_ 
In Chapter One of this work it was recognised that 
Shaftesbury's philosophy contains°a non-rational element which 
stands in contrast to his references to reason as the means 
-whereby'we can', recognise moral truth. However, with the excep- 
tion of occasi&nal references to the'non-rational'"moral''sense", 
Chapters}Two, 'Three and Four have'discussed Shaftesbury's ideas 
within ,a context, of his "rationalism". In so doing, that which 
has often been considered the, central aspect of Shaftesbury's 
thought has been: put on one side; that is, the element in 
ShaftesburyM's wri+tings" which "brought into . prominence 
the 
significance of, immediate feeling, determined by instinct, for 
ethical judgements .... "l 
That Shaftesbury consciously opposed rationalism may be 
doubted, for there is a repeated ' appeal, to reason in his works. 
However, 'that "Shaftesbury .... gave a decided stimulus to` 
emotionalism .. e.. "2 seems 
to be accepted. Consequently, there 
is a contrast between reason and emotion in Shaftesbury's 
writings, 'and it i's this that has often led to criticism of his 
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ideas. It has been said of him that his "analysis of the act 
of moral approbation .... does not discriminate with sufficient 
precision between'the rational and emotional elements in our 
moral judgements .... "3 The aim of the present chapter is to 
draw together those elements in'Shaftesbury's writings that 
make-up the emotional theory of morality. 
The'basis of the emotional theory of morality is what 
Shaftesbury believes tolbe. an attraction, found in all men, 
towards beauty: 
Nothing'surely is more strongly imprinted on our 
minds, or more closely interwoven with our souls, 
than the idea. or sense of order and proportion .... What a difference there is between harmony and dis- 
cord! cadency and convulsion! What a difference 
between composed and orderly motion, and that which 
is ungoverned and accidental! between the regular 
and uniform pile of some noble architect, and a 
heap of sand or stones! between an organised body, 
and a mist or cloud driven by the wind! 4 
This difference between the beautiful and the non-beautiful is 
perceived. by a "plain internal sensation" which is non-rational. 
This we may term the moral or aesthetic sense which can appreciate 
beauty in all its forms. Thus, if we consider beauty as it 
is found In Nature., or:, in_the creation of an artist or virtuoso, 
our recognition of it (i. e. beauty). will depend on this 
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non-rational' element within us all-. * 
However, beauty is not only to be appreciated'in the 
external object, but can also be found as a quality of mind. 
That is, Shaftesbury conceives an internal beauty as well as an 
external beauty; there is beauty in the affections as well as 
beauty in a work of art. This inner beauty involves the same 
principle as external beauty; and, the appreciation of this 
beauty is by means of the same aesthetic sense. This is made 
clear by Shaftesbury in the following statement: 
The case is the same in the mental or moral subjects 
as in the ordinary bodies or common subjects of sense. 
The shapes, motions, colours, and proportions of 
these latter being presented to our eye, there 
necessarily resultsýa beauty or, deformity, according 
to the different measure, arrangement, and disposition 
of their several parts. So in behaviour and actions, 
when presented to our Understanding, there must be 
found, of necessity, an apparent difference, accord- 
ing &the regularity or irregularity of the subjects. 
The mind, which is spectator or auditor of other minds, 
" cannot be without its eye and ear, so as to discern 
proportion, distinguish sound, and scan each sentiment 
or thought which comes before it. It can let nothing 
escape its censure. It feels the soft and harsh, the 
* "Every one is a virtuoso of a higher or lower degree. Every 
one pursues a Grace and courts a Venus of one kind or 
another. The venustum, the'honestum, the decorum of things 
will force its way. " -Character stics, I, 92. 
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agreeable and disagreeable in the affections; and 
finds a foul and fair, a harmonious and a dissonant, 
-, -as really and truly here as in any musical numbers 
or in the outward forms or representations of sen- 
sible things. Nor can it withhold its admiration 
and ecstacy, its aversion and scorn, any more in 
what relates to one than to the other of these 
subjects. So that to deny the common and natural 
sense of a sublime and beautiful in things, will 
appear an affectation merely, to any one who con- 
sidersYduly of this affair. 5 
This being the case, it must be recognised that the activities 
of artists, of creators of beauties external to the mind, are 
directed by a moral 'sense', and appeal to that sense when they 
present us with works of art. Thus, concerning his "frequent 
recourse to the rules of'common artists, to the masters of 
exercise, to the academies of painters, statuaries, and to the 
rest of the virtuoso tribe, " Shaftesbury says, 
I am persuaded that to be a virtuoso (so far as befits 
a gentleman) is a higher step towards the becoming 
a. man of virtue and good sense than the being what 
in this age we calla scholar. 6 
By following beauty in external things we prepare ourselves for 
the pursuit of beauty in the affections. The balance and order 
which'is sought for in outward things will be applied to the 
balance between the affections. When the balance is correct it 
will be beautiful, and our characters will be moral. Instead 
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of our discovering the correct balance of'the affections by 
reason, the affections will now be'judged and arranged accord- 
ing to their beauty. 
The aesthetic sense in Shaftesbury's writings provides us 
with a means of distinguishing between moral good and evil in 
affections and-actions. * Also, in the concept of the moral or 
aesthetic sense is found a further means for resolving the pro- 
blem of obligation to moral action which was. discussed in the 
last chapter. This is because the moral sense not only dis- 
tinguisIes"between good and bad, but is also a passion or desire 
whichaattracts'üs towards beauty. It is this "passion" which 
inspires the artist. It is "the love of numbers, decency and 
proportion. "7 Shaftesbury also terms the passion for beauty 
"enthusiasm", which is the moral sense as it can be seen 
functioning. As Philocles says to Theocles in the discussion of 
---------------------------------------------------- -------- 
* "No sooner the eye. opens upon figures, the ear to sounds, than 
straight the beautiful results. and grace and harmony are known 
and acknowledged. No sooner are actions viewed, no sooner 
the human affections and passions discerned (and they are most 
of-them as soon discerned as felt) than straight an inward eye 
distinguishes, and sees the fair and shapely, the amiable 
and admirable, apart from the deformed, the foul, the odious, 
or the despicable. " Characteristics, II, 137. 
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"beauty" that can-be-found in The Moralists: 
If there be any seeming extravagance in the case I 
must comfort myself the best I can, and consider 
that all'sound love`and admiration is enthusiasm: 
"The transports of poets, the sublime of orators, 
the rapture of musicians, the high strains of the 
virtuosi - all mere enthusiasm!.... " 
And I, replied,, Theocles, am content that you should 
call this love of ours enthusiasm, allowing it the 
privilege of its fellow-passions-8 
Enthusiasm in this context*forms the link between appreciation 
of beauty and creation of beautiful works by artists. In the 
moral context it is the link between the ability to distinguish 
the beautiful, and the creation within of a beautiful character. 
The moral sense involves the desire to-possess beauty, which 
involves the_obligationýto, create a beautiful (moral) balance of 
the affections - which will form the basis for beautiful 
(moral) 
actions. 
Shaftesbury argues "that there is a power in numbers, 
harmony, proportion, and beauty of every kind, which naturally 
captivates the heart, and raises the imagination to an opinion 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
* As will. be seen below, Chapter Six, Shaftesbury condemned 
certain forms of enthusiasm. 
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or conceit of something majestic and divine. " Without this 
relationship to the beautiful, men would not be able to raise 
themselves beyond the desire to satisfy sensual ends. Without 
it 
The animal functions might in their course be carried 
on; but nothing further sought for or regarded. The 
gallant sentiments, the elegant fancies, the belles 
passions which have, all of them, this beauty in view, 
wouldbe set aside, and leave us probably no other 
employment than that of satisfying our coarsest 
appetites at the cheapest rate, in order to the attain- 
ment of a supine state of indolence and inactivity-9 
But man does more than satisfy his immediate desires. He also 
has creative abilities. Man is creative in the arts, in morals, 
and 'in human society (which partakes of the other two - see 
below and Chapter Eight). 'Man is presented with a Nature 
(external and internal, environmental and'psychological), which 
is capable'of being changed and developed by him. How is this 
possible? Because man possesses a non-rational desire for'the 
beautiful in all its manifestations. It is this that Shaftesbury 
calls "divine enthusiasm". By acting upon this enthusiasm, 
which is also termed a "divine passion", all men try to possess 
beauty. In this activity, they also attempt to create beautiful 
things. In so doing they change their environment, and develop 
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both the arts and society. Men also attempt to create beauty 
of the affections (their psychological or internal nature). 
This creativity, which places man above the animals as a 
creature who develops both his environment and personality, is 
the product of "divine enthusiasm", the desire to possess beauty. 
Before the desire for the beautiful can be effective as a 
force for moral and aesthetic development, man must have the 
ability to recognise beauty, to know beauty when he sees it. 
This ability, as we have seen, is provided by the moral or 
aesthetic sense. The moral sense and enthusiasm thus become 
parts of the same process of human creativity. It is difficult 
to distinguish between them as they appear in Shaftesbury's 
writings. Perhaps the best way of describing them is to say 
that the moral sense is made functional by means of enthusiasm. 
In this way the one becomes dependent upon the other. The moral 
sense needs enthusiasm before it can become effective. Enthu- 
siasm'can not be"given direction without'guidance from the moral 
sense. However, it should be remembered that very often they 
appear to be the same thing - another example of Shaftesbury's 
lack of clarity in his use of major concepts. 
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- II - 
According to Shaftesbury if we follow "divine enthusiasm" 
we will progress beyond the sphere of external beauties to the 
beauties of the mind and the affections. The beauties that are 
to be found within the'mind are superior to those which exist 
in the external world. "Look! see: - What? where? -I can look 
into my mind and see 'finer things by much. "1° "Therefore, 
remember ever the garden and groves within. There build, there 
erect what statues, what virtues, what ornaments or orders of 
architecture thou thinkest noblest. "" 
Others may pursue different forms and fix their eye 
on different`-species-(as all men do on one or other) 
[of beauty]. The real honest man, however plain or 
simple he appears', has the highest species, honesty 
itself, in view; and instead of outward forms or 
symmetries', ' is struck with that of inward character, 
the harmony and numbers of the heart and beauty of 
the affections, 'which form the manners and conduct 
of 
.a 
truly social life. 12 
Our morality ' depends upon the. recognition of beauty in the 
affections by, the enthusiastic aesthetic sense. If beauty is 
not found there, then our desire for beauty which the aesthetic 
sense-involves will attempt. to create it. Consequently, virtue 
in the non-rational-context of Shaftesbury's philosophy is "no 
other than a noble enthusiasm justly directed and regulated by 
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that high standard which he supposes in the nature of things. ""13 
However,: the enthusiasm for beauty which directs us towards 
the creation of a moral character looks beyond the self towards 
even higher expressions of beauty. Shaftesbury claims that 
"beauty of. every kind .... raises the imagination to an opinion 
or conceit of something majestic and divine. "14 That "something" 
is an ordered cosmos, a beautiful whole. Experience with beauty 
impresses men'with the idea that their attempts to'create beauty 
for themselves, in either their character or in a work of art, 
have reference to something which is of higher significance than 
their subjective desires and satisfactions. * Enthusiasm there- 
fore encourages men to`look beyond themselves towards the beauty 
of Nature. Maintaining his belief in the general mind of Nature, 
Shaftesbury sees this mind as having made the whole beautiful 
by imparting a harmonious design into it. 
Accepting that the whole is beautiful, Shaftesbury presents 
his readers with a natural hierarchy of beauty in relation to 
which the individual may attempt to progress towards full 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
* Compare with what was stated above, Chapter Three, towards 
the, end, of Section: II, concerning the "necessary" emergence 
of the idea of an ordered cosmos. 
k 
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comprehension of the object of his "divine passion" or 
enthusiasm. This is presented in The Moralists as follows: 
1) At-the, lowest level there is physical beauty, 
"the lineaments of a fair face, or the well-drawn pro- 
portions of a human body .... " 
2)F Above this, there is the beauty of the mind of a 
moral individual. 
3) Looking further, the "aspiring soul" sees the 
beauty of, human relationships which result from the 
social actions of moral individuals; the "harmony of 
particular minds" which forms a "commonweal". 
4).. Looking beyond a particular. community, the 
enthusiastic love of beauty ". frames itself a nobler 
object, and with enlarged affection seeks the good 
of mankind. " Beauty is now sought in "Laws, con- 
stitutions,, civil and religious rites; whatever 
civilises. or'polishes, rude mankind; the sciences and 
arts, philosophy, morals, virtue; the flourishing 
state-of human affairs, and the-perfection of human 
nature """"ýý15 
All-theserfirst four orders of beauty are'the sphere within 
which;; the virtuoso finds his purpose. Depending upon the 
degree of progress made by the individual in his appreciation 
of beauty, he will be""a virtuoso of a higher or lower degree. " 
All men fit somewhere within the scale. "They who refuse to 
give it [the force of beauty] scope in the nobler subjects of 
a'rational and moral kind will find its prevalency elsewhere 
in an inferior order of things. "16 When, however, we progress 
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beyond the fourth order of beauty outlined above, we enter 
the realm of philosophy. The virtuoso learns "whatever is 
decent in company or beautiful in arts; and the sum of 
philosophy is, to learn what, is just in society and beautiful 
in Nature and the'order of the world. "17 The final two orders 
of beauty become, °°-b ý- +ý; 
5) The beauty of the cosmos in relation to which 
the beauties created and encouraged in (4) are com- 
plementary but subordinate. ''Love of beauty "rests 
not .... nor satisfies itself with the beauty of-a part, but, extending' further itsýcommun, icative bounty,, 
seeks the good of all, and affects the interest and 
prosperity of the whole. " 
6) Finally, the idea expressed in (5), that the 
whole is perfect, is seen by Shaftesbury to necess- 
arily involve the idea of a ruling mind, and this 
is seen to be the "supreme beauty": "And since all 
hope of this [a perfect whole] were; vain and idle if 
no universal mind presided .... 'tis here the generous mind labours to discover that healing cause 
by which the interest of the whole is securely 
established,, the beauty of things and the universal 
order happily. sustained. "18 
This is*Shaftesbury's expression of a harmonious cosmos, 
. beautiful as a result of being ruled by the general mind. How- 
ever, these final two elements in Nature's hierarchy of beauty, 
having been stated, recede into the background. In Shaftesbury's 
philosophy they are the basic principles of his system, central 
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to his' understanding. of the role of beauty in man's moral and 
social condition, but principles of faith rather than something 
which can be seen and appreciated by man. Shaftesbury's subject- 
matter remains within the first four orders as he provides 
explanation and advice to the virtuoso. What this involves 
within the context of what has been outlined in the present 
section will be discussed below. 
- III - 
When Shaftesbury directs our attention to the beauty of the 
whole, * he states that 
... .. having recognised this uniform consistent 
fabric, and owned the universal system, we must of 
consequence acknowledge a'universal mind.... For can 
it be supposed of any one in the world, that being 
in some desert far from, men, -and hearing there a 
11 
Although Shaftesbury says that by looking at Nature "you will 
be obliged to own the universal system and coherent scheme 
of things to be established on , abundant proof, capable of 
convincing any, fair and just contemplator of the works of 
Nature, ". the belief appears to precede the demonstration of 
order. "Think of the many parts of the vast machine in 
which we-have so little insight, and of which it is imposs- 
ible we should know the ends'and uses, when instead of see- 
ing to the highest pendants, we see only some lower deck, 
and are in this , 
dark case of flesh, confined even to the 
hold and meanest station of the vessel. " 
Characteristics, II, 65/66. 
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perfect symphony of music, or seeing an exact pile 
of'regular architecture arising gradually from the 
earth in all its orders and proportions, he should 
be pursuaded that at the bottom there was no design 
accompanying. this, no secret spring of thought, no 
active mind? 19 
The significance of this statement within our discussion of 
beauty is that Shaftesbury could not consider beauty as some- 
thing which occurs by accident. Beauty involves a creative 
act by a. being which has intelligence. This being implants 
design into the material with which it is working. The 
musician implänts'beäuty into sound; the sculptor into his 
clay; the architect into his bricks and mortar; the general 
mind into the material content of the universe. Because he 
thinks in this way Shaftesbury sees beauty as something which 
is distinct from that in which it is expressed. What then is 
beauty? Shaftesbury's reasoning appears to take the following 
line: 
1). Beauty becomes evident when an artist creates 
something; but beauty cannot be equated with the 
thing in which it is-found. 
2) Therefore, beauty mustbe'something which is 
added to an artist's material, but which is distinct 
from it. 
3) That which is added must be taken from the 
artist. 
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4) That which is taken from the artist is his 
art. 
A definition of beauty becomes a definition of the art of 
the creator of beauty. The created object is regarded as 
nothing more than a, vehicle for the expression of the activity, 
the art. This is what Shaftesbury means when he affirms that 
.. . '. the art is that which beautifies .... So that the beautifying, not the beautified, -is 
the really 
beautiful .... For that which is beautified, is beautiful only by the accession of something 
beautifying, and by the recess or withdrawing of 
the same, it ceases to be beautiful .... 20 
However,, in outlining what the concept of "beauty" involves 
Shaftesbury does not halt at this point. For behind the "art" 
or creative ability of the artist there lies the directing 
influence of the artist's mind. It is the mind which "regulates 
and orders", and which is the "principle of beauty". 
21 The mind 
provides the design which the art enables to be placed within 
a specific object. It is the mind which, through art, intro- 
duces beauty into its various modes of expression (i. e. into 
the creations of. an artist). Because this is the case, 
Shaftesbury directs our attention to the mind. We must look to 
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our non-material conceptions of the beautiful if we are to 
understand what beauty involves. 
When Skº f tesbc .º us o intellectual ideas of the " 
beautiful the concept of "form" becomes relevant. Form, which 
is, that which when added to the artist's material makes 
beautiful objects, music, buildings, paintings etc., is seen 
by. Shaftesbury to find its source in the mind. Beauty can be 
understood as an intellectual form, unadulterated by. sensual 
factors. When, the. artist appreciates this "innate idea" of the 
beautiful (see below) he can transfer form, through art, into 
externals. If we are to, -fully appreciate a 
beautiful work of 
art, -Shaftesbury tells us that we must appreciate this process, 
and recognise the intellectual characteristics of the created 
thing: 
. ':.. the, beautiful , the fair, , the comely, were never in the matter, but in the art and design; 
never in body itself, but in'the form or forming 
power. " Does not the beautiful form confess this, 
and speak the beauty'of the'design whenever it 
strikes you? What is it but the design which strikes? 
What is it you admire but mind, or the effect of 
mind? Tis mind alone which forms. All which is void 
of mind is`horrid, and matter formless is deformity 
itself. 22 
Beauty for. Shaftesbury involves both the creative process 
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(the art), and the intellectual conception of beauty (the form) 
which precedes the creative act. When we call an external 
object beautiful, it is to this dual characteristic which we 
should really be referring. -Similarly, if we return to the 
first extract from Shaftesbury's writings to be found in this 
section,, we see that Shaftesbury is saying that when we recog- 
nise the beauty of the whole, we should have in mind not the 
material. facade but the form and forming power, which is the 
design, that. has been imposed upon the matter by the general 
mind, of the universe. 
Beauty for. Shaftesbury implies an art, form, and mind; 
and, Shaftesbury says that when he refers to beauty he is 
referring to one or more of these things. This can not be said 
'to be a precise definition of what beauty is. For instance, he 
says that beauty. is, in "the form or forming power"; but whether 
it is one or both is never clarified. Nor is it made clear 
whether a distinction between these various aspects of beauty 
is possible. However,, it should be remembered that Shaftesbury 
was not concerned with dividing the idea of "beauty" into its 
component parts. His main concern was to persuade us that 
we all, have, in our. =feeling 
for beauty, a moral potential - that 
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is, beauty has an ethical as well as an aesthetic significance. 
As he says towards the end of the Characteristics, 
It has been the main scope and principle of these 
volumes, "to assert the reality of a beauty and 
charm in moral as well as natural subjects .... "23 
That the ethical standards which he believes to exist shall be 
of universal significance, Shaftesbury looks to permanent 
standards of beauty which are to be found within the minds of 
all individuals. For this reason he-directs our attention away 
from material objects and the beauty which may be thought to 
exist therein. We are told that we must look for beauty with- 
in the mind, and in'discovering it, discover there permanent 
principles of ethics. Shaftesbury's claim "that the beautifying, 
not the beautified 'I's the'reälly beäütiful" must be seen there- 
fore as ä means of making us-look'beyond the sensual evidence 
of beauty and consider the intellectual' principle of beauty 
which can be found in an innate form within all our minds (see 
below). We must attempt to discover within ourselves the moral 
and aesthetic principles that move the artist to create his 
works of art (see below). It is, therefore, possible to see 
Shaftesbury's definition of beauty that has been described in 
this section as a rhetorical piece rather than as a scientific 
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description of what beauty consists, of. Shaftesbury wants us 
to recognise that mind is a pre-requisite of beauty, ýthat 
beauty is a measure of the good, and that insofar as, we, all 
possess a mind we are capable of creating beauty for ourselves - 
we are all virtuosi. Finally, as well as appreciating beauty 
we will be able to contribute-to, the total amount, of beauty (as 
evidenced, by the sensual creations of an artist) which is 
present in the world. What this involves for Shaftesbury will 
now be considered. 
-IV- 
Shaftesbury's claim that all men have anon-rational 
aesthetic sense is tied to the idea that the individual is able 
to participate in'the ruling principle of the cosmos. In The 
Moralists, a work in which, we, -find a greater emphasis upon the 
emotional and aesthetic than the rational element in man, 
Shaftesbury informs us through Theocles that our "real self" is 
".:.. drawn out and copied from another principal and original 
Within this relation- self-(the Great One of the world).. .. "24 
ship, "the particular mind should seek its happiness in con- 
formity with the general one .... "25 "Conformity" is not 
attained by reason but by the emotional activity of the aesthetic 
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sense; and it is because of this that A. O. Alridge was able to 
write that "Shaftesbury's esthetic [sic] concepts are .... the 
logical extension of the stoic and classical training which 
dominated his tastes and conduct throughout his life, -1126 The 
attraction towards beauty which all men possess finds its source 
in the ruling principle or, general mind of the universe. Within 
the context of this belief Shaftesbury makes two assertions: 
1. That beauty always contributes to the purposes 
of Nature, serving the latter's moral design. 
2. That knowledge of beauty, and attraction to 
those things in which beauty is evinced, is "innate". 
Each of these claims will be examined in turn in the present 
section. 
In relation to the first assertion, that all beauty con- 
tributes to the moral design of Nature, let us examine the obscure 
statement made by Shaftesbury in his Sensus Communis, that "all 
beauty is-truth. "27 Truth here means for Shaftesbury the good of 
the whole* which is produced by the activity of a universal 
-------------------------- .......... -I -.. ---....... -. w-. -.. ý.. -----.. ---". --, 
* The truth` which'is'his beauty is'the oneness and rightness 
of the universe, for 'the good of which all the parts, includ- 
ing man, 'exist. There are'twb aspects to this truth. The 
first .... is the essential nature of things perceived by 
man. 'The second relates to man's own function .... 
The 
beauty, or the virtue, to be achieved by man is the management 
(Continued overleaf) 
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ruling principle. Ernst Cassirer has written that, for 
Shaftesbury 
.... "truth" signifies .... the inner intellectual structure of the universe .... which can only be immediately experienced and intuitively understood. 
This form of experience and of intuitive understand- 
ing is available in the phenomenon of the beautiful. 
Here the barrier between the world within and the 
world without disappears; both worlds are governed 
by the same all-inclusive law, which each expresses 
in its own manner. .... It is this kind of 
"reflec- 
tion" purified of all logically derived elements 
and showing the inner and outer worlds as indissolubly 
woven together, which we enjoy in the contemplation 
of the beautiful. 28 
Within this all-inclusive concept of the beautiful we see the 
controlling force of the universe. All beauty is seen to 
embody the general mind, and therefore is part of the moral 
design of Nature. When we say that something possesses beauty 
we are saying that it is in its natural state, and "acknowledg- 
ing that the proportionate and regular state is the truly 
prosperous and natural in every subject. " According to 
Shaftesbury, "the study and love of symmetry and order, on which 
---------------------- ---------- -------p---: ----page) (Continued from previous 
of his'life for the good of the whole (as shown particularly 
in the Inquiry) by developing whatever affections and activities 
make for the good of the whole, and eliminating whatever of 
them make against it. " Esther Tiffany, "Shaftesbury as 
Stoic", P. M. L. A., XXXVIII, 659. 
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beauty depends, " involves recognition of the fact that "beauty 
and truth are plainly joined with the notion of utility and 
convenience. "29 A thing which possesses beauty, whether 
animate or inanimate, has been given direction and performs its 
function - the function given to it by Nature. In man, that 
function is to perform the duties of a social being, which 
occurs when he has a beautiful balance of the affections. 
When man performs his function he is both beautiful himself 
and a creator of beauty. His aesthetic sense allows him to 
create beauty. We create beauty by means of a moral art (i. e. 
controlling the'affections) because our own minds (and aesthetic 
sense) are part of the general mind which is the origin of all 
beauty. Beauty is given to human relationships, beauty is 
instilled in the products of artistic activity, and beauty can 
be found in laws which encourage either of these activities - 
even the statesman is involved in contributing to the beauty in 
the world. These aspects of man's contribution to the beautific 
direction of the human race will be discussed below. At this 
juncture, what should be recognised is that insofar as we can 
participate in the realisation of beauty we are contributing to 
the design of Nature as determined by the general mind. As was 
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stated above, we are presented by Shaftesbury with a combination 
of aesthetics and stoicism. In the words of Cassirer: 
"Shaftesbury takes from ethics the Stoic demand for 'life accord- 
ing to nature' and applies it to aesthetics. The purest harmony 
between man and the world is attainable only through the medium 
of the beautiful .... ' The truth of the universe speaks, as it 
were, through the phenomenon of beauty .,,,, 
30 
Turning'to the second assertion listed above (i. e. that 
our knowledge of beauty is innäte)*we can begin by considering 
a criticism of`Locke's use of the innate which was made by 
Shaftesbury in a, letter"to Michael Ainsworth in 1709 (which can 
be found complete in Appendix B of this work). In this letter 
Shaftesbury condemns Löcke because he is seen to have continued 
in the path of Hobbes and denied the moral and social nature of 
man. 
'Twas Mr. LOCKE, that struck the home blow: for 
Mr. HOBBES's character and base slavish principles in government took off the poyson'of his philosophy. 
'Twas Mr. LOCKE that struck at all fundamentals, 
threw all order and virtue out of the world, and 
made the very deas of the .... unnatural, and 
without foundation in our minds. Innate is a word 
he poorly plays upon: the right word, t-ho' less 
ss used, is connatural. For what has birth or progress 
of the foetus out of the womb to do n this case? 
the question is not about the time the ideas enter'd, 
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or the:: moment that one body came-out of the other: 
but whether the constitution of man be such, that 
being adult-and rown up, at such or such a time, 
sooner or later 
? 
no matter when) the idea and sense 
of order, administration, .... inevitably, necessarily sprn3gup in him . 31 
` 
That Locke, his 
. 
father's. physician and childhood tutor to him- 
self, the respected philosopher with whom Shaftesbury maintained 
a., correspondenceuntil Locke's death, should. be tarred with the 
same brush as, Hobbes is, surprising. Two years prior to the 
above statement, , 
Shaftesbury had written to Ainsworth in praise 
of Locke's. Essay, Concerning Human Understanding. * Yet, it is 
the very epistemology of the Essay which Shaftesbury is 
-------------------- ------------- ---------- ------------------- 
* "...., I, am not sorry, that I lent'you Mr. LOCK's essay of 
humane understanding;, which may as well qualify for tusi ness 
and the world-, as for the sciences and a university. No 
one has done more towards the recalling of philosophy from barbarity, into use and practice of the world, and into 
the company of the better and politer sort; who might well 
be ashamed of it in its'other dress. No one has opened 
a better or'clearer way to reasoning. And above all, I 
wonder to hear him censured so much by any church of 
ENGLAND-men, för, advancing reason; and bringing the use of 
it so much into religion; when it is by this only that we 
fight against the enthusiasts, and repel the great 
enemies of our church. " 
Letters (1746)j-2. (Letter I, to Michael Ainsworth, 
Fe ruary 24th, 1706-7). 
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condemning in the later letter. The reason for this condemnation 
lies in Shaftesbury's'belief, common at the time, that in his 
Essay Locke had "destroyed" innate ideas. *, In so doing, Locke 
was seen by Shaftesbury to be encouraging the Hobbesian idea 
that right and wrong depend upon personal reactions, to external 
stimuli, as a consequence of which the ethical concepts come to 
have only a relative validity. . It is as a consequence of this 
interpretation of Locke's epistemology that Shaftesbury accuses 
him of making. "virtue and honesty" depend upon "fashion and 
opinion", and 'co. ndemnsý him with the following analogy in a letter 
to General Stanhope (1709): 
As if writing'to the Italian or other good masters, 
or understanders of music, he had said that the law 
of harmony was-opinion; or writing to the'maker of 
* That Locke was popularly thought to have renounced any 
innate contribution to knowledge can be seen in the following 
statement by Voltaire:. "MR. LOCKE after having destroyed 
innate ideas; after having fully renounced the vanity of 
believing that we think'always; after having laid down, 
from the most solid principles, that ideas enter the mind 
through the senses; having examined our simple and complex 
ideas; having traced the human mind through its several 
operations; having shewed that all languages in the world 
are imperfect, and the great abuse that is made of words at 
every moment, he at last comes to consider the extent or 
rather the narrow limits of human knowledge. " 
Letters Concerning the English Nation, 64. 
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scholars in statuary or architecture, he had said 
in general that the law of design or the law of beauty in these designing arts had been nion. Had 
Mr. Locke been ,av rtuoso, he woul 
onot 
have philo- 
sophised thus. For harmony is the beauty, the accord 
and proportion of sounds; and harmony is harmony l 
nature, let particular ears be ever so bad, or let 
men judge ever so ill of music. So is architecture 
and its beauty the same, And founded in nature, let 
men's fancy be ever so Gothic .... The same is the case of virtue and honesty; the honestum and the 
decorum in society, for which you, myfrfriend, can 
never, I know, lose your relish-32 
The aesthetic analogy is no accident. Because he was pursuing 
universal standards, Shaftesbury thought that man should have 
a common measure, This measure, in the'aesthetic context of 
Shaftesbury's thought, is the innate idea of order and propor- 
tion which manifests itself in the workings of the aesthetic 
sense independently of the particular experiences which any 
person may. have. No matter how much he may admire Locke's 
rationalism, when Shaftesbury attempts to discover the non- 
rational source of ethical truth he rejects what he considers 
to be the ethical limitations of Locke's epistemological method. 
Shaftesbury will not allow that man has no innate ideas. 
However, as we have seen above in the extract from the letter 
to Michael Ainsworth, Shaftesbury prefers the term "connatural" 
to "innate". This is because Shaftesbury is not concerned with 
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the origin of the idea of beauty, but with stressing the 
necessary presence of. it within the minds of all men. In this 
way-he re-emphasises his lack of concern with epistemological 
enquiry,. resting satisfied with his conviction that man's moral 
x and social nature is inherent to his species rather than some- 
thing. which depends upon external influences. * In the letter 
to Stanhope that has been quoted above, Shaftesbury writes that 
it is 
Not whether the very philosophical propositions 
about right and wrong were innate; but whether the 
passion or affection towards society was such: that 
is to say, whether it was natural and came of it- 
self, or was taught by art, and was the product of 
a lucky hit of some first man who inspired and 
delivered down the prejudice. 33 
We see here that Shaftesbury is not concerned with human 
knowledge when he refers to the innate or the connatural, but 
with human instinct. ` The innate idea for Shaftesbury is not 
a rationally identifiable intellectual object, but an emotional 
------------------------------------- ------- ------------------- 
* This does not 'prevent Shäftesbury from emphasising the 
importance of certain forms of political environment for 
encouraging the emergence of the idea as the controlling 
factor in making practical decisions (see below Chapters 
Seven and Eight). 
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tendency or desire which he thought must necessarily arise in 
all men. * When he says that, -"if you dislike the word innate, 
It was suggested.. in Chapter Two, (in a footnote in Section 
I) that the innate or connatural idea of Shaftesbury is 
similar to the general principles of natural law of Aquinas. 
This can be seen if we compare what has been said in the 
present section concerning Shaftesbury with the following 
interpretation of Aquinas's philosophy that has been made 
by Jacques Maritain: ".... let us stress that human 
reason [in the philosophy of Aquinas] does not dis, cover'. 
the regulations of natural law in anabstract and theoreti- 
cal manner, as a series of geometrical theorems. Nay more, 
it does not, discover them through the-conceptual, exercise 
of. the intellect, or by way of rational knowledge. .... When he [Aquinas]"says that human reason discovers the 
regulations of natural law through the guidance of the 
inclinations of human nature, he means that the very mode- 
or manner in which human reason knows natural law is not 
rational knowledge, but knowledge through inclinationr: 
That kind of knowledge is not clear knowledge through 
concepts and conceptual judgements; it is obscure, un- 
systematic, vital'knöwledge by connaturality or congeniality, 
in which the intellect, in, order'to bear judgement, consults 
and listens to the inner melody that the vibrating strings 
of abiding tendencies make present in the,, subject. " 
Man and the State, 91/2. 
See also Eric d'Arcy's analysis of Aquinas's "synderesis" (the method of appreciating the general principles of natural 
law): ' "For Aquinas.. '. the first moral principles are like 
the axioms only in their logical primacy -not in the way they 
are self-evident. They are not analytic propositions, seen 
to be true simply by studying,. the: meaning of their subject 
and predicate. In 'St. Thomas"theory, the clue to the evid- 
." ence of-. the-ethical 'axioms' lies in natural Inclination Conscience and Its Right to Freedom, 60. 
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let us"change it, if you will-, for instinct, and call instinct' 
that which Nature teaches, exclusive of art, culture, or 
discipline, "34 he'is referring to"an emotional or instinctive 
attraction towards certain things. Within the aesthetic con- 
text of the present chapter Shaftesbury can be`seen emphasising 
the attraction towards beauty which is found in all'of us. The 
innate idea-for Shaftesbury must=therefore be'seen as the 
equivalent of the aesthetic or''moral'sense which allows us to 
make an emotional distinction between the good and the bad, and 
which (under the influence of enthusiasm) prefers the former. 
ItIis a se`nse`which exists from Nature. It may be developed, 
in ' which 'ca`se' it, becomes the source of artistic creation (see 
below). Without development it is a means whereby we can, and 
do', ' serve Nature's purpose'by being moral. Shaftesbury even 
goes-'so far as to'say. that, in moral questions, "Men's first 
thoughts in' this'matter are generally better than their second: 
their natural notions better than those refined by study or 
consultation with casuists. , 
35 However, Shaftesbury also 
thought it necessary to develop a taste, which involves the 
development of the aesthetic"sense rather than the acceptance 
of spontaneity as`our guide in moral questions (see below). 
198 
The denial of'innate ideas was, therefore, seen by - 
Shaftesbury 'to'be the denial of the possibility of universal 
moral standards, and the denial of man's necessary attraction 
towards those sorts of actions which bring him into an ethical 
relationship'withlhis''fellow'beings. This is because the' 
supposed presence within all men of an aesthetic sense is 
regarded by Shaftesbury as°an innate idea. However, we should 
note'that'Shaftesbury's'lack of concern with epistemological 
questions results in a failure to distinguish between knowledge 
and emotion, principles and feelings, ideas and instincts. We 
can never be sure whether he is referring to "beauty" as-an 
intellectual form or as a creative force, as a category or as 
a function. Within the context of his aesthetic writings, ' 
where the. appeal is, to emotion or instinct more often than to 
reason, the functional use of the concept is more likely to be 
involved. The innate idea of the beautiful, termed also the 
connatural idea, instinct, or the moral sense, as Ernst Cassirer 
noted, "is not a content gained from experience or an idea 
present in the mind from'the first as a stamped coin; it is 
rather a specific basic direction, a pure energy, and an original 
function of the spirit. "36 This function involves the ability 
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to recognise the desire to apply aesthetic criteria (order, 
harmony, and proportion) to all human activities. In this 
process we'act as artists or virtuosi, a'role which is seen by 
Shaftesbury'to'be of equal importance to the role of the states- 
man in"society. For both the artist'and the statesman create 
things which-rank in-'the fourth order of, beauty in his con- 
ceived hierarchy"- see above. Why this 'importance is given to 
the artist will be discussed in'the next section. 
- v- 
i 
In order to understand the moral role of the artist or 
virtuoso in Shaftesbu'ry's thought, we must look at his develop- 
ment of the concept of "form" (first introduced into the dis- 
cussion in Section III above). Shaftesbury distinguishes 
between "three degrees or orders of beauty, "37 which are 
described'by him as three types of form. These are, 
1)' Dead forms 
2) Forms which form 
3) Forms which form other creative forms 
By "dead forms" Shaftesbury appears to mean the material objects 
in which beauty is found. He is referring to the "beautified" - 
such things as "the palaces, the coins, the brazen or the marble 
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figures of men . 1138 Those things, in fact, that in Section III 
above. we saw him deny as belonging to the beautiful genre in 
his. attempt to direct our attentions towards the origin and 
creative process involved. in,. the creation of beautiful things. 
Dead forms, regarded now as the lowest level of beauty, "are 
formed, whether by man or Nature, but have no forming power, 
no-action, or intelligence. "39 This form of beauty is found at 
the lowest level. in the hierarchy of beauty described in 
Section II. 
. 
Forms which. form,. "that is, which have intelligence, action, 
and operation, "40 are the minds of men as they create both dead 
forms and. a. balance_of affections within the self. 
At-is-when-We consider the third type of beauty, "which 
forms not. only such as we call forms but even the forms which 
form, " that we find explanations of why Shaftesbury held the 
activity of painters and writers in such high esteem, why he 
placed the activities and creations of'such virtuosi above the 
moral activity of an individual who creates within himself a 
moral character, and what he considered to be the aim and the 
measure of artistic accomplishment. For it was Shaftesbury's 
claim that an artist,, if his work is to be declared successful, 
4 
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should encourage the creation of amoral character within those 
persons who take pleasure in looking at or listening to his 
creation. The creation should stimulate the aesthetic sense of 
the person who is appreciating it, so that appreciation"promotes 
the prerequisite conditions for the creation of a moral charac- 
ter within the individual. 'In'other words, the form, the 
"architecture, music, and all of which is of human invention, ""41 
creates the appropriateýmentaiity in man, which in turn, will 
create a beautiful";, balance., of the affections (i. e. a form 
which forms). When art succeeds in this task it must be con- 
sidered on the same-level as'good laws, which encourage the 
innate moral elements in-the citizens over which they rule -jsee 
below Chapters Seven and Eight. 
Artistic creations lead to an emergence of the innate idea 
of beauty within ourselves and the use of it to balance our 
affections. This is the automatic effect of true art: 
Who can admire the outward beauties and not recur 
instantly'to the inward, which are the most real and 
essential, the most naturally affecting, and of the 
highest pleasure, as well, as profit and advantage? 42 
Art therefore encourages men to follow their natures, fulfil 
their purposes, and be happy because of the predominance of the 
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natural affections in the balance of affections which is 
attained - see above, Chapter Four. The question that now must 
be answered is, What will be the content of those artistic 
creations that encourage this'reaction in the-spectator? What 
does Shaftesbury think this moral propaganda, which delimits 
the legitimate sphere of artistic activity, will involve? We 
can see Shaftesbury's answer to these questions in the Notion 
that was published 'after his death. He concludes-in this essay 
that the painter should direct his'energies towards the 
creation-of a work that contains the following characteristics: 
Firstly, each part of the work should contribute to the 
creation of 'a, uniform whole - in the same way that Nature must 
be regarded as a whole: 
And thus it is, that in general, thro' all the 
plastick Arts,. or Works of Imitation, "Whatsoever 
is drawn from. Nature, 'with the intention of raising 
in us the Imagination of natural Species or Object, 
according toreal'Beaut and Truth, shou, 'd be com- 
priz'd in certain compleat Portions, or bistricts, 
which represent the Correspondency or Union of 
each part of Nature, with intire NATURE her-self- ýý43 
Secondly, a painting should represent the moral purpose of the 
object that is being painted - that is, the moral purpose given 
to it by Nature. Thus, in addition to "the Knowledge of a Whole 
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and Parts, ", Shaftesbury addsthat ".... 'twere to be wish'd 
that the Artist .... wou'd afterwards{ apply himself to the 
Study of moral and poetick Truth. . 
44 
Consequently; ' there are both structural-and ethical norms 
which the painter must conform to. If these norms are applied 
then the painting will'exhibit ! 'simplicity". In the essay 
entitled'"Simplicity" that can be found in the Philosophical 
Regimen we are told that 
.... where proportion and exactness are 
wanting, 
there it is that there Is a need of additions, 
ornaments; but, where order is preserved and 
perfection of art are attained,.. the rest only does 
prejudice and is an eyesore. 45 
If the artistic creation exhibits this simplicity, there will 
be no barrier to the recognition of the moral message which lies 
within the work. The true artist is concerned with the effect 
that his work has on the mind of those who view his work, not 
with the immediate sensual satisfaction that his work may give 
rise to: 
For of this imitative Art we may justly say; "That 
tho It borrows help indeed from Colours, and uses 
them, as means, to execute its Designs; It has 
nothing, 'however, more wide of its real Aim, or more 
remote from'its'Intention, than to make a shew of 
Colours, or from their mixture, to raise a separate 
and flattering Pleasure to the SENSE. "46 
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The artist's materials must always'remain subservient'to his 
moral design, to which end he must pursue simplicity rather 
than extravagance in his work. 
According to Shaftesbury, the'painter should'attempt to 
make his paintings exhibit a) a unity, b) morality, c) simplicity. 
If he succeeds'in'this task'it will mean that he`is moral him- 
self, instils morality into his paintings, and encourages the 
morality of others. These are the ends of artistic activity 
and can be used to measure the success of other arts than paint- 
ing. The material with which the artist works is not important 
as long as the ethical message is communicated. If he is 
successful, bY'following the aesthetic sense within himself he 
partakes of the creative force of Nature. * At the microcosmic 
* Cassirer writes of Shaftesbury's theory of artistic creativity; 
"In the contemplation of'the beautiful, man turns from the 
world of created things to the world'of the creative process, 
from the universe äs a receptacle of the objectively real 
, 
to the operative forces which have shaped this universe and 
constitute its'inner coherence. .... The true significance 
of the creation of man in God's image does not appear so long 
as man still remains'in the sphere of'created things, of the 
empirically-real, and tries to copy the order and outline of 
this world; ' it -is revealed only in'that original' 
inspiration 
which precedes every genuine work of art. " 
E. Cassirer; The Philosophy'of the Enlightenment, 316. 
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level he creates-in miniature a moral whole that involves beauty, 
encourages beauty, and reflects his own beautiful character 
which necessarily conforms with'Nature insofar as it is con- 
trolled by the aesthetic sense. When this"is done', the artist 
is seen by Shaftesbury tobe a "just Prometheus under Jove" as 
he directs himself, his works, and others towards moral ends: 
In his-Soliloquy, Shaftesbury writes, of the successful 
poet:,, 
Such a poet is indeed a second Maker; a just 
Prometheus under Jove. Like that sovereign artist 
or universal plastic nature, he forms a whole, 
coherent and proportioned in'itself, with due 
subjection and subordinacy of constituent parts. 
He notes the boundaries of the passions, and knows 
their exact tones and measures; by which he justly 
represents 'them, marks the sublime of sentiments 
and action; and distinguishes the beautiful from 
the deformed, the amiable from the odious. The 
moral artist who can thus imitate the Creator, and 
is thus knowing in the inward form and structure 
of his fellow-creature,. will'hardly, I presume, be 
found unknowing in himself, or at a loss in those 
numbers which make. the harmony of a mind. 47 
This true artist represents for Shaftesbury the potential of all 
mankind. He is a person who uses the beäuty'which h'e`finds within 
himself as a moral tool, which allows him to transmit his moral 
message to others through. the'medium of his art. The connection 
which the spectator makes with this artist is found in the 
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emotional. attraction to the beautiful which we all possess. In 
this way. there is, a, sympathy created between the character of 
the artist and the character of the spectator, both of whom 
will be in sympathy, with the purposes of Nature which are ex- 
pressed in, the work of art. 
-VI- 
That the appreciation of beauty, which is an appreciation 
of moral truth, is based upon anon-rational emotional element 
in men, has led to the suggestions that Shaftesbury removes the 
possibility of our. discovering universal moral truths because 
he leaves morality to the fluctuating standards of uncontrolled 
emotion. The American literary critic, Irving Babbitt, claimed 
that Shaftesbury undertook a "transformation of conscience from 
an inner check to an'expansive emotion., 
48 By this he means 
that Shaftesbury made ethical judgement depend upon personal 
whim, the feelings'of the moment, which should be controlled by 
reason rather than followed without question. Similarly, 
W. E. Alderman wrote of. Shaftesbury's doctrine of the moral sense 
that 
.... the theory. if applied in full would tend to 
make the ethical norm a variable rather than a con- 
stant: standard; for individuals differ from each 
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other, and'likewise, have within themselves, at 
various times, moods that are widely dissimilar. 
Were morality made wholly to depend upon passing 
intuitions, conscience would, no longer be the 
rational force that, we conceive it, "to be. If 
we accept the doctrine that an instinctive reaction 
is as infallible as a studied judgement, we hereby 
deny the need of'any rational restraint and 
struggle. 49 
,. t 
To regard Shaftesbury's theories as a deliberate attempt to 
base morality. upon an emotionalism that has no other than a sub- 
jective reference is to misinterpret Shaftesbury - if this is 
the suggestion of the above criticisms. For although Shaftes- 
bury wished for the individual to discover moral norms for 
himself rather than have them imposed by external influences, 
everything that we have seen of Shaftesbury's morality in this 
work points to the fact that he wished those norms to have 
universal validity, and therefore be held in common by all men. 
In conformity with this aim, the major factor of the moral or 
aesthetic sense-is that it is believed by Shaftesbury tobe a 
common measure, and consequently the source'of moral norms with 
which all men can agree. Hence, Shaftesbury writes, 
I 
For harmony is harmony, by nature, let men judge 
ever so ridiculously of music. So is symmetry and 
proportion'founded still in nature, let men's fancy 
prove ever so barbarous, or their fashions ever so 
Gothic in their architecture, sculpture, or whatever 
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other designing art. 'Tis the same case where life 
and manners are concerned. Virtue has the same 
fixed standard. - The same numbers, harmony, and 
proportion will have place in morals, and are dis- 
coverable in the characters and affections of man- 
kind; in which are laid the just foundations of 
an art and science superior to every other of human 
practice and comprehension. 50 
The "superior" art may be seen as, the art involved in creating 
artistic works that encourage others to think and act morally. 
What this involves we have seen in the last section. What it 
is'necessary to remember in. the present context is that the 
moral character created by the aesthetic sense conforms with 
Nature, the general mind of which is seen to be the origin of 
all that we, call beautiful, and the universal measure of beauty 
and morality,. Therefore, to declare Shaftesbury a thinker who 
would create ä variable ethical standard involves either fail- 
ing to take this into account (i. e. Shaftesbury's declaration 
of a universal measure of moral truth and beauty), or declaring 
it invalid. To declare it invalid is to take a stand against 
Shaftesbury on the a priori principle, which is either implicit 
or, explicit in everything that Shaftesbury wrote concerning 
morality, that all men stand in a similar intellectual relation- 
ship to the optimistically conceived cosmos. To deny this 
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principle, and to say that Shaftesbury's emotionalism leads to 
a variable morality, is to take a pessimistic view of man's 
ethical potentiality which Shaftesbury would never have 
accepted. 
However, although Shaftesbury advocates a universal morality, 
and believes that it is. possible, he does recognise that it is 
not automatic. We are not born with. it, and need not necessarily 
attain it. The reason for this would appear to be the existence 
of corrupting forms of religion and government (See below, 
Chapters Seven and Eight). Consequently, men can be found 
having differing views on moral and aesthetic subjects - involv- 
ing the logical necessity of at least some of these views falling 
short of truth. 'Men mäy-, jüdge "ridiculously" and have a 
"barbarous" fancy. Despite this, Shaftesbury is convinced "That 
in the very nature of'things there must of necessity be the 
foundation of a right and wrong taste .... " And 
it is this 
concept of a"taste" that becomes important to Shaftesbury's non- 
rational theory of ethical truth when the possibility of differing 
moral opinions is admitted. * By using this concept Shaftesbury 
-------------------------------------------- ------ ----------- 
* It has been suggested by one critic that the concept of 
"taste" forms part of the rational element in Shaftesbury's 
(Continued overleaf) 
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can say that when opinions concerning art or morals differ, 
then one-of the opinions will be qualitatively superior to 
others. The superior opinion will belong to the person with 
the better taste, which is described by Shaftesbury as a 
product-of experience: 
Now a taste or judgment, 'tis supposed, can hardly 
come ready formed with us into the world. -Whatever 
principles or materials of this kind we may possibly 
bring with us, whatever good faculties, senses, or 
anticipating sensations and imaginations may be of 
Nature's growth, and arise properly of themselves, 
without our art, promotion, or assistance, the 
general idea which is formed of all this management 
and the clear notion we attain. of what is preferable 
and principal in all. these subjects of choice and 
estimation will not, as I imagine, by any person be 
taken for innate. Use, practice, and culture must 
precede the understanding and wit of such an advanced 
size and growth as this. A legitimate and just 
taste can neither be begotten, made, conceived, or 
produced without. the antecedent labour and pains of 
criticism. 51 
We see here that although the aesthetic sense is innate, a 
(Continued from previous page) 
philosophy - see below', Chapter Six, Section I. Although this cannot be denied, if for no other reason than the fact 
that the rational and the non-rational are inextricably inter- 
mingled in Shaftesbury's writings, this is by no means the 
only possible interpretation. In this chapter "taste" is 
dealt with as a non-rational product of aesthetic experience - 
something which emerges as a consequence of long use of the 
aesthetic sense in both the moral and artistic spheres. 
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taste can only be obtained by some prior. activity on the 
part of the individual. Exactly what this activity is, and how 
the right taste emerges as a,, consequence is never made clear 
by Shaftesbury. It is possible to interpret it as a product of 
rational criticism (see below, Chapter Six). It is also 
possible to regard taste as a particular type of aesthetic 
sense, which has been refined by "use" and "practice". That 
is, the aesthetic sense becomes a-more efficient moral tool as 
we allow it both scope and activity over a long period of time, 
and it experiences many evidences of the beautiful. In this 
process, "culture" has a role to play in that it provides an . 
environment that will either encourage or discourage an improve- 
ment of ourselves (see Chapters Seven and Eight). Given a 
satisfactory environment and a determination to develop our 
taste, we will learn to recognise the qualitatively superior 
forms of art, and develop qualitatively superior moral charac- 
terswithin ourselves. The artistic taste and the moral taste 
are, as we have seen above, necessarily connected. As we 
improve our characters we improve our ability to judge the 
artist's work, and vice-versa; and the prerequisite for the 
creation of a "legitimate piece"52 is the existence within the 
212 
virtuoso of a well-developed aesthetic sense that creates 
taste in both morals and art. "And thus the sense of inward 
numbers, the knowledge and practice of the social virtues, 
and the familiarity and favour of the moral graces, are 
essential to the'character of a deserving artist and just 
favourite of the Muses. ""53 
In his concept of "taste" Shaftesbury is again insisting, 
as we saw him insist against the doctrines of the Epicureans 
and Hobbes (see Chapter Three above), that if we are to talk 
about moral norms, then we. must be discussing something that 
has both permanence and universal application. Suggestions 
that Shaftesbury's theory makes moral judgements both temporary 
and personal must be rejected - this is only true if we 
ignore 
part of his theory. The aesthetic sense is seen to exist in 
all men as a common measure, and universal principle. This 
aesthetic sense is the form of beauty within ourselves, 
which allows us to appreciate the form of beauty as it exists 
within an artistic piece, where it has been instilled by the 
virtuoso. It is this aesthetic sense that Shaftesbury calls 
the innate or connatural idea of beauty. - It is this aesthetic 
sense that creates a unity between aesthetic and moral subjects 
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and, when developed, allows us to judge correctly on all 
occasions in both ethical and aesthetic spheres of experience - 
both of which are implied by the presence of either one. Thus, 
in the concept of "taste", we find Shaftesbury's statement of 
a universal non-rational method of appreciating and following 
the purposes of Nature in all our decisions and actions. 
---00000--- 
SUMMARY: 
In this chapter the non-rational element that can be 
found in Shaftesbury's writings is considered as an alternative 
moral theory, standing-in contrast to the rationalism of 
Shaftesbury that has been discussed in previous chapters. 
In Section I it is noted, 
1. that Shaftesbury recognises in man an ability 
to immediately perceive the beautiful. 
2. that beauty is regarded by Shaftesbury as the 
standard of excellence in both aesthetic and 
moral subjects. 
3. that as a consequence of this, art and morality 
are necessarily connected. 
4. that by developing our artistic creativity, 
our virtuosity, we improve our moral character. 
5. that the aesthetic sense, which distinguishes 
beauty, also involves an enthusiastic desire 
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to possessbeauty, and thus resolves the 
problem of moral obligation by eliminating it. 
6. that the enthusiasm for beauty, seen by. 
Shaftesbury to be the stimulus for all noble 
actions by men, is the means whereby the 
"moral sense" can function. 
Having recognised the significance of the enthusiasm for 
beauty, Section II considers the metaphysical significance of 
the concept of beauty in Shaftesbury's still optimistically 
conceived cosmos. We see here 
that Shaftesbury regards the beauty which is 
found in the mind of a moral person superior to 
the beauty which is seen in the material world. 
2. that enthusiasm directs us towards the idea of 
an'ordered'cosmos, a beautiful whole, as the 
source of the beauty that can be found in the 
parts. 
3. that the beautiful whole is seen by Shaftesbury 
to involve a hierarchy of beauty, a natural 
hierarchy at the top of which is found the general 
mind of Nature. 
Section III enquires into Shaftesbury's concern to emphasise 
the non-accidental character of'all beauty (and, therefore, of 
morality). In this exercise, Shaftesbury is seen to direct 
our attention away from the object in which we find beauty (and 
which we might call "beautiful") towards the mind and art of 
the artist. The concept of "form" is seen to be relevant. 
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Mind, form, ýand art. are all emphasised because they all exist 
prior to a work of art which is dependent upon them. Although 
Shaftesbury neither provided thorough definitions, nor dis- 
tinguished clearly'-between the three`, it is noted that Shaftes- 
bury intendedus to understand"them, either singly or together, 
as both the origin and definition of the beautiful. Beauty 
thus becomes for Shaftesbury a mental rather than, a material 
quality, and he insists that when we consider a material object 
the beauty we find there must be regarded as an intellectual 
characteristic that refers us back to the mind of the creator. 
Section"IV discusses the1following two claims that are 
made by Shaftesbury: 
1. The claim that beauty, -, as it is found at all the levels of Nature's hierarchy (see Section II) 
always contributes to Nature's purpose(s). The 
statement that "all beauty is truth" is examined 
in this context. Also, 'the human` enthusiasm for 
and pursuit of beauty is seen as the source, for 
Shaftesbury`, of the human contribution to the 
universal design. 
2. The'claim that knowledge of, and attraction towards, 
beauty is innate to all human beings. In dis- 
cussing this claim the following things are noted: 
-- - that Shaftesbury criticises John Locke's epis- temology because he believed that it had rejected 
innate ideas and thereby destroyed the possibility 
of universal moral criteria. 
"-'that Shaftesbury prefers the term "connatural" 
to "innate" because he is not concerned with 
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developing a'sophisticäted epistemology after 
the manner of Locke. ' He is concerned with stress- ing the inevitable presence of the innate idea of beauty in the, human. adult, not with how or when -' it gets there. 
., - that-the i nnate idea - for , -Shaftesbury is also defined as the moral or aesthetic sense; and it 
is noted that Shaftesbury failed to distinguish 
clearly between knowledge and instinct. 
Section V. considers the role of artistic creativity in 
Shaftesbury's(; non-rational moral theory. The following points 
are made: 
1. that there are three forms of beauty to which 
.:.. the -artist may. ýapply -his creativity. 
2, that'the highest form, of-beauty: is, found- in- 
that work of art which encourages the creation 
of-amoral character-in the spectator. 
3. -:, -. that the. work of ýart. should contain unity, 
morality, and simplicity if it hopes to attain 
this end. -. 
4. that artistic activity becomes for Shaftesbury 
an ethical tool whereby the moral man can direct 
others towards Nature's purposes as they are 
expressed in his work and appreciated by others 
through the common possession of an aesthetic 
sense. 
Finally, Section VI is concerned with dispelling any suggestion 
that Shaftesbury's-theories, as conceived by himself, were 
intended to have anything less than universal applicability and 
the creation of a common moral standard for all men. The 
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emotionalism of the aesthetic sense is not seen to involve 
moral subjectivity because of the relationship of the human 
mind to the general mind of, the cosmos, and because of 
Shaftesbury's stressing of the need to develop a correct 
"taste".... In, the need for us all to develop a taste, Shaftesbury 
<. - posits the possibility of universal norms of, 
conduct 
- insists that our character must be developed 
before, -it can be called moral. 
, It is also . admitted,, however, that, Shaftesbury's use of 
the 
concept of "taste". has both rational and. non-rational aspects, 
which again pointsjto, the fact that Shaftesbury's non-rational 
theories as outlined in this chapter find no independent 
expression, in: his own-writings, where they appear with, and 
undifferentiated from appeals-to rationalism. 
---00000--- 
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CHAPTER SIX 
SHAFTESBURY'. S DOCTRINE OF RIDICULE AND GOOD HUMOUR 
r. -I- 
TM In-regarding Shaftesbury's aesthetic doctrines`as involving 
a mode of thought which stands in contrast to his appeals to 
reason, we have seen how there can be extracted from Shaftesbury's 
writings a moral doctrine which may be understood independently 
of the rational morality outlined in'earlier chapters. However, 
when Shaftesbury refers us`to'aesthetic modes of thought, we 
find that this non-rational doctrine directs us towards the same 
ends as his rational ethics. The emphasis is still upon the 
individual to control his affections and direct them towards 
Nature's purpose - which remains a social purpose in so far as 
it relates to man. That this is the case provides us with no 
help when we attempt to interpret the various roles of reason 
and emotion '(i. e. the instinctual recognition and attraction of 
the aesthetic sense towards beauty) in Shaftesbury's writings; 
and the fact that he fails to distinguish between these two 
logically distinct approaches to morality has led to contradic- 
tory descriptions concerning the basic tenets of Shaftesbury's 
thought. Some interpreters state that "Shaftesbury's aim was 
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evidently the `noble #one, of 'maintaining , the supremacy of'reason 
andconscience, "1 and claim that Shaftesbury's moral sense 
should be understood'as part'of the'rational potential of man: 
"The immutable-distinction between right'and wrong isýdis- 
cernable by reason, by moral conscience, or, to, use Shaftesbury's 
phrase,, the, moral sense. "2 On the other side of the coin, 
Robert B. Voitle insists that-the only way to understand 
Shaftesbury's concept of the moral sense is to look upon it as 
an emotional quality. Shaftesbury is seen to have made a con- 
scious rejection of reason: He sees Shaftesbury's moral theories- 
in the emotional context of'the following opposition between 
reason-and, -emotion: 
Reason äsä simpl'e logical process might well perform 
wonders with . the 
data available to it. Hedonistic, 
utilitarian, and naturalistic moral theories were well 
served. by, such a faculty; [but] for the moral absolutist, 
such a concept'of reason had no more authority than a 
calculating machine; and he had either to eschew 
empirical psychology completely or, as most did, search 
more deeply in the springs of human behavior for some 
morally authoritative impulse, usually emotional. 3 
As we have seen, there are grounds. for, making both. of these 
claims, but both must be rejected in that they ignore the 
evidence in Shaftesbury which supports the contrary view. For 
220 
both emotional and rational elements are certainly evident in 
Shaftesbury: - 
Seeing the presence of, two. explanations of the source of 
ethical knowledge in Shaftesbury's writings, A. O. Aldridge has 
pointed to the ambiguity surrounding Shaftesbury's concept of 
the. moral sense. Although he accepts. (as does the present 
writer), that Shaftesbury's moral sense is usually. to be under- 
stood as. a non-rational concept,. Aldridge. also points out that 
In some sections of the Characteristics it is not 
to be distinguished, from reason, and in others it is 
almost equivalent to innate ideas. At represents 
variously knowledge and motivation to action-4 
This lack, of clarity has been pointed to in earlier chapters of 
the present work. Unlike the present author, however, Aldridge 
considers Shaftesbury's idea of-"taste" as'something which is 
a product of reason. 1, Taste occurs when reason is applied to 
the aesthetic sense. according to Aldridge. Thus, he writes, 
Taste and moral sense are not, as they may seem to be, 
similar ideas, but almost opposite, the latter based 
on affection, the former on reason. The qualifications 
attached to the theory of innate sense which are 
found in the last two treatises of the Characteristics 
[the Inquiry and The Mora]ists] convert Shaftesbury 's 
esthetics from a system of simple intuitive perception 
to a system-of complex intellectual perception based 
upon the development ofa right taste for a fixed 
standard of beauty. 5 
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There are grounds for accepting this distinction, for in his 
concept of taste, as in all his ideas, Shaftesbury confuses 
both rational and non-rational elements. The advocate of a 
"rational" taste might point to Shaftesbury's statement that 
the individual who wishes to attain a right taste, "should set 
afoot the powerfullest faculties of his mind,, and assemble the 
best forces of'his wit and judgement, in order to make a formal 
descent on the territories of the heart .... "6 However, this 
statement is by no means a final solution of the problem; for 
the "mind" may refer to the aesthetic sense, and the "heart" to 
the affections which must be controlled by the aesthetic sense. 
Perhaps the clearest statement to give support to the rational 
interpretation of "taste" can. be found in a statement where 
Shaftesbury does not use the concept himself. In The Moralists, 
in a discussion concerning our appreciation of harmony and 
discord, Shaftesbury writes, 
.... as this, difference is immediately perceived by a plain internal sensation, so there is withal in 
reason this account of, it, that whatever things have 
order, theýsame have unity of design, and concur in 
one; are parts constituent, of one whole or are, in 
themselves, entire systems. 
It could be suggested that a rational appreciation of that 
F 
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which the moral or aesthetic sense immediately recognises (i. e. 
what Shaftesbury is discussing in this quotation) is what is 
involved in the formation of a right taste. For the scope of 
the Characteristics-is to demonstrate, according to Shaftesbury, 
the reasonableness of a proportionate taste and determinate 
choice in life and manners. "8 And when he is telling us how 
taste is to be formed, Shaftesbury writes, 
'Tis we ourselves create and-form our taste. .... Who is so>just to himself as to recall. his. fancy 
from the power of fashion and education to that of 
reason? Could we .... be thus courageous, we should 
! soon settle in ourselves such an opinion of good as 
would secure to, us an invariable, agreeable, and 
. just taste-in life'and manners. 9 
However, ' because Shaftesbury did not make a clear distinction 
between rational and non-rational elements in his writings, 
the opinion` of Aldridge concerning taste must be seen as an 
alternative +to the placing of taste within the aesthetic and 
emotional context of. Chapter Five of the present work. 
The'lack of distinction between rational and non-rational 
elements in Shaftesbury's ideas was, recognised by Thomas Fowler 
in the nineteenth century and. roundly condemned "because it 
assigns a disproportionate share to the emotional element at 
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the expense of'the'rational element. "10 His explanation of 
Shaftesbury's lack of clarity is that 
His main aim appears to have been to represent 
virtue in an acceptable. and attractive form to the 
men of taste and fashion, and hence he is far more 
concerned. in drawing'an. analogy between art and 
morals .... than in attempting to determine 
accurately the moral criterion or to analy1e with S/ 
precision the moral sentiments. 11 
However, whatever Shaftesbury's reasons for it, rational and 
non-rational are confused by him. We must not therefore opt 
for one or the other when interpreting Shaftesbury's philosophy, 
but attempt to recognise the significance of each; for the 
former approach involves ignoring part of what Shaftesbury had 
to say, and failing to appreciate part of his philosophy. A 
recognition of this can be-found in the interpretation by 
Charles Vereker who, whilst pointing to the absence of a precise 
logical system of thought in the Characteristics, directs our 
attention towards the variety of guides to virtue that can be 
found therein: 
First, but not perhaps pre-eminent, a direct, 
intuitive apprehension of beauty and order; then, 
the use of reason, different from that sponsored 
by the rationalists proper only in being less 
insisted upon; thirdly, the experience of happi- 
ness to be used as a general criterion; and, the 
supreme test, the interests of the whole system, 
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of the whole of which lesser entities are properly 
parts, a kind of public good.. Where the other 
criteria were lacking, the universal good, whether 
of the species or of the entire natural order, 
remained a. sure and dependable, guide to behaviour. 12 
Similarly, the present. work has taken as its basis the distinc- 
tion between. the rational and aesthetic or emotional approaches 
to morality-which can be found in Shaftesbury's, writings, and 
elaborated each in. separation from the other. The end product 
of. both, approaches was seen by Shaftesbury to be the common 
welfare of a. whole - either the.. species or. the cosmos; the end 
product of both will be. the happiness of the moral individual. 
However, it. must always be remembered that Shaftesbury himself 
did not distinguish between separate guides-to, -virtue, and was 
apparently unconscious of-the. difficulty of regarding his theories 
as a coherent and logical whole. 
However,., it should also be appreciated that in distinguish- 
ingbetween the separate approaches that Shaftesbury takes, and 
attempting to present each in a logically coherent form, we 
are being unfair to the. spirit that'. pervades all of Shaftesbury's 
writings. For Shaftesbury was-not a systematic writer. Before 
the republication of. his Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit in 
the first edition, of. the Characteristics (after its publication 
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in 1699 without either his knowledge or permission), ' he took 
the Unusual step of redrafting it in order to make it more 
consistent with'the more casual style of the other essays. The 
overall impression created by the Characteristics has been' 
described as follows: "Every reader knows that it is not based 
upon any model and that'`it does' not constitute an integrated 
whole. "13 even'the least disorderly of his random writings 
yields no precise or`logical system of thought. °14 
Shaftesbu*ry's'reason for. -this quite deliberate avoidance 
of a systematic approach can. be seen if we remember his recog- 
nition of the strength of sceptical reasoning. As a result of 
this he studiously., avoided placing himself-in a position where 
he could be accused. of, being dogmatic. This involved the 
rejection of that method of presentation in. which philosophical 
truth is expressed in-thewform of, a number of logically related, 
systematically presented . 
ideas. Despite the necessity of making 
certain assumptiöris'if`he was to have 'a philosophy at all, he 
was not prepared to develop'a system and present it as a, final 
explanation of all-that is truth. This would be equivalent to 
adopting a position which Shaftesbury never failed to condemn - 
an enthusiastic,, uncritical acceptance of one set of beliefs to 
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the exclüsioh of all others. Shaftesbury did not want his 
readers to"look upon his writings as a new moral creed which 
was to be either accepted or rejected outright. He wanted to 
inculcate that attitude of mind which would oppose this sort of 
approach, this tendency towards enthusiasm, *,. so that each 
individual-might discover within himself those principles which 
Shaftesbury was convinced were present in all thinking beings. 
* A. O. Aldridge, has pointed out that Shaftesbury's ideas 
concerning enthusiasm were borrowed from Henry More's 
Enthusiasmus Trium hatus. In his Miscellaneous Reflections, 
II, i, Shaftesbury acknowledges borrowing Mot's ideas 
concerning, 
a) The principle of an affinity, between atheism and 
enthusiasm. Enthusiasmus Triumphatus, Sects. I. XLVII, 
LXVI. 
b) The distinction between-inspiration and enthusiasm. 
Ibid., II. 
c) wie influence of melancholy on enthusiasm. Ibid., XV. 
d) The spurious imitations of virtue that melancholy or 
enthusiasm produces. Ibid., XXXVI. 
e) The salutary nature of-devotional enthusiasm as seen 
in such noble minds as Plato and Plotinus. Ibid., LXIII. 
However, "Instead, of adopting. More's threefold remedy .. 
of temperance, humility, and reason, Shaftesbury offers the 
simpler and all-embracing cure, good humour, the obvious 
balance .... to ill-humour. " Aldridge, -Shaftesburand 
the 
Deist Manifesto, 317. Aldridge might also have ae that 
Shaftesbury recommended a particular form of social and 
. political environment in order to 
develop that frame of mind 
in the individual which would reject enthusiasm (i. e. one 
that is based upon principles of freedom - see Chapters Seven and Eight). . 
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He was recommending -a method whereby we can discover moral 
truth rather than revealing to us that moral truth in all its 
detail. 
- II - 
In Chapter Five we saw Shaftesbury accepting enthusiasm as 
the source of man's aesthetic and moral. creativity. However, 
the "enthusiasm" that Shaftesbury accepts is "divine" enthusiasm; 
an enthusiasm which is directed by the moral sense. If the 
desire for beauty, which is enthusiasm, is not controlled, it 
must be condemned: 
.... as all'affections have their excess, and require judgement and discretion to moderate and govern them, 
so this high and noble affection, which raises man to 
action and. is his guide in business as well as 
pleasure, requires a steady rein and strict hand over 
it. 15 
Consequently, it is necessary to control enthusiasm. If this 
is not don'e, 'then "in'religious concerns particularly" enthusiasm 
is liable to make us dogmatic and superstitious. For without a 
real'meäsure of'beauty and'moräl truth (be the measure reason or 
the moral sense), then enthusiasm is liable to accept an un- 
justifiable measure'of truth In the form of a religious dogma, 
16 
and pursue this with . the. 
fanaticism of a zealot. 
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In his attempt to. avoid enthusiasm Shaftesbury recommends 
that we should refer to ridicule and good humour. The reason 
for this recommendation can be seen if we consider the effect 
that Shaftesbury thought enthusiasm had upon the mind of the 
individual: 
..... above all other enslaving vices and restrain- 
ers of reason and just thought, 'the most evidently 
ruinous and fatal to the understanding is that of 
-superstition,. bigotry, and vulgar enthusiasm. This 
passion, not contented like other vices to deceive 
and tacitly supplant our reason, professes open 
war, holds up the intended chains and fetters, and 
declares its, -resolution to enslave. 17 
Here we see that Shaftesbury thought that enthusiasm stands 
opposed to reason, claiming independence from reason. Con- 
sequently, 'enthusiasts will'not reject their beliefs as a result 
of reasoned. argument. "`However, if enthusiastic belief is faced 
with ridicule it will lose the respect of potential adherents 
and cease to be a menace to the pursuit of moral truth along the 
lines ' which' Shaftesbury expounded. in his own moral theories. 
The freedom of criticism and the toleration of all religions, 
which was advocated by Shaftesbury, * involves a freedom of 
ridicule and a toleration of raillery against all things. For, 
------------------------- --------------------- ----------------- 
* See below Chapter Eight for Shaftesbury's views concerning 
freedom and toleration. 
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Truth, 'tis supposed, may bear all lights; and one 
of those principal., lights, or natural mediums, by 
which things are to be viewed,. in order to a thorough 
recognition, is ridicule itself, or that manner of 
proof by which we discern whatever is liable to just 
raillery in any subject. 18 
Such statements-as this have led certain of Shaftesbury's critics 
to claim that he posited ridicule as a test of truth which is 
independent of rational enquiry. *, '' However, if we look at the 
statement quoted above, it is possible to see that this was not 
so. Ridicule is not merely the act of making something look 
ridiculous. It is an art of distinguishing what is a suitable 
subject for ridicule as well as the application; .... we dis- 
cern whatever is liable to just raillery .... In order to do 
this, reason must also be used. Thus, ridicule is not opposed 
to reason, but is complementary to it. This was stated by 
Charles Bulkley in defence of Shaftesbury against John Brown as 
follows: 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
* This was. done by John Brown in 1751 in his Essays on the 
Characteristics (see. the first essay),. and later by J. Hunt 
who stated that with reference to the Characteristics, "we 
may fairly reduce the subjects to three - that ridicule 
is the test of truth; (2) that man possesses a moral sense; 
(3) that everything is for the best. " 
J. Hunt, "Anthony Earl of Shaftesbury", Contemporary Review, 
VIII, 534. (1868). 
230 
Look back., reader, look .... and see whether his Lordship has ever once opposed ridicule to reason, 
or considered them as two efferent me iums of 
discovering truth, as this author [Brown .. intimates--. Or whether, on the contrary, it-does 
not most evidently and undeniably appear, that his 
sole aim was to'incülcate a particular method of 
reasoning,. which he thought best fitted for the 
investigation of. truth .... This is so far from opposing ridicule to reason, which is what the noble 
author is charged with, that it is on the contrary, 
directly and in the most express manner, making it 
subservient to it. 19 
Ridicule is not the opponent of reason, but the tool of reason. 
Reason judges the justness of its application: "For what 
ridicule can lie against reason? or. how can any one of the 
least justness of thought endure a ridicule wrong placed? 
Nothing is more ridiculous than this itself. 1120 
Ridicule is, therefore, the action of a rational individual, 
and is applicable only to the ridiculous. However, to be able 
to apply ridicule at all assumes a certain predisposition which 
Shaftesbury calls, "good humour. " For to be in good humour is 
to be in that frame of mind which stands in opposition to 
enthusiasm. Whereas enthusiasm will not consider any other 
belief than that which is accepted by itself, good humour is 
willing-to consider all shades of opinion without prejudice. 
Whereas enthusiasm produces the fanatic whose only concern is 
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the extension of his creed by any means, good humour is a less 
serious frame of mind that rejects the need to impose one's 
opinions upon others. These differences exist because of a 
distinction between the ways in which the enthusiast and the man 
in good humour regard their respective beliefs. With the 
enthusiast, the ideology that he accepts dominates his person- 
ality. The individual loses his independence of-thought to the 
greater glory of his political or religious creed. His belief 
is so complete that all further argument is rejected, and his 
personality has no significance except in relation to the 
specific dogma which-he accepts. With the man in good humour, 
the ideology is always considered to be subordinate to the 
critical faculties of the individual. The individual is in con- 
trol of his beliefs, which he manipulates in an attempt to make 
them conform to new considerations and experiences. The man in 
good humour does not accept final truth. He merely pursues truth, 
without requiring knowledge of an all-embracing explanation of 
the nature'. of things which all men must necessarily accept 
whether they like it or not; and Shaftesbury can see no reason 
why this pastime or pursuit, which is philosophy, should not be 
a source of pleasure to the individual: 
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.... if rational discourses (especially those of 
a deeper speculation) have lost their credit, 'and 
are in disgrace because of their formality; there 
is reason for more allowance in the way of humour 
and gaiety. An easier method of treating these 
subjects will make them more agreeable and familiar. 
To dispute about them, will be the same as about 
other matters. They need not spoil good company, 
or take from the ease or pleasure of a polite con- 
versation .... We shall grow better reasoners, by 
. reasoning pleasantly, and at our ease; taking up or laying down these-subjects as we fancy. 21 
Here we see that good humour is that frame of mind which is 
recommended for the individual who has rejected that mode of 
philosophical enquiry which is associated with "systems". 
By this means we will be able to avoid. having to give our 
allegiance to one rigid set, of. beliefs or another. 
It might be suggested at this point in the discussion that 
that non-rational element in Shaftesbury'. s philosophy which has 
been discussed in Chapter Five above, would fall under the 
attack of ridicule by the good-humoured individual who seeks 
"rational truths". If this were so, one part of Shaftesbury's 
philosophy would not only stand in contrast to another, but 
would direct itself towards the destruction of the other. Good- 
humoured rationalism would direct itself toward the destruction 
of the emotional. aspect represented by the moral or aesthetic 
sense. But Shaftesbury says that "divine enthusiasm" is "in itself 
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a very natural honest passion, and has, properly nothing for 
its object but what is good and honest. "22 Divine enthusiasm, 
which is for Shaftesbury a descriptive term embodying the non- 
rational elements of his philosophy, is not condemned from the 
standpoint of ridicule. The enthusiasm that Shaftesbury con- 
demns lacks the disciplinary element of the moral sense to guide 
it, and leaves the individual "no longer self-governed, but set 
adrift to the wide sea of passion. "23 It is against this form 
of enthusiasm (the uncontrolled) that Shaftesbury directs his 
polemic, suggesting that we should adopt good humour in defence.. 
How will "divine enthusiasm" avoid the criticisms and 
ridicule of the good-humoured' critic? The rational element in 
ridicule will'not stop the critic, for all enthusiasm is non- 
rational. The answer to the question is that criticism is not 
to be avoided. All beliefs must bear the brunt of criticism 
whether it is in the form of rational argument or of ridicule. 
By the means of a dialectic, truth', Shaftesbury assumes, will 
emerge. As for the misuse of ridicule - this will not occur if 
we also take into account the presence of our "moral sense" and 
"taste". Our common, moral sense will not allow us to ridicule 
the evidently moral, whilst ridicule lacks efficiency - is in 
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bad "taste" and will be ignored - when directed. against an 
undeserving subject. The good-humoured thinker will in this 
way never misuse ridicule, nor will he be impressed by the 
misapplication of ridicule by others. 
Consequently, we see that ridicule can be directed by the 
moral sense as well as reason. It would not, therefore, be 
wrong to say that there are two types of ridicule in Shaftes- 
bury's thought, one of which does stand in contrast to reason. 
This is never explained by Shaftesbury himself but is, as we 
have seen, implied by the non-rational moral theory that his 
writings contain. Consequently, those critics (see above) who 
condemned Shaftesbury for opposing reason to ridicule are not 
necessarily wrong. Neither are those who support Shaftesbury's 
use of a rational ridicule necessarily correct. Shaftesbury's 
own failure to distinguish between these alternatives himself 
is again the cause of confusion in interpreting his thought. 
Whether he is talking rationally or non-rationally, Shaftes- 
bury advocates good humour (and, therefore, the use of ridicule) 
as the most desirable frame of mind: for the study of moral sub- 
jects. Given this,, it was Shaftesbury's belief that men would 
recognise those same natural affections whose existence he 
A 
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postulated. in his own philosophy. Given good humoured tolerance, 
and all that it implies, the rest would follow. Shaftesbury's 
Yt 
faith in the potential morality of mankind, if only it were 
given the opportunity to reveal itself in conditions of specu- 
lative freedom, was unfailing. Only the restrictive atmosphere 
of dogmatism and intolerant enthusiasm is capable of stulti- 
11 fying the free and natural development of virtue in man. As he 
stated himself, 
A mannerly wit can hurt no-cause-or interest for 
, which I am in the least concerned; and philosophical 
speculations, politely managed, can never surely 
render mankind more unsociable or uncivilised. This 
is not the quarter from whence I'can possibly expect 
an inroad of savageness and barbarity. And by the 
best of my observation I have learnt that-virtue is 
never such a sufferer, by being contested, as by 
being betrayed. My fear is not'so much from its 
witty antagonists, who give it exercise, and put 
it on its defence, as from its tender nurses, who 
. are apt to overlay it, and kill it with excess of care and cherishing. 24 
Such is the moral nature of man that freedom of discussion and 
a respect for the ideas of everyone is seen to be the best means 
of realising virtue in society. It. is possible to regard the 
immediate aims of , all Shaftesbury's writings as'an attempt 
to 
elaborate this theme. Man must not be confined to one set of 
beliefs as this can only serve to. stultify his intellect. 
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Because of`this Shaftesbury is also concerned with political 
questions. He is concerned that the social and political 
environment be arranged so as to guarantee the emergence` of 
moral individuals in any human community. The discussion in 
the next two chapters will be directed towards elaborating the 
views of Shaftesbury concerning the organisation and ends of 
human communities so that individuals might achieve their 
natural ends as moral beings. 
---ooOoo--- 
SUMMARY: 
Chapter Six begins by recognising that Shaftesbury's moral 
philosophy is a confusion of rational and non-rational elements, 
and that this has led to opposing interpretations of his 
philosophy., It is'noted 
1. that Shaftesbury's philosophy may be open to 
contradictory interpretations that are equally 
valid. ' As an example of this, we see that 
Shaftesbury's concept of "taste" can be understood 
as, both rational and non-rational. 
2. that rather: thanxrecognising one guide to virtue 
in Shaftesbury's philosophy, we can find many. 
3. that Shaftesbury made no effort to distinguish 
between opposing approaches to moral approbation. 
4. that I Shaftesbury made a conscious effort to 
avoid being either dogmatic or systematic. 
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5. that the reason for ., this. was;. Shaf. tesbury', s. desire to avoid being "enthusiastic". 
Section II considers Shaftesbury's rejection of enthusiasm, 
and his advocation of ridicule and good humour as an approach 
to philosophical enquiry that will save us from falling into 
enthusiasm. We see here 
1. that uncontrolled enthusiasm tends to take on 
a religious form and become fanaticism. 
2. that enthusiasm is best opposed by ridicule 
insofar as the enthusiast denies the need for 
rational argument, and denies the legitimacy of 
reason. 
3. that ridicule is an instrument of reason. 
4. that ridicule is an instrument that is used by 
the person who is in "good humour", which is the 
opposite frame of mind to enthusiasm. 
5. that good-humour is non-dogmatic, non-systematic, 
does not wish to impose one's ideas upon others, 
and finds pleasure in philosophical disagreement. 
6. that "divine enthusiasm" must be prepared to 
accept good-humoured criticism. * 
7. that the moral sense will prevent the misuse of 
ridicule. This means that ridicule is guided by 
the moral sense as well as by reason (as stated 
in 3), thereby making the concept "ridicule" 
ambiguous - for Shaftesbury does not distinguish between types of ridicule as they are directed by 
reason or the moral-sense. 
------------------------------------------------ wrwwwrwrwwrr. wrw 
* Concerning "divine enthusiasm", see above Chapter Five. 
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Finally, it is noted that freedom of criticism is a necessary 
pre-requisite to both. good humour and the emergence of moral 
truth. This involves certain political arrangements. Shaftesbury's 
political theories become the subject of discussion in Chapters 
Seven and Eight. 
---00000--- 
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ý. CHAPTER SEVEN 
"SHAFTESBURY'S THEORIES'OF'GOVERNMENT 
-I- 
Shaftesbury saw'political enquiries as the logical 
consequence of ethical thought. He thought that once we have 
an understanding of the ethical characteristics that each man 
possesses in common with the rest of the species, not only are 
we able to realise morality within ourselves, but we are able 
also to gain insight into the situation that ought to exist 
within human communities: 
For to understand the manners and constitutions of 
men` in common, 'tis necessary to study man in 
particular, and know the creature as he is rin himself, 
before we consider him in company, as he is interested' 
in the State, or joined to any city or community., 
In studying Shaftesbury's ethical. theories in the previous 
chapters. of this work, we have seen what Shaftesbury thought 
about "man in particular". When we consider Shaftesbury's ideas 
concerning man "as he is interested in the State", the most 
important "particular" ethical characteristic is the possession, 
by all men,, of a telos or end that can be reached only through 
participation in a 
. 
human community, in pursuit of the common 
good of that community. Because he believes this, Shaftesbury 
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refuses to consider the idea of a non-social (orpre-social) 
human being as a useful philosophical concept when discussing 
the moral and social condition of man. It was from this stand- 
point that Shaftesbury condemned the contractual political 
theories of both Lucretius and Hobbes; -for-these theories 
treat the determining characteristic of man as the self-oriented 
pursuit of private satisfactions without reference to the wel- 
fare, of a social, group. Men, are depicted as competitors, natural 
enemies,. who make expediential arrangements to protect themselves 
from each other; and the sphere of politics is the sphere of 
activity that enables men to have satisfactory private existences. 
In contrast to this view of man, Shaftesbury sees man's public 
existence to be an end in itself, and an end which has priority 
over all. other private considerations that may stand in opposition 
to it. Man's social existence can never be ignored, for society 
is an immediate implication for all men. There was never 
historically a pre-social state of nature; nor can society be 
logically described or justified in terms of expediential arrange- 
ments which, provide for the satisfaction of private ends. "In 
short, " he writes in The Moralists, 
.... if generation be natural, if natural affection and the care and nurture of the offspring be natural, 
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., things'standing as they do with man, and the creature being of that form and constitution he 
now is, it follows "that society must be also 
natural to him, " and "that out of society and 
community he never did, nor ever can, subsist. "2 
Sha, ftesbury's vision of man is as a participator in a group - 
not as an individualist. When Shaftesbury talks of the "nature" 
of man in a descriptive sense, it is to this that he is 
referring. When he uses the term "nature" prescriptively, and 
tel{ls us to follow Nature, he is saying that we should pursue 
the welfare of the group by following the natural affections 
that we may find within ourselves. To be natural involves 
pursuing the welfare of the community within which we find our- 
selves. ' If we accept this, then it is Shaftesbury's opinion 
that neither the historical nor the logical basis of political 
society need further elaboration. * 
It' should be added that, whilst denying the Hobbesian inter- 
pretation of human nature, Shaftesbury is not prepared to use 
-------------------------------- -------------------------------- 
* When Shaftesbury does discuss the origin of political society 
(which is rare) he merely provides us with a brief outline in 
which he describes society as growing out of the family. See 
Characteristics II, 82/3. See also Chapter Three Section IV 
of this work Were Shaftesbury's criticism of the contractual 
theory of society of both the Epicureans and Hobbes is 
discussed. 
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his conception of. a naturally sociable humanity as grounds for 
looking back to a "golden age" when no government was needed 
to enforce peace between men by imposing common norms. Shaftes- 
bury never questions the need for government to direct the 
moral energies of men towards recognisable social goals. The 
nobility of stature that Shaftesbury grants to man requires a 
community, which for Shaftesbury involves a political (i. e. 
governmental) aspect. Shaftesbury looks neither backward nor 
forward to a golden age of uncorrupted humanity to find a model 
against which he can measure the social and political realities 
of his own time. Shaftesbury says that he would rather have us 
accept the Hobbesian theory of "this imaginary state of nature" 
than dream of returning to an ideal "state of nature". If we 
must continue to talk about a state of nature, the more unattrac- 
tive our idea of it is, the more utility it will have in making 
us accept the social and political condition as an alternative. 
Therefore, 
Let it be a state of war, rapine, and injustice. 
.... Let it, at least, be looked on as many degrees 
worse than the worst government in being. The 
greater dread we. have of anarchy, the better country- 
men we shall prove, and value more the laws and 
constitution under which we live, and by which we 
are protected from the outrageous violences of such 
an unnatural state. 3 
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If we must prattle-on about hypothetical conditions which, in 
Shaftesbury's opinion, have no basis in fact, then it is better 
for us to accept that interpretation which persuades us most 
easily to accept the social orientation of Shaftesbury's own 
theories. 
For-Shaftesbury, moral action implies a socio-political 
framework within which it can take effect. Virtue is described 
by him as follows*: 
Virtue is truly and properly all those qualities, 
and no one else besides, which being made habitual 
and growing natural to us, in every respect suit 
us and make us fit for civil society, and render 
us deserving partners in the benefits of it. And 
as for what is more than this, that which may be 
called virtue in a higher degree is merely such 
of those qualities that make us not only capable 
of living inoffensively and in the execution of 
all that is the immediate duty of a single member; 
but such as enable us to improve the whole society 
and cause us to give an additional prosperity to 
it (if success. attends us) and. to advance or on 
any occasion preserve the interest and happiness 
of a whole community. "4 
Man, in his nature as asocial being, follows Nature when he 
* This quotation is taken from a , manuscript that can be found 
in the Public Records Office in London. The spelling has 
been modernised here. 
244 
consciously performs such actions as benefit the whole community - 
providing'security, prosperity, and "improvement" for all 
members of the community. "Particular" moral actions will have 
social implications; as a result of which all moral'action may 
be regarded as social, and all moral thought as having both 
social and political aspects. To accept a conception of man 
that does not take this into account is, according to Shaftesbury, 
tobe mistaken. 
- II - 
When Shaftesbury considers the actual societies that men 
have 'formed, his apparent optimism concerning the moral and 
social potential of man is soon qualified. It is evident to 
Shaftesbury that men are not always moral, 'and that the societies 
in which they live do not escape corruption: 
.... map, notwithstanding the assistance of religion 
and-the "direction of laws, is often found to live 
in less conformity with Nature, and by means of 
religion itself is often rendered the more barbarous 
and inhuman. Marks are set on men; distinctions 
formed; opinions decreed under the severest 
penalties; antipathies instilled, and aversions 
raised in men against the generality of their own 
species. So that 'tis hard to find in any region 
a human society which has human laws. 5, 
We are told here that most human communities are in fact corrupt. 
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Yet we have seen that Shaftesbury's view of man is one of a 
moral being who fulfils his nature by pursuing the common good. 
To explain the latter within the context of recognisable human 
evil in society means that we must regard the idea of "a human 
society which has human laws" as part of the human potential 
that Shaftesbury would like to see realised in practice, but 
which must be distinguished from what actually happens in 
practice. * 
In examining the distinction between reality and potential- 
ity, in Shaftesbury's thought, and discovering his explanation 
of man's. corruption, it will be useful to recognise a distinction 
between the social and political elements in the group existence 
of men. The former may be said to refer to : a-spontaneous and un- 
coerced social life; the latter to man in his relationship with 
the institutional arrangements, supported by coercion, that 
define and enforce the values of a human group or community 
through the application of laws. In the writings of Augustine 
* See Chapter Four, Sections I and II, where Shaftesbury's 
acceptance of evil within the world is discussed in relation 
to. his belief that the cosmos is a perfectly organised 
whole. 
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we find the political sphere described as being willed by God 
as a means of providing peace to the unstable social situation 
of a corrupt humanity. 'In Hobbes we find a similar denial of 
the possibility of uncoerced peace between men because of 
universal selfishness, necessitating a compact and the vesting 
of coercive power in a "sovereign". In both these cases politics 
is regarded as a cure for the anti-social nature of a mankind 
that is incapable of combining stability with spontaneity. When 
we consider Shaftesbury's philosophy we find that the distinc- 
tion can again be made; but here we find that where men are 
incapable of living peacefully together without coercion, where 
men are selfish and anti-social in their affections, the cause 
is to be found in what Augustine and Hobbes saw to be the cure 
(if only a partial, cure in the case of Augustine) of human 
failings in the social sphere. For it is in-political and 
religious institutions that Shaftesbury finds the source of 
moral insufficiency in man's social life. In the present section 
the governmental (political) sources of moral weakness as out- 
lined'by Shaftesbury will be the topic of discussion. * The 
---------- mm -------------------------------! m --------- --- 
------ 
As will be seen in Chapter Eight below, moral weakness may 
also be generated by the self independently of the environ- 
ment, reinforcing the political factors that work against 
"human nature". 
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subject of Section III will be Shaftesbury's ideas concerning 
the religious origin-of man's failure to recognise and pursue 
his purpose in the common welfare of the community within which 
he finds himself. 
In introducing into the present discussion the distinction 
between society-(characterised by spontaneity). and government 
(characterised by its use of coercion in the enforcement of legal 
norms), it should again be stressed that Shaftesbury never denies 
the need for_the,. political sphere. As we saw in Section I of 
this Chapter, Shaftesbury considered the political, institutions 
in any, society as a necessary factor. He does not give us 
any reasons why. this should be the case. * It is merely a charac- 
teristic of human existence. However, although government is 
for him an'intrinsic part of the human condition, there are 
suggestions at*various-points in Shaftesbury's writings that 
certain forms of government may function in such a way as to pre- 
vent the ethical development of_the. individuals that make up the 
society over which they-rule. Government can prevent the ful- 
filment of the individual as a-_. being who finds his satis- 
faction, as an, uncoerced participator in the community 
Although not using the argument himself, it is possible to 
regard "voluntary" corruption as necessitating government. 
See footnote in Chapter Eight towards the end of Section II. 
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considered as a whole. The distinction between man's. relation- 
ship to government (the persons and, institutions that administer 
norms through control of the coercive power) and. his social life 
become significant for Shaftesbury when such a situation occurs. 
This is the case when Shaftesbury considers. the control of 
society by. a single individual in the person of an absolute 
monarch., 
If society is ruled. by an individual whose, will is unques- 
tionable, the. laws which are made by that. ruler cannot be derived 
from an appreciation of moral-truth. The reason for this lack of 
moral. consciousness in the ruler (which implies a lack of desire 
to pursue the, common good),, is as follows: - 
'Afpublic spirit can come only from a social feeling 
or sense-of partnership with human kind. Now there 
are none so far from being partners in this sense, 
or sharers in this common affection, as they who 
scarcely know an equal, 'nor consider themselves as 
subject to any law of fellowship or community. "6 
To acquire the sociable character which is the end of ethical 
thought Shaftesbury considered it to be necessary for men to 
regard themselves as equal partners (despite his rejections of 
the social , contract) 
in, an activity which has as its end the 
welfare of all persons in. the community. To develop this mutual 
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respect between men,. it is necessary that they know equals - 
from which relationship one can develop the ability to act for 
the good of some other person or'persons upon a basis of affec- 
tion or love, rather than as a consequence of a command (and 
learn. to recognise in others the same sort of action. ). 
If the possibility of unselfish action for the benefit of 
others is dependent upon each person's experience of a mutual 
respect between men who regard themselves as equals, the master- 
subject relationship will prevent the realisation of such an 
ethical personality in both the ruler and the ruled. Never 
having known equality, -the ruler will 
have no knowledge of the 
common good. which is based upon a. love of all men as they work 
together for social ends.. An absolute king, whose word is law, 
will know no: other end for his actions than. his personal satis- 
faction, attained through application of the self rather than 
the: social. or natural affections. Under an absolute monarchy, 
the political-arrangements stand in opposition to the formation 
of what_Shaftesburycalls a "people". For Shaftesbury, a 
"people" is a community whose existence is dependent upon an 
unforced unity of interests - what we have-called above "society" 
in contrast to "government": 
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A multitude held together by force, though under 
one and the same head, is-not properly united. Nor 
does such a , 
body make a people. 'Tis the social 
league, confederacy, and mutual consent, founded in 
=x some, common good or interest, which joins. i the 
members of a community and makes a people one. 
Absolute power annuls the public. 7 
The necessary prerequisites for the-existence of, a natural 
society`äre a sense of affiliation with one's neighbours, and 
ä common desire to pursue the good of that community to which 
we feel affiliated. When this occurs we have a "people". The 
trouble`with an absolute monarchy is that the monarch cannot 
share in a, common will because he is unassociated with it. He 
is therefore isolated from the society over which he rules, 
offers nothing positive`to the development of'society, and 
eXists in contradiction to the moral end of society. 
Bytestanding in contradiction to the pursuit of the common 
good, the monarch also destroys the possibility of the formation 
of-an ethical character in his subjects. As Shaftesbury himself 
says ; 'Absolute p6wer'annuls the public", by which he should 
be taken `to' mean 'that the" social `affections which create a bond 
betweenthe individual'and the community cease to be effective 
when society is ruled'over'by an absolute monarchy. Because 
right action 'for the subject is never more than conformity with 
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the, ever changing will, ofAhe. sovereign, the subject ceases to 
think that justice has: more=than transitory validity. Men 
cease'to, berrable'to. make moral judgements, lose their moral 
principles, and "have-scarce a, notion of what is good or just, 
other than as mere will and power have determined., 
8 As a 
result-of this corruption of their ability to distinguish the 
natural' affections within themselves, those who live under an 
absolute government growto-love their otherwise unenviable 
position. This-".... personal love they bear their prince, 
however severe towards them, may show how natural an affection 
there is towards government and order among mankind. "9 But it 
must be interpreted-as a misapplication of the natural affec- 
tions resulting from a corruption of the human personality under 
absolute government. 
According to Shaftesbury, some form of government is 
natural to mankind; but despotism definitely is not that form. 
Thereason for this we have seen to be the fact that it is 
implicit within the rule of society by a single person, whose 
positionrplaces, him'beyond any controls, that he should contra- 
dict in his actions the social end of man, and through his 
influence on his subjects destroy their ethical potential. 
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Shaftesbury. is not without'sympathy for those wholive in such 
communities: "I'make allowances for that part of-mankind who 
have their. education. under tyranny, and know no other law than 
absolute will. "10- But it. was a situation which he could never 
condone. 
As an example of, the*form of-society that'is produced by 
the influence of absolutism, Shaftesbury never hesitated to 
point*to his contemporary France: "I never yet knew one single 
French man a free man. * Nor do I think it in nature possible, 
if they have early sucked that air, or been bred .... amongst 
people and books of their own kind. "ll It was in this context 
that he condemned'his own friend, ýPierre Coste, who was a 
Protestant emigre from Louise XIV's France. Cöste appears to 
have been opposed to. Shaftesbury's own political beliefs, in 
relation to which Shaftesbury`wrote a scathing. criticism of 
all. Frenchmen from his Neapolitan sick-bed in 1712. In a letter 
to Thomas Mickelthwayt, Shaftesbury wrote, 
----------- -------------- 
* By "free" Shaftesbury would appear tobe referring to moral 
freedom,, understood as the ability to'distinguish between 
our affections and choose a course of-action that bears no 
reference to "externals", but aims only at the common good 
by following-the natural affections. 
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The judgement you, make of his [Coste's] character 
.... is very just. It is in so far innocent on his 
side as-that no oneýof his nation in the same circum- 
stance as himself would talk or act other-wise in 
politics than as he has done, and does. 
It-is-in vain, for them to aim at principles. They 
have none, and never can have any, in government 
...., not--a Tory in England, not even an Oxford or 
a Christ Church College proselyte, but in effect, 
and in real practice-, when matters come to an issue, 
and things press, would be found more true by far 
to liberty and property and a national constitution 
than either poor C---- or the best that ever was 
bornrtand bred aFrenchman. This I know, and can 
pronounce, by good experience of mankind. 12 
Of Shaftesbury's attitudes to constitutionalism, the Tories, 
and the High Church (signified by. his, reference to Oxford 
University) L will have more to say below. Here I wish only 
to draw-attention to the importance, for Shaftesbury, of 
absolute monarchy as a primary cause for man's apparent inability 
to create either a moral character or societies which direct 
themselves towards the attainment of the common welfare. * 
* See below, Chapter Eight, for'a possible explanation of 
the original source of "tyranny" in both church and govern- 
ment. 'There`we see that even: under environmental conditions 
that promote'the emergence of an ethical. character, human 
failure to take advantage of the situation will lead to 
moral degeneration and the physical and mental domination 
of the citizen. 
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- III -I 
The second major reason why man's orientation towards the 
common good: may remain ünrealised. is-that man's religious 
temperament may lead to the'domination of both his mind. and his 
body by an, organised priesthood. In order to demonstrate this 
aspect oVShaftesbury's, thought we need only look to his des- 
cription`of the development of the religious institutions of 
ancient Egypt. 
Inhis discussion'on'the Egyptian-'religious institutions 
Shaftesbury'draws'attention to that fact that man's uncritical 
"enthusiasm" in'religious matters may'lead'him to forsake his 
natural affections., Enthusiasm, Shaftesbury tells us, "disjoints 
the natural frame and relaxes the ordinary tone or tenor of the 
mind; "13 whilst in, religious concerns, "the habit of admiration 
and contemplative delight would, by over-indulgence, too easily 
mount into high fanaticism or'degenerate into abject super- 
stition. "14 In''Egypt, `Shaftesbury saw the priesthood as having 
Used man's tendency towards irrational zeal as a. means of gaining 
influence overtthe population and entrenching its position in 
society. Once established the priesthood had become a vested 
interest concerned with preventing the population from 
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freeing itself from a "pusillanimous, frivolous, and mean kind 
of, superstition. "15 . It. was pusillanimous because its end was 
the enrichment. of the clergy; frivolous because the-clergy were 
not concerned with religious truth,. but with the continuation 
of., irrational zeal; and. meah because it replaced the common 
good of society with. the good of the established church(es). 
Given the human basis for the possible rise of a priest- 
hood which was able. to dominate the Egyptian society, Shaftes- 
bury goes on to explain how that priesthoodbecame. the dominant 
power, in Egypt. The reason for this. lies in the fact that by 
becoming a. priest one entered into a most influential profession: 
No wonder if sucha 'profession was apt to multiply, 
especially when we consider the easy living and 
security of the professors, their exemption from 
all labour and hazard, the supposed sacredness of 
their character, and,. their free possession of wealth, 
grandeur, estates, and women. 16 
Because of this attraction of the profession, the numbers and 
influence of, the priests grew, and the superstitious zeal of 
the people was maintained as the source of priestly power. In 
this process the priesthood were able "to establish themselves 
a plentiful and growing fund or religious land-bank, "17 until 
at last "the property and power of the Egyptian priesthood in 
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ancient days arrived'to such a heightýas in a manner to have 
swallowed up the state and monarchy. "18 
Shaftesbury saw the'presence of, a powerful and prosperous 
priesthood in Egypt as not-only the basis for the spiritual 
corruption 'Of the people, but also as adanger to the temporal 
power of the government. After domination-"of the minds of the 
people there followed the domination of their bodies through 
the capture of, the' pol itical 'power in society. ` But what is more 
important for us'here to'note; is the fact that Shaftesbury con- 
verted his analysis of the ancient Egyptian situation into a 
general theory. Following a statement of the belief that, 
"dominion must naturally follow property, " Shaftesbury continues 
with: 
5 
Nor is it possible, as I conceive, for any state or 
monarchy to-withstand the encroachments of a growing 
hierarchy, founded on the model of these Egyptian .... 
priesthoods. No.. superstition will ever be wanting 
among the ignorant and vulgar whilst the able and 
crafty have a power to gain-inheritances and 
possessions by working on this human weakness. 19 
Therefore, any state which wants to ensure itself against the 
ever increasing encroachments-of the clergy must be careful to 
limit both the numbers of that class and the amount of property 
that is possessed by it. 
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Inthe-case"of the Egyptian priesthood, -however, its 
corrupting influence cannot be said to have reached its limits 
at thepoint where it entirely'dominated the Egyptian state. 
Its', religioüs domination spread-to all those tribes which were 
dependent-upon Egypt for-either food: or protection. 'Wherever 
Egypt} had. riofluence', men lost their moral ability and the free- 
dom. toformulate, by their natural capacities, the natural and 
social attitudes which are implicit to all human existence. 
This expansion`of'influence continued until, "when destitute 
of other. -capture [i. e. potential disciples] and confined within 
too narrow limits, " in order to maintain expansion, the 
representatives of different gods had to attempt to gain new 
disciples from other sects. At the same time it was necessary 
to heighten-the-irrational zeal of their own adherents in order 
to prevent dissension within their own ranks -'because of the 
competition-from other sects. "Thus provinces and nations were 
divided by the most contrary rites and customs, which could be 
devised in order to create the strongest aversion possible 
between.. creatures of a like species 1120 the end result of which 
was religious massacre and social chaos amongst mankind. 
, 
Through_. his analysis of the religious character of ancient 
258 
Egypt, - Shaftesbury presented-us-with an historical example to 
justify his theory-of, the religious origins of social conflict. 
This theory claims that a combination of spiritual influence and 
property will. always lead. to a domination of a community's 
political structure. ' When this has been achieved, combining 
both religious enthusiasm and the coercive power of the govern- 
ment, the tendency of all churches will be to undertake a 
religious crusade, 'not in order to save men's souls, but in order 
to extend the-temporal power-and wealth of the priesthood. The 
situation-thereby created is the reverse of what mankind both 
can and ought to be like.., In accepting'the anti-social leader- 
ship of the, priests, *the religious enthusiast lays the corner- 
stone for the-eventual destruction, of all those qualities which 
mark him out as, human; -and priests who hold. sway over the 
human mind must be. seen as the second reason why Shaftesbury 
thought that "..:. 'tis hard to find in any region a human society 
which has human laws. " .ý 
-IV- 
Beginning with Shaftesbüry's distrust of the priest as a 
potential exploiter of human failings in the spiritual sphere, 
let us now look at-his interpretation of the state of the 
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Christian religion atsthe time he was writing. As a supporter 
of the "Glorious Revolution" and the Protestant 1success16n, 
Shaftesbury made an"absolute distinction between the Roman 
Catholic and Protestant. -, elements in the Christian Church. He 
condemned the former and gave qualified support to the-latter. 
When we consider his reasons for these attitudes we find that 
they are political rather than theological. Consequently, his 
attitudes to these''two forms of Christianity are relevant to our 
present discussion. 
Shäftesbury's'reasons for opposing the Church of Rome were 
fundamentally the same as his reasons for condemning the religious 
institutions of ancient Egypt. This becomes evident if we look 
: of the Christian at Shaftesbury's summary of the early history 
Church, and his description' concerning how universal Christian 
orthodoxy waspursued"by the early church. The early Christian 
Church, we are told, came into existence when, under the tyranny 
of the'Röman"Empire, `mankind had lost its ability to appreciate 
and control the natural affections. At the same time, "Super- 
stition .... could'not but naturally prevail, as misery and 
ignorance increased. " With this increase in superstition, the 
heathen priesthood had grown in power and influence; and it 
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was this. power and influence which was eventually inherited by 
the, Christian Church when Christianity became the official 
religion of Rome under. Constantine: 
And when the season came, that by means of a convert- 
emperor the heathen churchlands, with an increase 
of power, became-transferred to the Christian clergy, 
'twas no wonder if by such riches and authority they 
were in no small measure influenced and corrupted 
. '''21' 
Inherited power corrupted the still youthful church. The form 
this corruption took was the organisation of the believers for 
the purpose of creating and enforcing religious conformity, there- 
by increasing the power and influence of the now established 
Church. In order to discipline their flock the hierarchy 
hardened the borders of religion, creating thereby the impersonal 
dogmas of a strict orthodoxy: "That which was naturally the 
subject of profound speculation and inquiry was made the 
necessary subject of a strict and absolute assent.. 
22 By means 
of this. regimentation of their: adherents into a united front of 
enthusiastic bigots, "the Roman-Christian and once catholic 
church ..... proceeded in the establishment of their growing 
hierarchy. "23-. The. price that-was paid for final unity was the 
destruction of all opportunity for men to discover their natural 
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affections, and the domination of mankind by a hierarchy which 
is equated by Shaftesbury with the rule of an absolute temporal 
power. "These, " he wrote, referring to the Catholic priesthood, 
"are the spiritual conquerors, who, like the first Caesars, from 
small beginnings established the foundations. of an almost uni- 
versal monarchy. "24 Although "the exercise of power, however 
arbitrary or. despotic, seems less intolerable under such a 
spiritual sovereignty"25 as the'Church of Rome, it must be equally 
condemned. This was Shaftesbury's final word in relation to 
the Roman church. Its influence upon mankind must always be 
corrupting and the source of human misery. 
We. turn now to Shaftesbury's attitude towards Protestantism. 
Shaftesbury does'not describe for us the tenets of the Protestant 
church(es) as he understands them. His concern is that there 
should be religious freedom, (see Chapter Eight below). However. ', 
as an avid supporter of the 1688 Revolution which had cast a 
Catholic king from the throne of England, he tended to associate 
non-absolute government with the Protestant cause in general; a 
feeling strengthened by the fact that Britain's main ally in the 
wars against France in Shaftesbury's time, was republican 
262 
Holland -. also largely Protestant. In a letter to Mr. Furley, 
an English merchant residing in Rotterdam, Shaftesbury stated 
that, 
.... notwithstanding our late pullbacks, the good 
prospect of the age and the security of the 
Protestant Religion, and libertyes of mankind on 
a happy foundation of good correspondence between 
the two nations of Brittain and Holland, the con- 
ductors of this great work, all this, I say, is a 
just subject for you to rejoice with yourself .... 26 
Protestantism was associated with the non-absolute form of 
government that. would allow man the freedom to develop a socially 
oriented' moral. personality. 
When we consider Shaftesbury's attitude towards the estab- 
lished Church of England, however, we find that this support for 
the'Protestant form of Christianity was qualified. For Shaftes- 
bury regarded any established church as a potential danger to 
the moral'and political freedom of the individual insofar as the 
ambition''of the priesthood might, as with the Egyptian and 
Catholic hierarchies, ' lead to the establishment of theocracy. 
He saw good reason for distrusting the Anglican clergy - as he 
tells-us in a letter to Michael"Ainsworth in 1710: 
.... honesty, good principles, moderation, and true Christianity,.... are now set at nought, and at 
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defiance, by the far greater part and numbers of 
that body. of clergy call'd the church of ENGLAND; 
who no"more esteem themselves'a Protestant church, 
or in union with those of Protestant communion; 
'tho' they'pretend to the name of Christian, and 
would have us judge of the spirit of C risstianity 
from theirs: which GOD prevent! .... 
.... you have been broughtVinto the world, and 
come into orders, in'the worst time for insolence, 
riot, pride, and presumption of clergy-men, that I 
ever knew, or have read of .... "2ý 
The Church of, England was betraying what Shaftesbury considered 
to be the true, principles. of Christianity. His reasons for 
coming. to.: this conclusion were; firstly, the Sacheverell sermon, 
preached, in St. Paul's on November 5th, 1709, denouncing tolera- 
tion and sounding the war-cry of "the Church in danger; " and 
secondly, the., association of the clergy with the Tories, whom 
Shaftesbury was never able'to consider as anything other than 
reactionary and-, absolutist. * In-opposition to this active 
----------------- ------------ ------------------------- 
The relationship of the clergy to-the Tories, and their 
interference in, party politics was. as follows: - 
"The clergy ..,. were divided into Latitudinarians, and 
High 
Churchmen. The former, who were mainly-Whigs, held most of 
the bishoprics; the latter, who were almost exclusively Tory, 
composed the vast majority of the clergy as a whole .. `.. The influence of the Established clergy at elections was 
specially noticeable, for the sermon was at once more popular, 
a more. important, and a more widely diffused vehicle of 
propaganda than any pamphlet or news-sheet could be. When 
(Continued overleaf) 
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participation-by the Church in affairs of state, Shaftesbury 
held that. the Church was only useful "in so far as it tied the 
hands of priests and fanatics, and acted as a gag instead of a 
trumpet; it would be pernicious if it could be made an engine 
of priestly power ".. t28 (Leslie Stephen). 
Given this attitude towards, the'established Church, it is 
to be expected that'Shaftesbury should insist upon the subordina- 
tion of the. Church to the, civil. government; for if the govern- 
ment provides a sound basis for the social-development of that 
portion of mankind over which it rules, it would be foolish to 
endanger this-lby-. allowing the priesthood any large degree of 
influence. Therefore, "'tis to be hoped that in'a more civilised 
age, such as at present, we'have the good fortune to live in, 
they [the priesthood] will not attempt to strain their privileges 
to the same height as formerly. "29 "And remember, " Shaftesbury 
------ --------------------------------------------------------- 
(Continued from previous page) 
the High Church clergy proceeded to inflame the minds of their 
parishioners against the Whigs, their influence penetrated to 
villages reached by no literature save. -the monthly news- 
letter, and to men who could not read Defoe and would not 
have understood Addison. All these elements of unrest were 
focused into one by an explosive sermon delivered in St. Paul's 
on .... November 5,1709. " H. W. V. Temperley, Party Government under Queen Anne. The 
Cambridge Modern History, Vol. V. 467/8. C. . P., 
934. 
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says` in a letter'to Ainsworth, that HE, whom you'own to be 
your Master and legislator, made no laws relating"to civil 
power; or interfering with it. " In this statement we can see 
not only a rejection of the theory of divine right, but a 
rejection also of clerical participation in public affairs. 
Shaftesbury believed, with Hobbes, that in'matters relating to 
the organisation of society, the clergy should obey the civil 
government, "all other pretensions of priests -being 
Jewish and 
Heathenish, and in'our state seditious, disloyal, and factious 
.. 30* 
Although Shaftesbury is in agreement with Hobbes in saying 
that the civil power must be superior to the religious power in 
the'state, the two thinkers'differ in their views concerning the 
relationship between Church and State. Hobbes demanded a 
combination bf'Chürch and State in the sovereign power, which 
was tobe*both the civil and the religious controller of the 
* For Hobbes, the'power of the priest is the power to teach, 
not to command. ".... Christ hath not left to his ministers 
in-this world, unless they be also endued with civil 
authority, any' authority'to'command other men. " Leviathan 
326/27. Christian ministers ".... shall do wisely, to 
expect the coming-of Christ hereafter, in patience and 
faith, with obedience to their present magistrates. " 
Ibid., 330. 
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community. * Shaftesbury fears such. a powerful combination of 
means for influencing the lives of men. The situation would 
differ little from that of the. rule of the priesthood in Egypt - 
physical and psychological control of the people would be com- 
bined in the hands. of a single individual or group whose 
tyranny over the population would corrupt man's natural orienta- 
tion towards moral and social. relationships with his fellows. 
And even if the civil power were not absolute, affiliation with 
the religious power would introduce the danger of it becoming 
so. Of priestly power, Shaftesbury was always suspicious. There- 
fore,. not only must the Church remain subordinate to the state, 
but it must also remain separate from it - an aspect of Shaftes- 
bury's thought that is amply illustrated in Appendix A to this 
enquiry. Only if this is the case will mankind be safe from 
* Where the sovereign power professes Christianity, it is Hobbes's 
opinion that it should be. spiritual leader of the community: 
"A private man has always the liberty, because thought 
is free, to believe or not believe in his heart those acts 
that have been given out for-miracles .... But when 
it 
comes to confession of that faith, the private reason must 
submit to the public; that is to say, to God's lieutenant. " 
(Leviathan, 291. ) For Hobbes, God's lieutenant, the chief 
pastor and head of the national church, was the sovereign 
power created by the social contract. 
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moral and political authoritarianism and able to fulfil its 
moral and social purposes. 
Like Hobbes*,, Shaftesbury accepted the inability of the 
finite mind to*formulate truths concerning the infinite matters 
of religion**. But unlike Hobbes, this was not grounds for 
prescribing the adoption of a-unified national church. On the 
contrary, it was seen by Shaftesbury as grounds for toleration 
in religious matters; for where there is no certain truth one 
* "Whatsoever we imagine 'is-finite. Therefore there is no 
idea, or conception of any thing we call infinite. .... When we say any thing is infinite, we signify only, that 
we are not able to conceive the ends, and bounds of the 
things named .... And therefore the name of God 
is used, 
not to make us conceive him, for he is, incomprehensible 11 
Leviathan, 17. 
** Shaftesbury's recognition of this distinction is, to my 
mind, demonstrated by the fact that he condemns the com- 
bination of philosophy and religion in the early Christian 
church. ".... their sophistic teachers became ecclesias- 
tical instructors, the unnatural union of religion and 
philosophy was completed, and the monstrous product of 
this match appeared soon in the world. " By reducing 
religion to a finite descriptive art the essential nlYsticism 
of the infinite'was destroyed, to be replaced by dogmatism: 
"The allegorical, mythological account of sacred things 
was wholly inverted; liberty of judgement and exposition 
taken away; ' no ground left for inquiry, search, or 
meditation .... " Characteristics, II 206/7. 
268 
might`as well"Ieave'each person to that form of religious 
worship'or°belief°that he prefers. Although "'tis necessary 
a, people should. -have'a public leading in religion, " it is pure 
vanity and ignoranceto suppose that we°can or ought "to 
prescribe boundsýto fancy and speculation [in'order] to, regulate 
men's, apprehensions and religious beliefs or fears **so 1131 
Shaftesbury demands toleration in order, to. allow the free 
development of the individual, in harmony with himself and with 
the complex, of individuals that make up society. This leads 
A. O. Aldridge to discuss'Shaftesbury within the same context of 
the free thinker, Tindal, when he writes, 
Tindal, and.,, Shaftesbury. together with moderates and 
latitudinarians in the Church go along with Hobbes 
in denying that, the ecclesiastical body. has any 
authority independent of the civil body, but deny 
, that there is any, one, sole-commissioned church or ecclesiastical authority. They advocate the free 
exercise, of religion and, oppose the. use of. religion 
as a servant of the magistrate, and the magistrate 
ý,: as a, servant of,, religion. 32 
' _V_ 
Shaftesbury condemned those political situations that do 
not''all, ow the individual sufficient opportunity for the 
realisation of moral action, and, its consequence, the welfare 
of society as a whole. In order for there to exist the 
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possibility of an, ethical society that which had to be evident 
was "liberty". In the next chapter we shall examine the full 
implications that this concept had for Shaftesbury. For the 
moment, the following' passage from a letter written in 1705 
to Arent'Fürley will give some idea of his position. 
'Tis liberty; indeed, that can only polish and 
refine the spirit and soul as well as wit of man. 
'Tis liberty that exalts him to manhood, and makes 
him differ from the slave, than the slave' differs 
from the beast; and when he has felt and'is'con- 
scious of this. advantage, he will know this difference, 
notbefore .... x'33 
Only those forms of political organisation which exhibited 
what Shaftesbury considered to be a sufficient degree of liberty 
(for the maintenance. of the moral and social consciousness of 
both the governors and the governed) could hope to find justi- 
fication for their existence in his writings. 
In discussing the institutional framework of what he 
considered tobe a free political environment, Shaftesbury does 
not present us with any utopian. models of the perfect state. 
However, both in the Characteristics and in his letters Shaftes- 
bury leaves us in no doubt that he was well-satisfied with the 
British constitution of the post-Revolutionary period (post-1688). 
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In the . 
Characteristics we find him saying: 
As for us. Britons, thank Heaven, we .... have the notion of ,a public,, and a constitution; 
how a 
legislative and howýan executive is'modelled. .... Our increasing knowledge shows us every day, more 
and more, what common sense is, in politics; and 
this must of necessity lead us to understand a like 
sense in morals, which is the. foundation"34 
And, 
'Tis. scarce a, quarter of an age since such a'happy 
balance of power was. settled between our prince and 
people as has firmly secured our hitherto precarious 
liberties, and removed from us the fear-of civil 
commotions .... 35 
However, such statements' as these say-little; and it is to 
Shaftesbury's opinions concerning the particulars of his 
. 
contemporary political scene that we must look if we are to 
find anything more than platitudinous generalisations. If we 
consider the contents of a letter written to Mr. Fowler in 
February, 1701, certain implications concerning Shaftesbury's 
precise attitude towards the "happy balance of power" may 
become evident. He was writing just after the election of a 
new House of Commons under a Whig majority - the House having 
been dissolved in the previous December after the King had asked 
the Tories to forma ministry. Of the circumstances of this 
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election he wrote as follows: 
And now pray see the vertue that is still left in 
this nation, were we under an Administration to 
exert it. Here was a Parlemt. dissolv'd .... and 
a new one call'd under a new ministry in the most 
fatal conjuncture imaginable, '.... [the new 
ministry] with all its arts and corruptions set 
on foot to ruine us, and gain 'a Parlemt. for this 
treacherouse ministry, friends to France and 
King James; the King himself'not awak'd, but still 
managing with the, same Ministers who openly side 
with France and favour "the Jacobite interest; yet 
notwithstanding this, wee have strength enough in 
the Parlemt'. to carry every question against the 
Toryes ...., against the Ministry ...., against the Court, and even-against the King himself, 
whilst he is thus against himself. Never 
Parlemt. was more ready to do for him to the 
utmost, and if he be resolv'd to do for himself, 
and put himself out of French hands, 'he has all 
England with him, but what he intends God knows; 
who alone truly knows the hearts of Princes. 36 
The ! 'fatal conjuncture" here mentioned by Shaftesbury was the 
danger of a Tory majority in the House of Commons. For the 
Tories, already in control of the executive power in the state, 
"are good servants, but ill masters; and, as by principles 
they are slaves, so they are only serviceable when they are 
kept so .... ". 
37 This being their sole potential, the Tories 
were placed by Shaftesbury in opposition to the true interests 
of the nation as, represented by the newly elected majority of 
Whigs. The elective House of Commons, a product of "the 
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vertue that is still left in this nation, " was seen by Shaftes- 
bury to be the sole protection against the absolutist moves of 
a Tory ministry which had been chosen by a king who was "against 
himself"(so described because of the Jacobite sympathies of the 
Tories). In considering the opposition between the administra- 
tive agents of society and the wishes of. the people (or its 
representatives), Shaftesbury unhesitatingly places his support 
on the side of the people. If a free people, uninfluenced by 
enthusiasm, have influence in the government, there will be no 
danger of an elitist group obtaining power in the state for its 
own ends against the welfare of the community. In relation to 
the English situation, he is saying that the legislature should 
be superior to the executive power, which includes the chief 
executive agent, the king. 
In the above letter to Furley, Shaftesbury also says that 
the king was "himself not awak'd, " implying that the king Was 
blind to the real interests of both himself and the nation. Also, 
the exasperated statement that it is, God alone who knows what 
goes on in the minds of princes complements what appears to be a 
general attitude of anti-monarchism. Just as an established 
Church always contains a potential theocratic tyranny, so it 
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would, seem-does the presence-of-a-monarch in the political 
system. , 
For, , _ý ,_ 
n' söoner has a Prince done-great things for 
his country, but he has the sovereign power in a 
manner devolved upon him, and'by the foolish zeal 
of the people is made absolute, almost whether he 
will or no. For, togo no higher than our own times, 
what think you had become of our English Constitution, 
had King Charles the Second not been a prodigal, 
King James a bigot, or had King William been 
victoriouse ....? 38` 
There is a constant danger of absolutism developing from the 
royal establishment"not- only because of ambitions of the monarch, 
but also as a result of the thoughtless actions"of the people. 
From these opinions concerning the governmental insti- 
tutions*of Britain, "'it would have been quite logical for him to 
take up a. revolutionary stance and advocate the abolition of the 
monarchy in favour of a republic. However, there is a strong 
conserVat0e element'in Shaftesbury's writings which demands 
that we respect the customary governmental institutions in any 
society. As a consequence of this he does not advocate 
revolutionary change and provides no organisational blue-prints. 
He limits his recommendations to the need to prevent uncontrolled 
absolutism: ` In order to attain this it would appear to be 
necessary for the rulers of society to have their power balanced 
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by the active political participation of the people (or at 
least a segment'of-the population that can represent the 
interests of the people). Given'this, as it exists in England, 
then changes in'the political arrangements should be discouraged. 
Shaftesbury discourages political change in all societies 
because he believes that tampering with customary arrangements 
willa,; lead to tyranny* --the emergence of. a single ruler who 
, follows the self rather. than the social, affections: 
` to' vary on' every turn the' rule ahd measure of 
government, without respect to any ancient constitu- 
"tions or establishments', or'to the'stated and fixed' 
rules of equity and justice, is as certain slavery as 
it 'i s" vi of ence, x distraction, and misery, such as in 
the issue must prove the establishment of an irre- 
trievable state of tyranny and. absolute dominion. 39 
'For' the same reason rebellion must also be rejected: 
.... such respect ought ever to be borne by all good 
people towards every Government that stands upon the 
foundation of laws, and has any thing that may be called 
-a constitution; - that, however Unjustly things may for 
a while, or on some particular occasion be administer'd, 
they will bear with patience those infirmities and 
occasional corruptions and mismanagements which are 
---------------------- ------- 
* It should be noted that Shaftesbury does not make the 
traditional distinction (found in Aristotle) between monarchy 
and tyranny. The absolute monarch, because his power is 
' "'uncompromised, must become'a tyrant (an individual who 
gratifies only his selfish pleasures). See Section II of 
this chapter. 
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incident to all Governments, and are natural to men 
as men, rather than by a sudden zeal or animosity 
in their own or friend's case (when unhappily injur'd 
or ill dealt with) attempt to unhinge the Government 
itself, and stirr up the minds of the people against 
their magistracy and settled form, which fails not 
to end in cruelty and tyranny. For so the best 
Commonwealths have been converted into the most 
absolute tyrannys. 40 
Although Shaftesbury does not provide us with a detailed 
explanation of how he reached this conclusion, a possible explana- 
tion may be found in his belief that both society and some 
governments are natural to the condition of man. If this be the 
case, then in the customs and laws of society we find the necess- 
ary norms for man's natural condition. It is this environment 
that may be seen as educating man to an equality with the 
historical development of the human race from barbarism to 
civility. Society and government take the child from which will 
develop the social being. The man realises his inner potential, 
becoming more natural through contact with, and sympathy towards, 
the moral and cultural norms of the society that are found in the 
institutions and traditions; and to oppose that to which we owe 
our development is to negate our morality and sociability. There- 
fore, just as he had considered the ability of an absolute 
monarch to alter the laws at will as destructive of man's moral 
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consciousness, Shaftesbury also thought that the radical change 
of customs and laws, whatever the source of that change, would 
have the same effect. By the acceptance of change men lose 
the ability to appreciate the possibility of permanent standards 
of action. For the established institutions and laws are primary 
to the formation of a moral consciousness in the citizen, and to 
question or change the former is to question the latter. The 
result of change would be the destruction of our faith in either 
of them, and they would be made incapable of providing an effec- 
tive opposition to the claims and ambitions of the potential 
tyrant. The only exception that he is prepared to make to the 
unquestioning obedience to, the laws of the country as enforced 
by the magistrates is if the individual judges that the state 
faces "impending ruin". *" What such a situation would involve 
is the loss of liberty; an appeal to the people against the 
magistrates only being the greatest injury that can be offered 
* ". ý.. as a friend of ye people, I ever was end must 
be 
y greatest enemy to those who, on any acc less than 
immediate impending ruin of their state, shall dare 
appeal to their tumults, and invite them by their 
riotouse assemblys to intimidate their Magistrates. " 
J. Forster (ed. ), Original Letters, 260. Letter to 
Mr. Furley, Reygate, May 22nd, 1710. 
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a free government. The pre-1688 condition in Britain appears 
to have satisfied this pre-requisite for revolt, for "Late 
England, since the Revolution, " was thought by him to be "better 
still than Old England by many a degree, and .... In the main we 
make somewhat a better figure in Europe than we did a few reigns 
before. x'41 
Shaftesbury also thought that if radical change was necess- 
ary it must not take the form of a complete destruction of all 
the trammels of the old government. The edifice of the state, 
however unnatural, always contains the essence of what a state 
ought to be. What is necessary is reform - the cutting away of 
a canker in order to leave the essential core of the state in 
its natural, healthy condition. This attitude becomes evident 
if we consider Shaftesbury's opinions concerning the organisa- 
tion of the Egyptian state under the priesthood or Magi. He was 
the first to admit that some sort of change was necessary in 
this situation. However, when considering the form that that 
change should have taken, he tells us that even the most evil 
rule will not extinguish all moral principle. Certain laws and 
customs will conform with man's true moral nature. Even though 
one "might have resolved not to leave so much as their houses 
standing, " it is necessary to remember that to totally destroy 
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all the laws and customs would be to make man even worse than 
he had become under the theocracy. Shaftesbury asks, 
Should we have flown at every religious and moral 
principle, denied every natural and social affection, 
and rendered men as much wolves as was possible to 
one another, whilst we described them such; and 
endeavoured to make them see themselves by far more 
monstrous and corrupt than with the worst intentions 
it was ever possible for the worst of them to 
become? 47' 
To destroy everything is to destroy the natural with the un- 
natural, the good with the bad. To do so would have created in 
Egypt a nation of Hobbesian archetypes. For the socio-political 
environment is a product of mankind's moral and cultural history, 
and to this the individual owes what moral ideas he may possess 
no matter how inadequate they are. To destroy the whole legal 
framework of a state would be to negate any progress that its 
members had made towards the fulfilment of their natures as moral 
beings. 
- VI - 
In spite of Shaftesbury's failure to provide us with a 
model outlining the features of a perfect society, and in spite 
of his apparent satisfaction with the prevailing governmental 
forms in his contemporary Britain, Shaftesbury does make two 
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recommendations concerning the most natural means of organising 
society. The first is concerned with the formation of political 
parties and interest groups; the second with the maximum size 
to which any state can grow without the emergence of conflict 
between its members. 
According to Shaftesbury, man's natural sociability is not 
only the cause of man's moral maturity and personal happiness, 
but also, "methinks, this herding principle, and associating 
inclination, is seen so natural and strong in most men, that 
one might readily affirm 'twas even from the violence of this 
passion that so much disorder arose in the general society of 
mankind. " The source of this disorder is the fact that man's 
"sense of fellowship" ought, ideally, to stretch to the whole 
of mankind. However, "the interest of the world in general, is 
a kind of remote philosophical object. That greater community 
falls not easily under the eye. " This also applies to the 
nation as a whole. It is only in the smaller social group that 
we can feel a common interest which we attempt to pursue. For, 
"In less parties, men may be intimately conversant and acquainted 
with one another. They can there better taste society, and enjoy 
the common good and interest of a more contracted public. , 
43 
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Most men are willing to rest satisfied in their local community, 
pursuing the good of that in which they can see the immediate 
results of their actions. 
However, those individuals who have a more expansive nature, 
"they who are of the sprightliest and most active faculties 1,44 
cannot rest satisfied in pursuing the common good on such a 
small scale. In an attempt. to pursue the welfare of the whole 
community, the socially conscious individual may affiliate with 
others and form a political party. It was-Shaftesbury's belief 
that when this occurred there was formed an interest opposed to 
the common good. It is an "abuse or irregularity of that social 
love and common affection which is natural to mankind. "45 As 
a member of the Commons in 1695 he showed evidence of placing 
his conception of the general good above the quarrels of party 
politics. In a letter to one Thomas Stringer concerning a Bill 
which was then before the Commons, * and which had both his 
* "We have got a bill to be engrossed, which lays an incapacity 
on the elector .... in case of corruption, meat, 
drink, &c., 
and which obliges the Knights of the shire to have,. 500 a 
year, or the inheritance of it, as freehold within the 
county, and a BurgessjE200 a year somewhere at least in 
England on the same terms. " 
Rand (ed. ) Life, Unpublished Letters, and Philosophical 
Reimen, 300. 
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support and his vote, he wrote of himself: 
.... your poor friend that now writes to you has 
sentence (and bitter sentence too) every day pass- ing upon him for going, as you may be sure he goes, 
and ever will go, on such occasions as these, what- 
ever party it be that is in or out at Court .... 46 
Having recognised a distinction between the common good and 
the ends of factional sub-groups, Shaftesbury strove to pursue 
the former in opposition to the latter. 
It was Shaftesbury's opinion that political factions or 
parties are formed when men find that they can not relate them- 
selves immediately to the common purpose and interest of their 
community. His fears of the divisive effects of such groups 
are sufficient to lead him to recommend a limitation on the 
size of political organisations. For Shaftesbury, the most 
desirable size for a community is the size at which each person 
in that community is capable of associating himself with the 
interests of the whole. This will be an upper limit beyond 
which the community cannot grow without factions occurring and 
destroying its common aim. If expansion occurs and takes the 
size beyond this upper limit, new societies will be formed with- 
in the old as men attempt to gain that common sense of fellowship 
which has been lost: 
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Thus we have wheels within wheels. And in some 
national constitutions (not withstanding the absurdity 
in politics) we have one empire within another. 
Nothing is so delightful as to incorporate. Dis- 
tinctions of many kinds are invented. Religious 
societies are formed. Orders are erected, and their 
interests espoused and served with the utmost zeal 
and passion .... And the associating genius of man is never better proved than in those very societies, 
which are formed in opposition to the general one of 
mankind, and to the real interest of the State. 47 
In large states, conflict is caused because of the desire of 
human beings to "incorporate" their interests with others. 
Shaftesbury calls sedition "a kind of cantonising"- the pro- 
duct of a state growing too large for the existence of a common 
interest and good which can be shared by all. The cure for 
this, says Shaftesbury, has been the emigration of groups from 
the home country to form colonies abroad - by which he means 
politically independent communities formed by emigrants from 
the home country. Shaftesbury approves of this sort of action, 
and "empires" are always faced with Shaftesbury's condemnation 
through their incapacity to provide any common goals because 
of a lack of unity: 
Vast empires are in many respects unnatural; but 
particularly in this, that be they ever so well 
constituted, the affairs of many must, in such 
governments-, turn upon a very few, andrthe relation 
be less sensible, and in a manner lost, between 
the magistrate and people, in a body so unwieldly 
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in its limbs, and whose members lie so remote 
from one another and distant from the head. 48 
If the state grows too large, the government will find it 
impossible to share in. any common sympathy which may be possessed 
by the whole population. The size of the population over which 
it rules makes the recognition of any such common element 
impossible. Even if the government is unanimous, its aims will 
remain particular insofar as the government will only form a 
part of, a faction within, the whole society. 
However, Shaftesbury's preference for a state that was 
limited in size was tempered by a recognition of the impossi- 
bility of ever achieving such a limitation in the de facto 
situation of his own time. This qualification was expressed by 
Shaftesbury when he was discussing what he calls "the balance 
of power in the world. " Starting from the self-evident prin- 
ciple that "there should be a balance of power in the world" - 
this being "one of the plain principles which the world (thank 
God) is pretty well possessed of in this rising age", - he 
continues with a statement of his belief that "the balance 
should for the good of mankind be. -. composed not of a few, but 
as many powers as is possible .... " Expanding on this, he 
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states that he would, 
bring these smaller powers or sovereignties 
within the limits of cities, and those too of no 
enormous bulk of widely extended territory. Such 
powers as these, united by confederacy, or stand- 
ing league (as of old the Grecian cities by the 
Achaian, and at this day the German circles, Swiss 
cantons, and Dutch states), are doubtless the most 
perfect and according to nature .... 49 
However, at this point his hesitancy to recommend any radical 
change again becomes evident. Despite his belief that an 
increase. in the number and dispersion of politically independent 
communities would be preferable to the larger political communi- 
ties that he sees around him, he feels that this would lead to 
a domination of. mankind by "unnatural sovereignties", by which 
he means absolute monarchies. Therefore, he qualifies the above 
statement, saying that smaller political units would be 
"ineffectual to preserve a general balance against greater and 
more unnatural sovereignties when such appear in the world, 
[as] history and reason will in good measure show us. "49In this 
we again can recognise Shaftesbury's refusal to be carried 
away by utopian dreams, despite his belief that the contemporary 
political structure of the world was far from perfect. 
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- VII - 
The present chapter has been largely concerned with man 
as a subordinate unit in the community at large. We have been 
concerned with how Shaftesbury. thought the state should be 
organised-in order to achieve the common good. As a consequence 
of this we have, in a sense, lost sight of the individual in so 
far as he is subordinated to the common good of the whole 
community. ., 
For by postulating a higher moral end than the 
individual himself, yet to which the individual belongs, the 
individual is in danger of losing all significance. There is 
a tendency to avoid the placing of the individual in opposition 
to the government, especially if that government is believed to 
facilitate the attainment of the common good. At the same time 
we have seen that Shaftesbury regarded government and religion 
to be sources of moral corruption in man - as a result of which 
he recommends that certain forms of political and religious 
institutions should, be. opposed. The reason for the radical 
element is that one of the norms that he feels all political 
societies should possess is the opportunity for the individual 
to develop his moral consciousness. Because of this, despite 
a tendency to recommend support of the laws and the magistrates, 
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when he feels that freedom is denied Shaftesbury will condemn 
political structures and hope for their reform. When he does 
this he is asserting the moral significance of the individual 
against the corrupting influence of the state; his writings 
take on a libertarian view which is not found when he stresses 
the need for the individual to subordinate himself to the common 
ends of the whole community. Individual autonomy loses almost 
all its significance, however, when the natural development of 
man towards his social condition is equated with his existence 
in a particular form of political organisation - such as the 
British constitution. 
We are faced in Shaftesbury's philosophy with an opposition 
between the moral need of men for freedom, and the moral 
responsibility of men to subordinate themselves to social goals. 
These two elements may conflict, and Shaftesbury does not give 
a clear explanation of how we can decide when to support, or 
when to oppose, the government - which defines and supports the 
social goals. There is no definition of a sphere of individual 
activity, nor a statement of human rights, that the government 
may not legitimately interfere with. As a consequence of this, 
the problem of political obligation remains unsolved. However, 
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we must recognise that Shaftesbury never set out to solve such 
a problem. His main interest in those writings which have 
political significance is to demonstrate that freedom leads to 
moral and cultural development. He set out to demonstrate the 
results of freedom, not to justify any particular method for 
bringing it about, or to justify revolution in a situation where 
freedom was lacking. He was, after all, living in a society 
which he believed was already free. 
---00000--- 
SUMMARY: 
This chapter begins by recognising that political enquiries 
are a necessary extension of Shaftesbury's moral thought. 
Shaftesbury regards the human purpose to be found only in the 
liefe of a political community. It is because of this that he 
refuses to consider man as being able to exist in a pre-social 
"state of nature", whether that condition be regarded as pleasant 
or otherwise. He rejects the presence of knowledge of a "golden 
age" when no government was needed, sees government and society 
as necessarily implying each other, and sees "virtue" as con- 
sisting in the welfare of the community within which Nature has 
placed us. 
288 
However, Shaftesbury was prepared to recognise that man 
does not usually fulfil his ethical potential. The reason for 
this is to be found, according to Shaftesbury, in the corruption 
of man's ethical potential by political and religious institu- 
tions. Section II considers the "political" sources of corrup- 
tion and notes that for Shaftesbury, 
1. an absolute monarch can have no knowledge of the 
common good 
2. an absolute monarch prevents the emergence of moral 
standards within the community over which he rules 
3. his contemporary France was regarded as an example 
of a society corrupted by absolutism. 
Section III considers the religious sources of the human 
failure to achieve the ethical status that Nature has given to 
men. It is seen that as a consequence of "enthusiasm" men 
become religious fanatics and can be dominated by a priesthood. 
Using ancient Egypt as an example to demonstrate what for him 
is a general theory concerning the religious origins of man's 
failure to realize an ethical existence, Shaftesbury attempts to 
show, 
1. that a priesthood can always be found to take 
advantage of an enthusiastic population 
2. that the priesthood has a vested material interest 
in encouraging enthusiastic superstition 
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3. that by acquiring property the priesthood will 
gain political power and dominate the population 
in a manner like that of an absolute monarchy 
4. that having gained political power in a state 
the established church will then attempt to extend 
its influence by encouraging religious war. 
Turning to consider Shaftesbury's attitude towards the Catholic 
Church and the Protestant Church of England, Section IV notes 
that for him, 
1. the Roman Catholic Church was characterised by its 
corruption and the exploitation of its members by 
the priesthood as in ancient Egypt - that is, the 
Roman Church was regarded by Shaftesbury as a source 
of moral corruption 
2. the "Protestant Religion" was seen to be related to 
freedom from domination 
3. the established Church of England was regarded as a 
potential danger to morality and freedom 
4. it is noted that Shaftesbury believed that the 
Church should be both separate from and subordinate 
to the political arrangements of a society. 
Section V recognises that "liberty" is regarded by Shaftesbury 
as the basis for moral development. We see here that Shaftes- 
bury regards the British constitution as an example of a 
government which provides men with freedom, and approves of the 
power of the House of Commons, thinking that it should be the 
superior branch of government. In spite of anti-monarchical 
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elements in his writings, Shaftesbury is seen to refuse to 
take a revolutionary stance. He is conservative, refusing to 
provide utopian schemes of government, because 
1. he thought that radical change will lead to 
the establishment of an absolute government - which for him is necessarily a tyranny 
2. no society is entirely corrupt, and in making changes 
one should attempt to preserve the natural elements 
that are present in any society. 
In spite of his refusal to provide us with an organisational 
blue-print of the perfect society, we see in Section VI that 
Shaftesbury recommends 
1. .. the avoidance of parties or factions whose interest will stand in opposition to the public good. 
2. that no political community should grow so large 
as to necessitate the development of factions. 
However, because of the presence of "unnatural sovereignties" 
Shaftesbury is not prepared to encourage the splitting up of 
states into smaller units even though such action is morally 
desirable. We see Shaftesbury's conservatism reasserting itself. 
Finally, Section VII notes that Shaftesbury failed to solve 
the problem of political obligation because he failed to define 
a sphere within which the individual may legitimately act with- 
out being limited by the state. The needs of the community and 
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the needs of the individual are constantly in danger of conflict 
whenever the political aspects of Shaftesbury's writings are 
considered. However, that there should be a sphere of individual 
freedom in any community must not be doubted, as will become 
evident when we consider the moral and cultural consequences of 
freedom in the next chapter. 
---00000--- 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF FREEDOM 
-I- 
Shaftesbury recognised that the political arrangements in 
society have important effects upon the individuals who are 
controlled by them. These effects are psychological. The norms 
imposed by a government determine the way that the members of a 
community think. We have seen in the last chapter that Shaftes- 
bury thought that the individual would be alienated from his true 
nature if the rulers of society dominate his personality in order 
to achieve their own selfish ends. In this event the individual 
would lose his ability to recognise moral truth and accept 
instead the norms dictated to society by the government. Con- 
sequently, in his analysis of different forms of political 
organisation, Shaftesbury rejected those organisations which to 
his mind prevented the individual from attaining moral comprehen- 
sion, and advocated a constitutional arrangement which would 
leave the individual with sufficient opportunity to appreciate 
the natural affections. The essential characteristic of those 
political arrangements of which he approved was the presence of 
a degree of freedom. Although never precisely outlining 
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what degree of freedom, it would appear to involve at least the 
following two elements: 
1. some degree of popular participation in government. 
"For no people in a civil state can possibly be free, 
when they are otherwise governed than by such laws as 
they themselves have constituted, or to which they have 
freely given consent. "1 
2. critical freedom, which is the provision of the oppor- 
tunity to discuss and criticise the beliefs of both 
ourselves and others in all spheres of human activity. 
If these two elements are present then we shall also be able to 
appreciate moral truth as a consequence of the opportunity to 
exercise either our reason or our moral sense. In this manner 
we shall be able to attain 
3t moral freedom, which involves the conscious choice of 
moral action without reference to externals (see above 
Chapter Four). 
To call a person "free" involves all those forms of freedom 
described here - the political, the critical, and the moral. The 
first two are necessary for the third to come into effect. 
For Shaftesbury, if truth exists it must be something that 
can be appreciated by the human mind. As a result of this, all 
claims relating to knowledge of the truth must be open to question- 
ing by the human intellect. In this way only can truth emerge, 
and each individual appreciate it for himself. In this way only 
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can each person become morally "free". 
can bestow liberty. "2 
"Reason and virtue alone 
However, it should be remembered that in Shaftesbury's moral 
philosophy moral truth may be appreciated either by reason or 
by the non-rational moral sense. Recognition of this aspect of 
Shaftesbury's thought is necessary if we are to appreciate his 
attitudes towards liberty and its desirable effects. At the 
outset we can present his argument in a dual form, stated simply 
as follows: Government organisation and laws should always 
encourage freedom of enquiry and of all human creativity, because 
the product of such liberty will be 
1. the emergence of truth in all areas (including morality) 
where reason is regarded as the measure of truth, and 
2. the emergence of aesthetic truth and a national culture 
as a consequence of the citizens' freedom to develop 
their "taste". * 
This chapter will attempt to analyse these theories concerning 
the desirable consequences of freedom according to this dis- 
tinction. In the next section we shall consider Shaftesbury's 
views concerning the necessary interdependence of political 
freedom, critical freedom and morality as they are outlined in 
--------- ----------------- ---------------- ------ --------------- 
* For a discussion of the moral implications of Shaftesbury's 
aesthetic theories, see above Chapter Five. 
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his "rational" theory. 
- II - 
According to Shaftesbury, if a person is to become moral 
he must not be dominated by the will of another person. He must 
be given the opportunity to study his affections and create 
within himself a balance of the affections. In a tyranny, as we 
saw in Chapter Seven, the acceptance of those norms which are 
dictated to society by the ruling individual or group* leads to 
the belief that this is the only measure of right and wrong. The 
tyrant limits freedom of enquiry and produces an environment in 
which his word is the only known law that governs our actions. 
Without freedom of enquiry, there can be no morality. On the 
other hand, it is also Shaftesbury's claim that without freedom 
of enquiry (critical freedom) there must be tyranny, and that if 
men voluntarily forsake their pursuit of morality, tyranny will 
necessarily result. Taking the standpoint of a "rationalist" 
Shaftesbury tells us that the only thing that raises men "above 
the degree of brutes, " is "freedom of reason in the learned 
world, and good government and liberty in the civil world. 
------------------------------------------- ------------------- 
* Shaftesbury made no categorisation of governments into 
different types. He does not make the traditional distinction 
between the selfish rule of an individual (tyranny) and the 
selfish rule of a group (oligarchy). 
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Tyranny in one is ever accompanied, or soon followed, by 
tyranny in the other.. In addition to tyranny destroying 
criticism and morality, if men do not have the opportunity to 
develop their "freedom of reason", or do not take advantage of 
such opportunities, society will not be able to escape from 
tyrannical control. 
Because. all our actions are guided by our opinions concern- 
ing what is proper or right, it is necessary for us to form 
correct opinions concerning the proper way. to act in any situation 
(if we wish to be moral). This involves for Shaftesbury the use 
of reason or the moral sense in an effort to distinguish between 
good and bad affections. When Shaftesbury places his faith in 
human reason, however, he is faced with the problem that, "Tis 
the habit alone of reasoning which can make a reasoner. "4* From 
here Shaftesbury's.. reasoning appears to take the following line: 
1. If we are to be practised in reasoning we must 
desire to participate in discussion with others 
so that we can develop our reasoning faculties. 
* In the aesthetic approach to morality it might also be 
claimed that we must be practised in the use of the moral 
sense before we can form a "taste". See above Chapter Five, 
Section VI. 
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2. For us to desire discussion and argument with 
others, that form of social intercourse must be 
an accepted activity in our community. 
3. If the exercise of our wits is a social norm, by 
reasoning with others the individual will learn to 
reason with himself and distinguish between the 
affections (that is, he will learn the art of 
soliloquy). 
In this manner Shaftesbury concludes that the best preparation 
for an analysis of our affections is an intellectual free-for- 
all, which will sharpen our wits and enable us to understand 
and appreciate truth when we come across it. It is as a result 
of this "critical freedom" that we can become moral. 
The problem arises, however, that even though there may be 
no social or legal barriers to unhindered discussion and criti- 
cism, and the necessary training ground is thereby provided for 
rational development, it does not necessarily follow that the 
individual will take full advantage of the situation. 
There is good reason to suppose that, however equably 
framed or near alike the race of mankind may appear in 
other respects, they are not always equal thinkers, or 
of a like ability in the management of this natural 
talent which we call thought-5 
As a consequence of this, even in an environment that does not 
limit our moral creativity, certain types of individual fail 
to realise their moral potential. They may just not think - 
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that is, they may be "unthinking". Also, they may be either 
"half-thinkers" or "under-thinkers". 
Those who are afraid to think, who consider it "too'high 
and dangerous, too aspiring and presumptive" because of the 
influence of some theological or philosophical authority, are 
the "half-thinkers". In their willing acceptance of authority - 
for no-one can prevent contemplation if the rational being 
desires this pursuit - they reject that moral freedom that is 
achieved through the recognition and acceptance of rationally 
formulated moral prescriptions which are discovered within the 
self. At the same time, the acceptance of an external authority, 
such as church dogma, will result in an abandonment of the desire 
to be independently critical, and we will be prepared to accept 
the conclusions of others. * Of this type of personality Shaftes- 
bury asks 
Is there much difference between this case and that of 
the obedient beasts of burden, who stop precisely at 
their appointed inn, or at whatever point the charioteer 
or governor of the reins thinks fit to give the signal 
for a halt? 6 
Those who refuse intellectual independence in this manner become 
------------- -------------------------- -------------- --------- --- 
* It should be added that we will also lose our "good humour", 
the importance of which (for Shaftesbury) has been explained 
above in Chapter Six. 
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the same as beasts and deserve. only our scorn. 
In addition to the intellectual cowards there are those 
who cannot be bothered to think. They are too lazy to undertake 
an analysis of the affections and rest contented with the external 
satisfactions of life. In so doing they "under-think". Resting 
satisfied with something less than their true interest, which is 
moral enlightenment, such individuals tend to pursue "public 
distinction, fame, power, an estate or title, " and overlook "the 
chief enjoyments of life, which are founded in honesty and a good 
mind. "7 They cease to care about the pleasures of social discourse, 
lose any ability to orientate their affections towards the good, 
and are completely dominated by inferior ends. 
In the case of both the'"half-thinker" and the "under-thinker", 
freedom of moral enquiry and self-examination are rejected in 
favour of a substitute. Our defenses against the moral domination 
of others are broken. Unable to guide ourselves we will be 
prepared to accept the guidance of others. This voluntary accept- 
ance of inward of mental slavery prepares us for the acceptance of 
external domination. In a letter to Michael Ainsworth, written 
in 1708, this is described as follows: 
In some, who are horridly degenerate, this submission 
is wholly voluntary. Self-interest leads them; whether 
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it be a private one of their own; or in society and 
confederacy with some faction or party, to the support 
of temporal ends. In this case it carries a specious 
shew of up blick good; whether it be in CHURCH, or 
STATE. And thus it is often the occasion of an open 
denyal of reason, and of a bare-fac'd opposition to 
the glorious search of TRUTH. ' 
The voluntary rejection of critical freedom leads to the pursuit 
of self instead of moral interests. * We find two types of external 
domination resulting from this: 
1. the domination by a Church of the individual who 
hopes to gain his reward in Heaven by obeying a 
particular theological orthodoxy. 
2. the domination by a political party of the 
individual who joins a group in an attempt to 
achieve external satisfaction (e. g. honours and 
titles) by sharing in the processes of power. 
In both cases the individual rejects critical thought, dismisses 
his moral potentiality in favour of a spurious self-interest. 
It is true that the individual may come to accept the group with 
which he associates himself as a higher moral entity than the 
individual, and work unselfishly for the common welfare of the 
group. However, the ends of any faction which finds its origins 
in selfishness, must remain unrelated to the universal truths of 
morality. In the case of a Church it will give rise to a priest- 
hood, as in Egypt and in the Roman Church, who are able to exploit 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* By self-interests Shaftesbury now seems to mean the ends pursued 
by the self affections, not our self-interest or happiness as 
defined in Chapter Four above. 
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the worshipper for their own material ends. The moral welfare 
of the individual and the common good of society will be ignored. 
In the case of a political party, the common good of society will 
not be represented by the ends of the party. * Through the accept- 
ance of the limited ends of the party, the members will stand in 
opposition to the unhindered pursuit of the common good by all 
the rational individuals in society. As with certain churches, 
a creed is accepted without question, criticism within the group 
is thought heretical, and criticism by others, misguided. Con- 
sequently, any political party that attempts to enforce conformity 
amongst its members must come to stand in opposition to "the 
glorious search of TRUTH, " and through its opposition to critical 
freedom endanger the development of moral enlightenment in society. 
In this situation the leaders of the party would come to stand in 
the same relation to the party members as an organised priesthood 
does to its believers. They would exploit the faith of the 
adherents to their own advantage. 
In addition to those who accept domination through voluntary 
enslavement, there are those who desire domination. This sort 
* For Shaftesbury's attitude towards political parties (factions) 
see above Chapter Seven, Section VI. 
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of person, and the way his inward slavery leads to this desire, 
are also explained in the letter to Michael Ainsworth cited 
above. This person will be "unthinking" insofar as reason has 
no role to play in the ordering of his life. Sensualism will 
characterise this individual. If the general outlook in society 
is one that is dominated by sensual pursuits (the product of 
"sloth and laziness"), reason can have no significance. For 
sensual pleasures stand in opposition to the rational pursuit of 
ethical ends. As a result of this opposition reason will be 
rejected: 
For when reason, as an antagonist to vice, is become 
an inward enemy, and has once lost her interest with 
the soul, by opposing every favourite passion; she 
will then be soon expell'd another province, and lie 
under suspicion for every attempt she makes upon the 
mind. She is presently miscall'd and abus'd. She is 
thought notional in the understanding, whimsical in 
company, s ediitious in the state, heretical in the 
church. 9 
The people who live in a condition of sensual slavery reject 
reason. At the same time they cannot abide a freedom of 
criticism of which they would become the target. To escape 
this criticism they prefer a political system which will reject 
criticism. This is a system of political tyranny, the macrocosmic 
expression of their own microcosmic condition. In this case, 
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.... 'tis mere sloth and lazyness, or sordid appetite 
and lust, which bringing them under the power of sin 
and ignorance, fits them for political servitude by 
moral prostitution. .... Vice and ntemperance is but 
an inward persecution. 'Tis here, the violence begins. 
Here truth is first held in unrighteousness, and .... 
reason, the knowable, the divine part is persecuted 
and imprison 'd. Those, who submit to this tyranny, in 
time, not only come to like it, but plead for it, and 
think the law of virtue tyrannical and against nature-10 
When men accept tyranny within as natural, and consider virtue 
and reason to be unnatural, they will be prepared to accept 
political tyranny: 
So in the absolute governments of the world: nations, 
that submit to arbitrary rule, love even their form 
of government; if one may call that a form, which is 
without any, and, like vice it self, knows neither law 
nor order. 11 
If the individuals in society are under the tyranny of the 
passions and see no further than the gratification of their 
sensual appetites, they are a community with a slave personality 
and will receive the government appropriate to their outlook. 
Just asthe individual is ruled by his irrational appetites, so 
society will be ruled by the irrational whims of its ruler(s). 
In the same way as there is no self-criticsm within the individual, 
there will be no freedom of enquiry and criticism in society. 
From the moral point of view the society will be completely 
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stagnant. 
As to the ruler of this morally stagnant society, there 
can be no hope of him being an enlightening influence. The 
reason for this is "that great truth, that tyranny can never be 
exercis'd, but by one, who is already a slave. "12 The tyrant, 
a product of a corrupt society, will be the slave of his vices, 
and it is the attempt to satisfy those vices which will have 
been the driving force in his acquisition of power. Shaftesbury 
described the emergence of the tyrant as follows: 
'Tis pretty visible indeed, that the original of all 
is in those sordid vices of sloth, lazyness, and 
intemperance. This makes way for ambition: for how 
should these be so illustriously maintained and vin- 
dicated, without large temporal power, and the umbrage 
of authority? 13 
If society has become corrupt enough to allow this slave 
personality to come to power there will be an intensification of 
that fear of reason and criticism which allowed him to gain 
power. Criticism will be denied his subjects, for a rational 
analysis of his actions would lead to condemnation upon grounds 
of morality. The practice of rational enquiry and criticism 
being denied, the population will accept the actions of the ruler 
as the only measure of justice. All sight will be lost of a 
genuine morality which is based upon an appreciation of the 
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natural affections. 
We see, therefore, that when those who do not think enough 
and those who do not think at all reject freedom of enquiry 
they lose their political freedom* at the same time as they 
forsake morality. However, in the last paragraph it also becomes 
apparent that the analysis has gone the full circle and we have 
returned to the social implications of despotism that were dis- 
cussed in the last chapter. For Shaftesbury there is an inter- 
action between corrupting forces from below (from unthinking 
individuals) and the corrupting forces from above (from absolutist 
forces) in any society which loses its zest for freedom of enquiry. 
All possibility of moral individuals pursuing the common good 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
* The conclusions reached in Chapter Seven, Sections II and III 
concerning the institutional sources of moral corruption in 
man must now be considered in conjunction with the fact that 
these forms of social organisation are often encouraged by 
the already corrupt nature of man. This recognition that 
man can be anti-social in himself without corruption by the 
environment might suggest that herein lies the reason why, 
as we saw in Chapter Seven, Shaftesbury refused to consider 
the possibility of social order in the absence of governmental 
authority. However, Shaftesbury does not take this line, directing his argument towards a denial of the Hobbesian "natural" man without recognising the possibly anti-governmental 
character of his interpretation of human nature, (an interpreta- 
tion that seems to have undergone change in Shaftesbury's 
explanation of the on in of tyranny that has been discussed 
in the present section). 
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within a politically stable situation, will be destroyed. 
- III - 
Firmly believing in a correspondence between the degree of 
freedom and the degree of morality in society, Shaftesbury 
thought it was necessary to allow a complete freedom of discourse 
and criticism. As a result of this freedom a large proportion 
of the members of society will be able to appreciate moral 
truths, producing thereby a community which is oriented towards 
the pursuit of the common good. It was the belief that this 
would occur, that moral truth would be seen and appreciated, that 
led Shaftesbury to advocate: 
1. public participation in government in order to counter- 
act the absolutist tendencies of monarchy. 
2. a political programme of non-interference in the 
religious and intellectual lives of the citizens. 
The first of these prescriptions was a result of Shaftesbury's 
belief that, unless the people were allowed to have some say 
in the government of their society, absolutism would lead to a 
decline in the moral condition of the community. This may be 
called Shaftesbury's doctrine of political freedom, without 
which freedom of criticism would be denied. The second pres- 
cription relates to Shaftesbury's belief that freedom of enquiry 
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and criticism is necessary if men are to remain politically 
free. Without criticism, political tyranny is likely to develop 
under the conditions outlined in the last section. Both pres- 
criptions centre on the necessity of a free use of our rational 
faculties, the full implications of which will now be considered. 
Shaftesbury saw that a complete freedom of enquiry and 
criticism might give rise to attitudes and opinions with which 
he disagreed. However, even though "liberty of thought and 
writing will produce a sort of libertinism in philosophy, " this 
is something "which we must bear with. "14 For only through 
liberty of enquiry can we hope to gain complete insight into 
the truth available to the human mind. Consequently, the 
magistrates must remain uninvolved in all theological or philo- 
sophical disputes: 
For I am against all .... appeals thither, both 
in 
religion and philosophy, thinking it a kind. of 
cowardice and mistrust of our cause to call for other 
help, or do anything which looks like a beginning of 
delivering over to the secular arm. 15 
If we wish to destroy the attitudes of others - such as adher- 
ence to the Roman Church or belief in hedonism - we must do it 
by reason, not persecution. Similarly, the atheist is to be 
reasoned with, not eliminated. All religions must be tolerated 
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in the belief that the just and true religion will succeed 
through its moral and rational superiority to other modes of 
belief and worship. Both the orthodox and the heterodox must 
join in a free intellectual contest by means of which truth will 
be given the maximum opportunity of presenting itself to the 
minds of men. 
Freedom of criticism does not apply only to the realm of 
ideas. It should also be applied to the character of particular 
individuals, whatever their position might be within the society 
or government: 
For where jealousy of state, or the ill lives of the 
great people, or any other cause, is powerful enough 
to restrain the freedom of censure in any part, it in 
effect destroys the benefit of it in the whole '16 
If freedom of criticism is to achieve its end, it must be total. 
If a person or institution is exempt from criticism, no criti- 
cism will be entirely impartial; for the exemption must always 
be present in people's minds, which, through the necessity of 
even a minor external conformity, will be prevented from taking 
the completely unbiassed attitude that is necessary to the 
search for truth. Therefore, in answer to those who oppose free- 
dom of criticism because it may give rise to scurrilous and 
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unwarranted attacks upon the things they hold dear (reputation, 
institution, or belief), Shaftesbury wrote, 
'Tis true, this liberty may seem to run too far. We 
may perhaps be said to make. ill use of it. So every 
one will say, when he himself is touched, and his 
opinion freely examined. But who shall be judge of 
what may be freely examined and what may not? Where 
liberty may be used and where it may not? What 
remedy shall we prescribe to this in general? .... Let but the search go freely on, and the right measure 
of everything will soon be found. 17 
No single person is able to judge absolutely that which is 
right or wrong for everyone else in the community. What is 
necessary is the interaction of opinion and the free use of 
criticism. In this way, that degree of truth which is available 
to the human mind will gradually disseminate itself through 
society as a result of personal experience of the truth. Men 
will be practised in the art of distinguishing between right 
and wrong, their rational capacities refined by constant usage. 
This approach to "truth" was the same in religion as in 
other matters; and when Shaftesbury advocates "free-thinking" 
he is contributing to what was, by the time he wrote, an old 
theme. During the seventeenth century numerous writers in 
England had advocated religious toleration based upon a faith 
in reason. The Cambridge Platonists who greatly influenced 
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Shaftesbury* were advocates of religious toleration. 
William Chillingworth (1602-1644) had advocated both rationalism 
and toleration in religious matters. ** Two other seventeenth- 
century thinkers that are worth mentioning in relation to 
Shaftesbury's thought are Bishop Jeremy Taylor and Archbishop 
Tillotson. Both these thinkers are quoted at length by Shaftes- 
bury (towards the end of the Characteristics) in favour of 
"free-thinking" in religion. + Also, there are the writings of 
John Locke, whose Letters Concerning Toleration (1689-1693) 
popularised both rationalism and religious toleration perhaps 
more than the writings of any other thinker. Shaftesbury's 
ideas concerning religious toleration often seem to be taken 
directly from Locke. 
What were Shaftesbury's thoughts on religious toleration? 
His first principle seems to be taken from Locke who stated 
that, "A religion that is of God wants not the assistance of 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
* See Chapter Two above for a discussion of Shaftesbury's 
intellectual debt to the Cambridge Platonists. 
** Shaftesbury wrote to Ainsworth in 1709 saying "CHILLINGWORTH 
against Popery is sufficient reading for you, and will 
teach you te best manner of that polemick divinity. " 
Letters (1746), 28. "Letters .... to a Student", 
Letter VII. 
+ See Characteristics II, 353/363. 
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human authority to make it prevail. " (Locke)18 "I am sure, " 
writes Shaftesbury, "the only way to save men's sense, or 
preserve wit at all in the world, is to give liberty to wit. "19 
Freedom of enquiry is considered by Shaftesbury to be the 
essential pre-requisite of truth - in this case, religious 
truth. Therefore, it is necessary to tolerate all of the 
various religious sects which may be found in society. Even 
if you became certain that religious truth had been discovered 
this would not justify the use of political power to obtain a 
conformity of everyone to that religious form; for coercion 
cannot create belief: 
If perhaps by compulsion, or through any necessity 
or fear incumbent, a different carriage be at any 
time affected, or different maxims owned, the prac- 
tice at the bottom will be still the same. If the 
countenance be composed, the heart, however, will 
not be changed. 20 * 
*A similar statement can be found in Locke's Third Letter for 
Toleration: 
.... tell you, by using force your way to bring men to the religion of the church of England, you mean 
only to bring them to an outward profession of that 
religion; .... force used your way, being applied only to dissenters, and ceasing as soon as they conform .... 
cannot be to bring men to any thing more than outward 
conformity. ". 
Locke, Works, VI, 323. 
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Truth does not stand or fall by the power of the sword, but 
through the impression it makes upon our minds. Truth being 
the end of religious enquiry and discussion, and this being 
the only end which Shaftesbury considered to be relevant, reli- 
gious persecution must be condemned for being the antithesis 
of this aim. Persecution does not even succeed in its own 
stated purpose, the persecuted remaining unconvinced even if 
outwardly they accept orthodoxy. At the same time, it will do 
positive harm by destroying the possibility of man ever* dis- 
covering the truth if orthodoxy happens to be fallacious. Also, 
according to Shaftesbury's thesis (and the central point of 
his argument), by denying men the right to criticise the 
accepted opinion, and forbidding enquiry along original lines, 
all will lose the rational ability required for moral enlighten- 
ment. Consequently, intolerant action must always be condemned. 
Rather than representative of a desire to save the souls 
of mankind (even against mankind's will), Shaftesbury regarded 
intolerance and persecution as representative of the baser 
instincts in mankind which find their root in selfishness. When 
discussing the basis of religious persecution, he tells us that 
the advocate of such methods, 
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.... being devoted to the interest of a party already in possession or expectation of the temporal advan- 
tages annexed to a particular belief, he fails not, 
as a zealous party-man, to look with jealousy on every 
uncomformable opinion, and is sure to justify those 
means which he thinks proper to prevent its growth. 
.... the passion he feels on this occasion is not from pure zeal, but private interest and worldly 
emulation. 21 
We see here that Shaftesbury regarded intolerance, if not based 
upon enthusiasm or zeal, as based upon selfish desires. 
Avarice is therefore seen, as the psychological basis for that 
form of religious intolerance which is not motivated by zeal, 
but which utilises zeal for the attainment of its ends. * 
-------------- ------------------------ --------------------------- 
* Shaftesbury is again in agreement with Locke who expressed the 
same attitude in the following succinct manner: 
"The heads and leaders of the church, moved by avarice and 
insatiable desire, making use of the immoderate ambition 
of magistrates, and the credulous superstition of the giddy 
multitude, have incensed and animated them against those 
that dissent from themselves, by preaching unto them, 
contrary to the laws of the gospel, and to the precepts of 
charity, that schismatics and heretics are to be outed of 
their possessions, and destroyed. " 
Locke, Works, VI, 53 (A Letter Concerning Toleration). 
Locke here iso ates the superstition of the masses an the 
non-spiritual materialistic desires of powerful institutions 
and individuals as the basis of intolerance and religious 
persecution. The anti-social and unnatural rejection of 
the charitable affections which Shaftesbury attributed to 
the superstitious enthusiasm of the populous under the 
encouragement of a selfish priesthood, has been discussed 
in Chapter Seven above. 
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Concerning the social results of religious intolerance, 
Shaftesbury believed that to legislate religious practice is 
to destroy stability and peace in society: 
To be pursued. by petty inquisitors; to be threatened 
with punishment or penal laws; to be marked out as 
dangerous and suspected; to be railed at in high 
places with all the studied wit and art of calumny, 
are indeed sufficient provocations to ill-humour, and 
may force people to divide who at first had never any 
such intention. 22* 
To place a person's belief outside the law, and to persecute 
him, "may force people to divide, " thereby creating antagonistic 
factions within society. Because of persecution, and the denial 
of freedom of enquiry and criticism, there will be a hardening 
* This aspect of Shaftesbury's views upon religious persecution 
can also be found in Locke's theories. 
".... how much greater will be the security of a 
government, where all good subjects, of whatsoever 
they be, without any distinction upon account of 
religion .... shall become the common support and 
guard of it; and where none will have any occasion 
to fear the severity of the laws, but those that do 
injuries to their neighbours, and offend, against the 
civil peace. " 
Locke, Ibid., VI, 51 (A Letter Concerning Toleration). 
Locke is Fe-re saying that peace within the community will be 
the advantageous product of religious toleration. 
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of attitudes between different sects. Individuals will not be 
able to transcend their prejudices through reason. Consequently, 
civil strife is the logical result of persecution in so far as 
the legal situation demands a violent solution to what is 
essentially a rational problem. On the other hand, if there is 
religious toleration no-one will find it necessary to place 
their will against the government when pursuing their spiritual 
ends. With Shaftesbury, religious freedom must be seen not only 
as the pre-requisite of truth, but also the pre-requisite of 
civil peace. 
Finally, we should note that the belief that persecution 
neither persuades nor has relevance to the truth, is a belief 
which does not apply merely to religious matters in the writings 
of Shaftesbury. For Shaftesbury, it was a general and predictable 
quality in all men, that if they are denied the right of freedom 
in their intellectual pursuits, they will react against that 
which is forbidden with a greater enthusiasm than ever before. 
He tells us that, 
.... if we had a sort of inquisition, .... erected 
to 
restrain poetical licence, and in general to suppress 
that fancy and humour of versification; but in parti- 
cular that most extravagant passion of love, as it is 
set out by poets, in its heathenish dress of Venuses 
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and Cupids: .... we might perhaps see a new Arcadia 
arising out of this heavy persecution: old people 
and young would be seized with a versifying spirit: 
.... forests would be filled with romantic shepherds 
and shepherdesses: and rocks resound with echoes 
of hymns and praises offered to the powers of love. 
We might indeed have a fair chance, by this manage- 
ment, to bring back the whole train of heathen gods, 
and set our cold northern island burning with as many 
altars to Venus and Apollo, as were formerly in 
Cyprus, Delos, or any of those warmer Grecian climates-23 
As light-hearted as this statement is, it contains three 
important implications relating to Shaftesbury's theory of 
liberty. Firstly, it states that legal prohibition of a belief 
or attitude of mind is not a sufficient means for the destruc- 
tion of it. Rather, the opposite applies; and the belief, true 
or false, will gain strength as a result of its illegality. At 
the same time the belief will become revolutionary in so far as 
it cannot exist within the unchanged framework of society. 
Secondly, if men's opinions are to be changed for the better, 
some other method than force must be found. As we have seen, 
this method is the encouragement of criticism in the rational 
pursuit of truth, whereby "the right measure of everything will 
soon be found. " Thirdly, the use of an analogy which is cultural, 
rather than moral or religious, introduces for consideration in 
the present discussion, a major aspect of Shaftesbury's social 
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theories. This is his theory of cultural development. 
- IV - 
As freedom allows men to develop their rational faculties, 
so does it allow them to develop that non-rational aesthetic 
or moral sense that has been discussed in detail in Chapter 
Five above. We saw there that in order to form a "taste", men 
must be free to improve their aesthetic sense by "use and 
practice. " We saw Shaftesbury taking the position that a 
"legitimate and just taste can neither be begotten, made, con- 
ceived, or produced without the antecedent labour and pains of 
criticism. "* If the appropriate political preconditions for the 
development of the moral sense towards a "just taste" exist in 
society, then the citizen body will be characterised by its high 
moral standards. It is for this reason that Shaftesbury points 
to laws and constitutions as a higher beauty than that which 
exists within the person of an ethical individual. These politi- 
cal arrangements are the highest type of "form", in that they 
form other forms that form when they contribute to the formation 
of ethical characters within the populous. ** The beauty of a ? ýýp., ýaul 
--------------------------------- -------- ---------------------- 
* See Chapter Five, Section VI. 
** See above, Chapter Five, Section V concerning Shaftesbury's distinction between types of form. 
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government is seen to belong to the same category of beauty 
as that of the arts. * Both political institutions and art 
"civilise and polish rude mankind", improving the ability of 
the aesthetic sense to distinguish between the beautiful and 
the ugly in both art and morals. It is because of this that 
Shaftesbury sees the political environment as being directly 
related to the level of artistic achievement in any society. As 
freedom allows our moral judgement to improve, so it improves 
our aesthetic judgement - for according to Shaftesbury both 
sorts of judgement are the same: 
All politeness is owing to liberty. We polish one 
another, and rub off our corners and rough sides by 
a sort of amicable collision. To restrain this, is 
inevitably to bring a rust upon mens understandings. 
'Tis a destroying of civility, good breeding, and 
even charity itself, under pretence of maintaining 
it. 24 
The politeness referred to here is a sophistication in both art 
and morality. However, in so far as moral truth is realised by 
the same means as artistic truth, morality is also an art, and 
must be regarded as one aspect of a total cultural system. If 
* See Chapter Five, Section II. 
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we understand the term "culture" as referring to the level of 
artistic ability, - both critical and creative - that any 
community has attained, then it is Shaftesbury's claim that 
this culture has developed, and can be maintained, only by allow- 
ing its people and its artists (as individuals) the freedom to 
express their ideas in contrast to, and in criticism of, the 
ideas of others. 
Only through freedom can the aesthetic sense in each person 
develop into a "taste" upon which culture is founded. This 
freedom is seen to involve certain political arrangements that 
will allow men to be free. In a letter to Lord Somers, written 
in 1712, Shaftesbury elaborated the relationship between politi- 
cal freedom and cultural development as follows: 
Nothing is so improving, nothing so natural, so con- 
genial to the liberal arts, as that reigning liberty 
and high spirit of a people, which from the habit of 
judging in the highest matters for themselves, makes 
'em freely judg of other subjects, and enter thorowly 
into the characters as well of men and manners, as of 
the products or works of men, in art and science. So 
much, my lord, do we owe to the excellence of our 
national constitution, and legal monarchy; happily 
fitted for us, and which alone cou'd hold together so 
mighty a people; all sharers (tho at so far a dis- 
tance from each other) in the government of themselves; 
and meeting under one head in one vast metro po ; ... 025 
Freedom of criticism, which is present only under a free 
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government of the type that Shaftesbury thought could be found 
in Britain, was regarded by him as the basis for the formation 
of a just taste. Having acquired taste, men can then provide 
positive criticism for the guidance of the artist, who himself 
will be given full opportunity to freely maximise his creative 
potential. From continuous argument, criticism, and experiment 
there will result an improvement in the quality of the artistic 
products of the nation. 
In order to demonstrate the process whereby freedom of 
criticism gives rise to cultural development, Shaftesbury dis- 
cussed the course which he considered literature to take in 
the development of human society from its earliest stages. "In 
the weaker and more imperfect societies of mankind, " he informs 
us, "such as those composed of federate tribes, or mixed 
colonies, scarce settled in their new seats, " the necessity of 
pursuing the means of mere existence forbids either the leisure 
or the disposition required for the development of language as 
an art form. However, when societies become "settled on an 
easy and secure foundation, " individuals who choose to partici- 
pate in the affairs of state find it in their interest to be able 
to persuade others of the correctness of their views. In order 
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to do this, "the most soft and inviting numbers, must have been 
employed to charm the public ear, and to incline the heart by 
the agreeableness of expression. " Thus, the natural development 
of society gave rise to the art of persuasion, and it "may easily 
be perceived from hence that the goddess PERSUASION must have 
been in a manner the mother of poetry, rhetoric, music, and the 
other kindred arts. 1126 
In the development of the art of language, either in the 
spoken or written word, Shaftesbury's, assumption relating to the 
society which gives birth to this art form, is that the public 
has an influence upon the government and is allowed freedom of 
criticism. It is this which gives rise to the necessity of the 
leaders justifying their actions and policies in an attempt to 
gain the support of the people. This leads to the birth and 
development of both the literary and musical arts. If a primi- 
tive government was not free, and rule is "by the influence of 
awe and terror, " there can be no such development: 
Hence it is that those arts have been delivered to 
us in such perfection by free nations, who from the 
nature of their government, as from a proper soil, pro- 
duced the generous plants; whilst the mightiest bodies 
and vastest empires, governed by force and a despotic 
power, could, after ages of peace and leisure, produce 
no other than what was deformed and barbarous of the 
kind-27 
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The seed of culture which exists in every man requires freedom 
before it can grow to its full maturity and give rise to beauti- 
ful-, works. 
The literary and musical products of a society are what 
Shaftesbury would term first Characters. In the notes which he 
prepared before his death for a work entitled, Plastics, or the 
Original Power and Progress of Designatory Art, Shaftesbury dis- 
tinguished between three types of artistic presentation. These 
types he termed Characters, which were as follows: 
[First Characters: ] Notes: Marks of sounds, syllables, 
words, speech, and of sentiments, senses, meanings 
by that medium, viz. of sounds and speech. Thus 
ciphers, shorthand, Cicero3s invention. 
[Second Characters: ] Signs, Signa, Si ills. Imitations 
o rea forms and natural beings, plastically (convex 
or concave), or lineally and graphically by lines and 
colours, from the superficies and extremeties of the 
bodies, according to optics. 
[Third Characters: ] A 'third and middle sort, emblematic. 
As when the latter signa are used as mediums (speech 
being passed over) to convey sentiments, senses, 
meanings, etc. 28 
In relation to the "first characters" we have already seen that 
Shaftesbury considered liberty to be a necessary basis for their 
development. Concerning the "second characters" the same 
necessarily applies: 
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.... politeness always holds proportion with laws and liberty. So that where the one is with a tolerable 
progress in the first species (viz. 1st Characters), 
the other (viz. 2d Characters) will soon prevail. 
And where it ceases and tyranny (such-as the Eastern 
monarchies, ancient and modern) prevails, art and 
second Characters accordingly sink. See Japan! 
Mogul! China! Turk and Tartar! Show me amongst 
their infinite delicacy of other work °a single 2d 
Character, a form, even but a single figure, a 
perspective, a statue, coin, palace, architecture - 
that is not worse than Gothic. Show but so much as 
a vase! till in China taught by us and the Dutch-29 
Here again, despite-the apparent narrowness of Shaftesbury Is 
own taste, is an expression of the belief that in communities 
which are ruled by tyrants, no progress in cultural ability - 
this time, sculpture and painting - can be found. This would 
appear to be because improvement in second Characters is a 
logical consequence of the establishment of first Characters - 
".... where the one is with a tolerable progress in the first 
species .... the other .... will soon prevail. " 
Freedom of 
criticism must lead to the establishment of the musical and 
literary arts, which in its turn gives rise to the frame of mind 
which is able to transfer the idea of harmony and proportion into 
material objects and paintings. Consequently, where first 
Characters decline as a result of tyranny, "art and second 
Characters accordingly sink. "* Where there is no liberty, there 
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can be no culture. Only the moral and artistic products of a 
free society may claim permanent validity, and all other 
cultures must be regarded as deviations from this norm. Free- 
dom, art, and morality are the inseparable triad which must be 
present if any society is to gain our respect. Power, conquest, 
and longevity become insignificant when compared with these 
qualities which are always present in the truly natural and truly 
cultural society. 
As a result of this indestructible union between freedom 
and culture, Shaftesbury can look back to former societies, real 
or hypothetical, and condemn them upon either moral grounds, or 
because they denied man's artistic potential. Both criticisms 
are equally valid; for one implies the other. His moral 
criticism of absolutism has been discussed in Chapter Seven. In 
relation to this criticism, we can now appreciate that by en- 
slaving the individual, absolutism denies not only the realisa- 
tion of moral truth, but also'the possibility of artistic 
appreciation and creativity. Culture is destroyed in its 
entirety, and only freedom can retrieve the loss. Similarly, 
when Shaftesbury discussed Plato's Republic, he wrote as 
follows: 
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. *... Plato and other philosophers and sages look 
wistfully towards the Egyptian laws .... admiring mystery, hiding secrets from the vulgar .... being frightened by the popular spirit, felt so 
severely in the person of their master Socrates .... 
True indeed that by this ungenerous [rejection of 
music and poetry] and hierarchical polity the state 
of longer duration. For of what duration Egypt? 
But then what a state! What barbarity! Super- 
stition! And when enervated once; how perpetual a 
slavery, from Mede and Persian, to Marmaluke and 
Turk., 30 
Referring, one assumes, to the non-participation of the masses 
in government, the rejection of certain forms of artistic 
exercise, and the use of myths to produce conformity in the 
populous, Shaftesbury claims that such ideas were adopted by 
Plato because of his admiration of the Egyptian situation. What 
Shaftesbury thought of the social situation in ancient Egypt has 
" already been discussed at length in the last chapter. If Plato's 
social recommendations found their source in Egyptian example, as 
Shaftesbury thought, then they must be condemned because of their 
cultural results. These results will be cultural ineptitude, the 
moral and artistic barbarism which results from slavery and super- 
stition and the denial of moral freedom and taste. For Shaftes- 
bury, the power of such a political organisation becomes irrelevant. 
The size of a state, or the longevity of a state's existence, 
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means nothing without culture. 
It was upon the basis of cultural insufficiency that Shaftes- 
bury condemned the Roman empire. His analysis is as follows: - 
Prior to Caesar's rise to power and his institution as emperor, 
the Roman people were able to progress towards the formation of 
a real culture. However, just as the nation was losing its 
roughness and barbarity and beginning to develop its natural 
faculties, liberty was lost. In Shaftesbury's words, "'Twas 
the fate of Rome to have scarce an intermediate age, or a single 
period of time, between the rise of arts and fall of liberty. 1131 
Liberty fell with the formation of the empire under Caesar. 
With time it became irretrievable. Liberty being lost for good, 
Shaftesbury interprets the barbarian conquest of Rome in the 
following manner: 
The fatal form of government was become too natural; 
and the world, which had bent under it, and was 
become slavish and dependent, had neither power nor 
will to help itself. The only deliverance it could 
expect was from the merciless hands of the barbarians, 
and a total dissolution of that enormous empire and 
despotic power, which the best hands could not pre- 
serve from being destructive to human nature. For 
even barbarity and Gothicism were already entered into 
arts ere the savages had made any impression on the 
empire. 32 
To condemn Caesar for destroying the liberty of the Roman 
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people was by no means original - Machiavelli had also criticised 
Caesar for this same reason (although his idea of what freedom 
involved was entirely different from Shaftesbury's). However, 
to say that barbarism was no worse than imperial Rome most 
certainly differs from the general trend of eighteenth century 
opinion, (and takes the criticism further than Machiavelli ever 
did). The fact that this attitude would appear to be most 
radical and original to his contemporaries could have been the 
very reason why Shaftesbury put it forward - thereby stressing 
his theory that political freedom is a necessary prerequisite to 
cultural development. Whether this was the case or not, this 
attitude towards Rome's decline is entirely consistent with 
Shaftesbury's theory of culture. Because of tyranny, the artis- 
tic talent of the Roman civilisation sank beneath even that of 
the barbarian hordes. With the entrenchment of absolutist govern- 
ment, "ignorance and darkness overspread the world, and fitted 
it for the chaos and ruin which ensued., 
33 Where culture has 
died through the suppression of freedom of thought and criticism 
and where the population accepts without question the tyrannical 
situation, the destruction of that society cannot be regretted; 
for only through a change brought on by some power which is exter- 
nal to that society can there be any sort of cultural renovation. 
0 
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The only deliverance which the Romans could expect was at the 
merciless hands of the barbarians. Consequently, despite the 
chaos and ruin which followed the invasions of Rome by the bar- 
barians, Shaftesbury appears to have considered this as a 
necessary purgation before human nature could again discover 
that creativity upon which he believed all culture depends. 
- V- 
The conclusion which we have now reached could be expressed 
as follows: - The maximum amount of freedom must be allowed to 
mankind if the potential within man's nature-is to be realised. 
Only by living in a free environment is the individual able to 
develop his rational and aesthetic potential. 
Upon this basis it would be possible to argue that if we 
will but give men freedom to develop their faculties, they will 
develop a culture (including a moral outlook) that does not 
require the coercive force of government to assure the culture's 
norms. Complete freedom of action could be given to each indi- 
vidual in society in the knowledge that he will not contradict 
the inner law of morality. Consequently, it would be 
within the logic of Shaftesbury's interpretation of the nature 
and potential of the human personality to advocate the 
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establishment of certain institutional preconditions for the 
security and expansion of freedom - which could be anything from 
universal suffrage in a democratic republic to direct democracy 
in small communities, and which would form a basis for the 
ultimate limitation of the responsibilities of government to an 
absolute minimum. However, Shaftesbury never showed any signs of 
undertaking such a task, * limiting his sights to the following 
goal: 
.... should I have the good fortune to raise the 
masterly spirit of just criticism in my readers and 
exalt them ever so little above the lazy, timorous, 
over-modest, or resigned state in which the generality 
of them remain, though by this very spirit I myself 
might possibly meet my doom, I should .... be proud of having plumed the arrows of better wits, and 
furnished artillery or ammunition of any kind to 
those powers to which I myself had fallen a victim"34 
His stated aim is to persuade men to think for themselves. There 
is no utopian dream for the creation of a society in which all 
men will act benevolently towards one another, no vision of a 
truly natural community. What are the reasons for this? 
There are three reasons which arise from what has already 
been explained of Shaftesbury's philosophy in the foregoing 
* Concerning Shaftesbury's refusal to provide an organisational 
blue-print ofa perfect society see also Chapter Seven, 
Section V. 
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chapters. These are, firstly, Shaftesbury's optimistic hypo- 
thesis concerning the harmony of the cosmos. The belief that 
the cosmos is under the guidance of a general mind may form the 
basis for political inaction. It may be thought that every- 
thing which happens is for the best in relation to the overall 
structure of the universe. This is the attitude which Voltaire 
satirised in Candide after the doctrine had gained popularity 
in the eighteenth century. Secondly, it is evident from Shaftes- 
bury's writings that he was satisfied with the workings of the 
British constitution. It appeared to him that Britain had 
already acquired the degree of freedom necessary for development 
of culture: "We are now in an age when Liberty is once again in 
its ascendant. And we are ourselves the happy nation who not 
only enjoy it at home, but by our greatness and power give life 
and vigour to it abroad ..:. "35 Thirdly, as we saw 
in the last 
chapter Shaftesbury was of a conservative temperament when it 
came to the making of radical change in the institutions and 
laws of any society. Those who experience such change come to 
believe that there are no permanent standards of action. either 
for the society as a whole, or for the individual to find within 
himself. The lack of permanence is, as we have seen, one of the 
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reasons why Shaftesbury condemned the rule of society by a 
non-constitutional monarchy or tyranny. 
In addition to these reasons for Shaftesbury's indifference 
to utopian programmes of social reform, there is a further aspect 
of his thought which contradicts all such radical implications. 
This is the fact that Shaftesbury at times suggested that he 
was not half so confident in the moral potential. of the generality 
of mankind as it would at first appear. He did hope that those 
who read his works would be persuaded to undertake the pursuit 
of truth. But there is also the further assumption that his 
readers were the intellectual aristocrats of his time, and there 
is a tendency to consider the "vulgar" as of no real significance. 
Although some moral truths are "so evident in themselves, that 
'twould be easier to imagine half mankind to have run mad .... 
than to admit anything as truth which should be advanced against 
such natural knowledge, "36 to accept majority opinion as a basis 
of truth would be ridiculous. Truth, both moral and artistic, 
does not depend upon majority opinion but upon eternal standards 
which men may or may not recognise. Consequently, we find the 
following criticism of democratic principles: 
.... some modern zealots appear to have no better knowledge of truth, nor better manner of judging it, 
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than by counting noses. By this rule, if they 
can poll an indifferent number out of a mob; if 
they can produce a set of Lancashire noddles, remote 
provincial headpieces, or visionary assemblers, to 
attest a story of a witch upon a broomstick, and a 
flight in the air, they triumph in the solid proof 
of their new prodigy, and cry, magna est, veritas et 
praeyalebit. 37 
The liberty which Shaftesbury was defending was not the liberty 
that is associated with some democratic form of government. He 
recognised that if truth there be, the majority decision cannot 
be a measure of it. * In fact, from the tone of the last 
quotation, it would appear that to pay heed to the beliefs of 
the mass of the people is a sure method of denying the realisa- 
tion of truth in any sphere. In the final analysis, Shaftesbury 
was a supporter of an intellectual aristocracy after the lines 
of Plato, even saying at one point that, "'Tis real humanity and 
kindness to hide strong truths from tender eyes. "38 Despite all 
his protestations concerning the. necessity of having freedom of 
expression and criticism if culture were to improve, Shaftesbury 
can also be found accepting censorship as playing a legitimate 
role within a culturally advanced community. For example, he 
believed that censorship in ancient Athens had played such a 
---------------------------------------------------- ------------ 
* Concerning Shaftesbury's refusal to regard the majority 
opinion as the measure of truth, see also Chapter One, 
Section IV. 
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role: 
Instead of any abridgement, 'twas in reality an 
increase of liberty, an enlargement of the security 
of property, and an advancement of private ease and 
personal safety, to provide against what was injurious 
to the good name and reputation of every citizen-39 
The hiding of strong truths from tender eyes, and the censor- 
ship of writing, both assume that there is present in society 
some group of individuals capable of judging what limitations 
of the freedom of expression are necessary to the common welfare. 
Shaftesbury never tells us who these people are or where we can 
find them in any society. However, that they are acknowledged 
to exist is sufficient to place severe limitations upon the 
free interaction of ideas that he advocates elsewhere. 
Although Shaftesbury's writings often appear to advocate 
an extreme degree of freedom to all members of society, in fact 
he was writing for a sophisticated. minority. This minority is 
assumed to be capable of appreciating moral truth and acting 
upon it. In opposition to them stand the mass of mankind who 
will often only act rightly through fear of punishment; ".... 
the mere vulgar of mankind often stand in need of such a recti- 
fying object as the gallows before their eyes ., 
40 Similarly, 
Shaftesbury says that "'tis necessary a people should have a 
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public leading in religion. . 
41 Consequently, when he is 
advocating freedom of criticism, Shaftesbury informs his reader 
that this freedom must have strict limitations; ".... you are 
to remember, my friend, that I am writing to you in defence of 
the liberty of the club, and of that sort of freedom which is 
taken among gentlemen and friends who know one another perfectly 
well. " He did not believe in the free use of criticism by all 
and sundry. It was the private privilege of gentlemen, who by 
this pursuit might hope to discover something of the eternal 
truths of morality and art. These sophisticated-members of the 
community will always take care not to "offend the public ear, " 
or cause a "scandal and disturbance. "42 The uncultured masses 
will accept the laws without criticism, and peace will be main- 
tained amongst them. The educated and well-bred men, the men 
of taste, will pursue their criticisms and enquiries in the 
privacy of their clubs. 
As we saw earlier in this Chapter, Shaftesbury thought that 
there were both thinking and non-thinking* elements in mankind. 
---------------------------------------- --------------- 
See Section II above for a description of "half-thinking", 
"under-thinking", and "unthinking" personalities. 
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This being the case, it would be impossible for all men to 
develop their moral potential even if they were given freedom. 
Now it appears that those non-thinking individuals who are 
incapable of forming a taste, make up the bulk of mankind. 
Consequently, it is beyond the scope of his philosophy to examine 
the possibility of a political system which will allow all men 
to realise their benevolent affections and thereby establish a 
truly natural community. 
However, the radical aspect of Shaftesbury's philosophy 
must not be discarded, for he was by no means consistently aris- 
tocratic. Nor was the aristocratic aspect of his writings 
necessarily appreciated by his contemporaries. In his Letter to 
a Deist (1726) John Balguy wrote in opposition to Shaftesbury in 
an attempt to justify the need of a belief in heavenly rewards 
and punishments as a source and stimulant of moral action. In 
attempting to contradict Shaftesbury's belief that virtuous 
action is inconsistent with the hope of reward or fear of punish- 
ment, Balguy provides us with the following insight concerning 
Shaftesbury's concept of taste: 
Let it be observed then, in the first Place, how 
small a Proportion of Mankind are capable of discern- 
ing in any considerable Degree, the Inward Beauty 
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4 
and Excellence of Virtue. In the Characteristicks 
we find a good Taste required for this Purpose; 
and, -whether that Taste be derived from Nature or 
Education, there is little Reason to expect it 
should be found in the Bulk of Mankind-43 
It would appear from the tone of this passage that Balguy did 
not appreciate that the human limitations referred to by him 
were also recognised by Shaftesbury. The fact that Shaftesbury's 
recognition of these limitations to his theory of individual 
creativity was hidden to Balguy is evidence of the limited place 
which they have in his writings considered as a whole. Even 
more modern critics have failed to see that Shaftesbury in 
places explicitly states his aristocratic principle in opposi- 
tion to a radical interpretation of his theories. C. A. Moore, 
writing in 1916, stated that, 
.... when the English perceived the revolutionary 
possibilities of sentimental benevolence, which had 
escaped Shaftesbury to be fully expounded by Rousseau 
and applied by the Revolutionists, their distrust 
extended to the comparatively innocuous doctrine of 
the Characteristics. Between 1711 and 1790 it 
comman ee even English editions; after 1790 no 
edition appeared for a century. 44 
To say, as Moore does here, that the revolutionary implications 
of his doctrine escaped Shaftesbury is to misinterpret him. It 
would be more correct. to say that he recognised it and rejected 
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it. However, it only requires a faith in the possibility of 
universal (as opposed to partial) enlightennent to make 
Shaftesbury's assumptions relating to the nature of man the 
basis for a radical political programme. Such a programme would 
demand the removal of those environmental factors that prevent 
the emergence of a higher culture based upon the free interaction 
of ideas within a situation that respects and encourages the 
potentiality of all. 
---00000--- 
SUMMARY: 
Having considered Shaftesbury's institutional preferences 
in Chapter Seven, the present chapter considers Shaftesbury's 
views concerning a "free" environment. For Shaftesbury, freedom 
had "political", "critical" and "moral" elements. Following the 
rational-emotional dichotomy of Shaftesbury's thought that has 
been outlined in earlier chapters, the rational and the emotional 
(aesthetic) aspects of Shaftesbury's views on freedom are each 
considered in turn. 
Section II looks at Shaftesbury's "rational" explanation 
of the interdependence between political freedom, critical 
freedom, and moral freedom. This we have seen in Chapter Seven 
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where immorality (loss of moral freedom) was regarded the 
consequence of tyranny (political or theological). In this 
section tyranny is seen to be a consequence of immorality. 
Shaftesbury's argument is as follows: 
1. Although moral truth can be discovered by reason, 
men must have practice in order to be capable of 
using their reason. 
2. Even if no environmental factors prevent develop- 
ment of reason, the individual may not take 
advantage of the situation. 
3. There are "half-thinkers" who accept a dogma 
because of their intellectual cowardice, and 
"under-thinkers" who pursue external goods. Both 
of these types are prepared to accept the domina- 
tion by religious or political organisations in 
the mistaken belief that they can satisfy their 
interests in this way. 
4. There are "unthinking" persons who follow only 
sensual desires, standing in opposition to reason 
and enquiry and only being satisfied with a 
political tyranny that corresponds to their inward 
slavery to their passions. 
5. In this manner rejection of moral enquiry leads to 
tyranny in the same manner tyranny leads to loss 
of morality. Failure to reason and tyranny interact. 
Enquiry being necessary to both enable morality and prevent 
tyranny, freedom of enquiry is regarded as essential by 
Shaftesbury. In Section III Shaftesbury's belief in "freedom of 
enquiry" is seen to involve 
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1. A denial of the right of government to interfere 
in either religion or philosophy. 
2. An assertion of the right to criticise public 
persons and institutions. 
Truth, it is thought, can stand the force of all criticism and 
emerge untarnished. Also, in the special field of religion, 
following the lead of other seventeenth-century thinkers, 
Shaftesbury advocates toleration by making the following points: 
1. Only reason, not force, can persuade men to 
accept a truth, or one interpretation of truth in 
religion. 
2. Intolerance, when not finding its source in zeal 
(i. e. enthusiasm), is only to be found in persons 
who can expect material benefit from acts of 
persecution. 
3. Intolerance leads to civil disturbance as illegal 
sects continue in their heresy. Tolerance pro- 
duces civil peace in a situation where each person 
can follow his conscience. 
4. Intolerance leads to an intensification of the 
proscribed belief in the mind of the adherent. 
Therefore, intolerance is ineffective. 
Having considered Shaftesbury's attitude towards "freedom of 
reason" (Sections II and III), the chapter turns to consider 
the emotional-aesthetic advantages of freedom of enquiry, criti- 
cism, and creativity. This freedom will allow the emergence of 
aesthetic truth and the development of culture. In Section IV 
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we see that 
1. As freedom improves the moral judgement so it improves aesthetic judgement; for they are the 
same. 
2. The development of a national culture depends upon 
the amount of freedom (political and critical) 
in the society. 
3. Shaftesbury considers literature and music as 
having their basis in "persuasion". Persuasion 
is a political art that is needed by statesmen 
in free societies (i. e. societies where the 
people have a political influence). Therefore 
progress in these "first characters" is depend- 
ent upon freedom. 
4. Paintings and sculpture ("second characters") 
grow out of "first characters". When the latter 
decline through loss of political freedom, so do 
the former. 
5. Shaftesbury condemns Plato's recommended republic 
because of its lack of popular participation in 
government, and its artistic limitations. 
6. Shaftesbury condemns the Roman Empire because of 
the cultural insufficiency resulting from Caesar's 
destruction of republican freedom. 
7. Shaftesbury thought that the destruction of the 
Roman Empire by the barbarians should not be 
regretted. 
In Section V it is recognised that in spite of the utopian 
implications of Shaftesbury's ideas concerning the need for 
freedom, he does not make any such prescriptions. Shaftesbury's 
optimistic metaphysics, his satisfaction with the British 
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constitution, and his belief that political change creates 
the impression that there are no permanent standards,. are all 
seen as reasons for this. However, in addition to these, an 
aristocratic element is also seen to be present in Shaftesbury's 
thought. This is seen in his 
I. distrust of the will of the majority. 
2. his acceptance of censorship. 
3. his belief in the need for the vulgar to be 
both threatened in law and guided in religion. 
4. his advocation of the liberty only of the club. 
Consequently, those students and critics of Shaftesbury's 
writings who have suggested that Shaftesbury's writings were 
revolutionary in politics must be regarded as mistaken. 
---00000--- 
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CHAPTER NINE 
ASSESSMENT 
We have seen in this work that Shaftesbury was attempting 
to direct his readers towards the recognition of their own ability 
to distinguish between the good and the bad, the beautiful and 
the ugly. In addition to this, the last two chapters have shown 
that he thought that certain environmental conditions were 
necessary to the development of a "taste" in both morals and art 
in both the individual and the community as a whole. But it has 
also been noted that Shaftesbury's writings contain contradictions 
which may or may not find explanation within the framework of his 
own thought. Whilst remembering that he opposed a "systematic" 
approach to moral questions, we should note that as a consequence 
of this Shaftesbury is often as likely to confuse his readers as 
to enlighten them. Perhaps the most obvious example of a contra- 
diction in Shaftesbury that may tend to confuse his readers is 
the presence in his thought of two approaches to morality. His 
indiscriminate reference to both "reason" and the "moral sense", 
logically distinct approaches to the discovery of moral truths, 
was introduced in Chapter One of this work, and must always be 
borne in mind if Shaftesbury is to be understood. Other 
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difficulties that have been noted in the course of this work 
include, 
- his acceptance of sceptical reasoning whilst refusing 
to accept the ethical conclusions of scepticism (Chapter One), 
- his condemnation of metaphysical enquiry whilst accept- ing the Stoic metaphysics of optimism (Chapter Three), 
- his acceptance of the. possibility of evil within a 
perfect cosmos (Chapter Four), 
- his acceptance of the possibility of freedom where 
everything is necessarily arranged for the best (Chapter Four), 
- his failure to explain whether taste is a product of 
reason or emotion (Chapter Five), 
- his rejection of enthusiasm although he accepts "divine 
enthusiasm" (Chapters Five and Six), 
- his failure to explain whether ridicule is rational or 
non-rational (Chapter Six), 
A ýr1acý Iý - his advocation of certain organisational needs for a 
moral society is combined with a refusal to consider 
them as practically possible (Chapter Seven), and 
- his belief in the need for freedom if men are to develop their moral and aesthetic potential is combined 
with an aristocratic element which seeks to prevent 
such a possibility (Chapter Eight). 
An attempt has been made in this work to explain these difficulties - 
where an explanation is possible within the framework of Shaftes- 
bury's own thought. However, Shaftesbury never attempted to 
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resolve them himself, apparently being unaware of their exis- 
tence. As a consequence of this it is possible to say that his 
philosophy fails to provide a coherent explanation of man's moral 
and political experience. 
Yet, as we noted in the preface to this work, Shaftesbury's 
writings were regarded in high esteem by some of the major 
philosophers of eighteenth-century Europe. * Why should this be 
so if his writings are so lacking in consistency? To answer this 
question we must remember firstly that Shaftesbury's ideas were 
not the accidental product of his own particular contemplations. 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Stanley Grean has provided us with the following statement of 
Shaftesbury's influence in his "Introduction" to the 
Characteristics: "As founder of the 'moral sense' school in RhiCS, his fideas were extensively used and developed by Francis Hutcheson, Bishop Butler, Adam Smith, and Hume. He 
played an important role in the Deistic movement, particularly influencing John Toland and Anthony Collins. In the sphere 
of literature, his effect can be traced in the writings of 
Addison, James Thomson, Mark Akenside, and Henry Fielding. On 
the continent, his thought had an impact on Jean Le Clerc, 
Voltaire and Diderot. .... Shaftesbury's effect may 
have 
been even greater on German thought, especially on Lessing, 
Mendelssohn, Wieland, Herder, Kant, Goethe, and Schiller. 
**** Shaftesbury's optimistic metaphysics, as well as his con- cepts of moral sense and humor, remained at the centre of 
controversy through the third quarter of the eighteenth century. 
His influence on the arts was at least as great as that on 
philosophy. " Characteristics (1964), xiv-xv. 
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Shaftesbury's thoughts are a product of his age; and this was 
an age in which many thinkers were referring to "reason" and 
"nature" in an attempt to explain how man can know moral and 
political truth independently of external authority. It was 
upon this basis that Locke had justified the removal of James II 
from the throne of England. Shaftesbury was influenced by this 
approach and he can be found using both "nature" and "reason" 
as a means of justifying certain capacities that he thought were 
inherent in man. Without ever explaining clearly what he means 
by "reason", Shaftesbury never seems to have doubted that it was 
an efficient moral tool. Because of his insistence. that it also 
applies to theological questions he is often labelled a Deist. 
However, whilst never abandoning his appeals to reason, it 
is clear that by appealing to man's emotional ability to dis- 
tinguish between right and wrong Shaftesbury moved away from a 
rational approach to ethics. By doing this he became a con- 
tributor to that school of thought which sought to find the basis 
or moral approbation (and disapprobation) in the sphere of 
"feeling" rather than reason. Shaftesbury's influence can be 
seen in the prescriptive theory of morality of Hutcheson, who 
wrote (1725), 
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That as the AUTHOR of Nature has detemin'd us to 
receive, by our external Senses, pleasant or dis- 
agreeable Ideas of Objects, according as they are 
useful or hurtful to our Bodys; and to receive from 
uniform Objects the Pleasures of Beauty and Harmony, 
to excite us to the Pursuit of Knowledgeg and to 
reward us for it; .... in the same manner he has given us a MORAL SENSE, to direct our Actions, and 
to give us still nobler Pleasures; so that while 
we are only intending the Good of others, we 
'undesignedly promote our own greatest private Good. 
Similarly, Shaftesbury can be seen as a forerunner of Hume's* 
descriptive moral theories when the later thinker says that 
(1739-40), 
Pride and humility, love and hatred, are excited, 
when there is anything presented to us that both 
bears a relation to the object of the passion, and 
produces a separate sensation, related to the sen- 
sation of the passion. Now, virtue and vice are 
attended with these circumstances-2 
For Hume, "Moral good and evil are certainly distinguished by our 
sentiments, not by reason .... "3 
-------- M ---------------------------------------------------- 
In his attempt to publicise his own Treatise Hume was to 
mention Shaftesbury as follows: "He [Hume] entions .... Mý- Locke, rqv Lord'Shaftsbury [sic]s Dr. Mandevillev 
Mr. Hu hiýon [sic] Dr. Butler, who, th-o-1 they differ in ýany points among 
Nemselves, 
seem all to agree in founding 
their accurate disquisitions of human nature intirely upon 
experience. " 
An Abstract of A Treatise of Human Nature, 7. (1740). 
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In Shaftesbury's statements concerning the emotional 
origins of moral Judgements we find an early contribution to a 
debate on moral subjects that was to continue well into the 
eighteenth century. * He introduced and made popular an alter- 
native approach to moral subjects; an alternative approach that 
was to be more carefully elaborated by later thinkers than by 
Shaftesbury himself. Shaftesbury may even be said to have 
achieved his aim of "pluming the arrows of better wits.,. 
4 
To the modern reader, however, Shaftesbury is not only 
worthy of interest because of his originality in considering 
Examples of'opponents to the "moral sense" school are 
John Balguy and William Wollaston. Balguy considers 
how improbable it is, that our Perceptions of Right and 
Wrong, and the Approbation or Disapprobation consequent 
thereupon, should depend on such a Sense, or Instinct, as he (Hutcheson] has advanced for that purpose. " Selby-Bigge (ed. ), 11,71 (From Balguy's The Foundation of Moral 
Goodness, 173i). Wollaston writes in The Religion of Naturei 
DeRrneMd (1722), "They, who contenting themselves With 
superficial and transient views, deduce the difference 
between good and evil from the common sense of mankind,, and 
certain principles that are born with us, put the matter upon 
a very infirm foot. For it is much to be suspected there are 
no such innate maxims as they pretend, but that the impressions 
of education are mistaken for them: and beside thatq the 
sentiments of mankind are not so uniform and constantt as that we may safely trust such an important distinction upon them. " Ibid., 11,372/3. 
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morality as a non-rational aspect of human activity. For the 
historian of ideas Shaftesbury also provides an insight into 
some of the philosophical concerns of British thinkers both 
during and after the time he was writing. For instances we 
find in his thought the belief that authority (moral, religious, 
or political) must find its justification within the structure 
of human experience. When Shaftesbury refers to reason, even 
though the concept is vague, we are left in no doubt that it 
stands in opposition to the arbitrary authority of either a 
church or a monarch. The authority of tradition alone was no 
longer sufficient in itself to a nation that had lopped off the 
head of one king and sent another into exile. 
By insisting that men should attempt to discover codes of 
behaviour by using their natural faculties (rational or other- 
wise) Shaftesbury involves himself in what wasq for his con- 
temporaries, a topical subject of debate. According to Shaftes- 
bury, man's nature is both social and moral. This belief placed 
him in opposition to those of his contemporaries who insisted 
that mang because he is by nature selfish and evils should accept 
the revealed word of God as a means of limiting his tendency 
towards immorality. Shaftesbury regarded this attitude as 
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similar'to that of Hobbes, whose authoritarian "mortal God" also 
found justification in the supposed inadequacies of human nature. 
In his "Preface" to Whichcote's Sermons (1698) Shaftesbury tells 
us that if Hobbes's view of man had not become so popular 
. *.. it would have been the Business of those who had manag'd the Cause of Religions to have contended for 
these better Dispositions [i. e. natural affections]; 
and to have shewn, how deep a Root and Foundation they 
had in Human Nature; and not, just contrary-wise, to have built on the*Rui-ne of these. For, with some 
people, this was then beconi-e a Method to prove 
Christianity. Revelation was to owe its Establishment 
to the Depression and Lowering of such Principles as 
these, in the Nature of Man: And the Weakness of 
these was made the strength of Religion-5 
In saying this Shaftesbury stands opposed to those in his time 
who saw in Nature not a guide, but a source of licence. Such 
a one was Bishop Fowler of Gloucester who wrote in reply to the 
Letter Concerning Enthusiasm that, 
Our Matures are corrupt, and our Passions depravld, 
our Thoughts vain, and Appetites irregular; and, 
some Live in a perpetual sort of Heat and Intoxication 
of the Mind. In short, the Animal Life is more, in 
most Persons, than the Divine; and the Earthly 
Principle stronger than the Heavenly. This, and 
Reason of the Sublimer sort, are kept downg as it were, 
with Weights and Fetters .... So that, without some Change and Assistance .... great Numbers of Persons can seldom feel effectually the Force of Religion, or 
the Powers of the World to come. 6 
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With Fowler we see the other side of a debate that had been 
present in Christian thought from the time of the early 
Christians. The question asked is, Is man, because of original 
sin, incapable of a moral existence without supernatural 
guidance? In Shaftesbury's writings we find evidence of the 
fact that the discussion centred on this question was still very 
much alive at the time he was writing. * 
When Shaftesbury says that man can have a moral existence 
without supernatural guidance, he ties this to a belief in an 
ordered cosmos (see above Chapters Two, Three and Four). This 
cosmological "optimism", which accepts all things as happening 
Whether "selfishness" (amoral or immoral) or "sociability" 
characterises human nature continued to be discussed after 
Shaftesbury's death. The former interpretation can be 
found in Mandeville's Enquiry into the Orjqjn of Moral 
Virtue (1723): no species of animalg is ... IS 
capab of agreeing long together in multitudes than that of 
man; .... being an extraordinary selfish and headstrong, as well as cunning animal, however he may be subdued by superior 
strengths it is imppssible by force alone to make him tractable, 
and receive the improvements he is capable of. " Ibid., II, 
348. In contrasts Hutcheson was to follow Shafte--sFu-ry in 
arguing for the natural "benevolence" of man: "The human Nature is a lovely Form; we are all conscious of some morally 
good Qualitys and Inclinations in our selves, how partial and imperfect soever they may be; we presume the same of every thing in human Form, nay almost of every living Creature.... Ibid., Is 88 (From Hutcheson's Inquiry Concerning the Original 
OT'Our Ideas of Virtue or Moral Good. 1725). 
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for the best, was to become popular both on the continent and 
in England during the first part of the eighteenth century. 
Pope's Essay on Man (published 1733-34) gave it poetical 
expression as follows: 
All Nature is but Art, unknown to thee; 
All Chance, Direction, which thou canst not see; 290 
All Discord, Harmony, not understood; 
All partial Evil, universal Good: 
And, spite of Pride, in erring Reason's spite, 
One truth is clear, "Whatever IS, is RIGHT *"7 
It was this view of Nature (termed "Cosmic Toryism" by 
Basil Willey)8 that Voltaire was to criticise later in his 
Candide (1757): 
Shaftesbury also appears to have been attuned to the 
interests of his age in his concern with the idea of "taste". 
During Shaftesbury's lifetime Richard Steele wrote in "The 
Spectator" of 
the Folly of admitting Wit and Learning as 
Merit in themselves, without considering the 
Application of them. By this Means it becomes a 
Rule not so much to regard what we do, as how we 
do it. But this false Beauty will not pass upon 
Men of honest Minds and true Taste. Sir Richard 
Blackmore says, with as much good Sense as V'Tir-tue, 
"It is a mighty Dishonour and Shame to employ 
excellent Faculties and abundance of Wit, to humour 
and please Men in their Vices and Follies. 
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Nothing ought to be held laudable or becoming, but 
what Nature it self should prompt us to think so. 9 
Taste is here used by Steele to represent wit (reason) acting 
in accordance with virtue as the latter is defined by Nature. 
Like Steele,, Shaftesbury was also recommending the development 
of "taste" in morals and art. * That it remained of interest 
to British thinkers during the eighteenth century is evident 
from the fact that both Edmund Burke and David Hume were to 
publish works in which they express their concern with the con- 
cept. Burke included an "Intýoduction on Taste" in his 
Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the 
Sublime and Beautiful (1757). He tells us there that 
see* if Taste has no fixed principles, tion is not affected according to some 
certain laws, our labour is like to be 
very little purpose.... 10 
In the same year, 1757, Hume's "Of the Star 
published (included in Four Dissertations). 
that 
if the imagina- 
invariable and 
employed to 
idard of Taste" was 
Hume wrote there 
For Shaftesbury, "taste" is not necessarily a product of 
reason - See above Chapters Five and Six. 
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It is natural for us to seek a Standard of Taste; 
a rule, by which the various s6timents Ff men may 
be reconciled; at least, a decision, afforded, 
confirming one sentiment, and condemning another-,, 
With the continuing interest in the subject of "taste" it 
comes as no surprise that Shaftesbury's Characteristics 
remained popular through the eighteenth century. 
In relation to the view that Shaftesbury reflects the 
interests of his own age we should also note that his lack of 
desire to see political change was appropriate to the 
eighteenth century. After the turmoils of the seventeenth 
centurys the eighteenth century is an age of stability. 
The contrast between political society in eighteenth- 
and seventeenth-century England is vivid and dramatic. 
In the seventeenth century men killed, tortureds and 
executed each other for political beliefs; they 
sacked towns and brutalized the countryside. They 
were subjected to conspiracy, plot, and invasion. 
This uncertain political world lasted until 1715, and 
then began rapidly to vanish. By comparison, the 
political structure of eighteenth-century England 
possesses adamantine strength and profound inertia*12. 
The political stability of the country under the post-1688 
constitution can be seen not only in the constitution's con- 
tinuance (in spite of a change in dynastyt threats from 
pretenders, and the loss of an empire), but also in the interests 
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of British philosophers during the eighteenth century. Accord- 
ing to Leslie Stephen, political philosophy has been the product 
of political instability. In eighteenth-century England there 
was stability, and this stability was reflected in the absence 
of political philosophy. * 
theories have followed, more than they have guided, 
events. Happy is the nation which has no, political 
philosophy, for such a philosophy is generally the off- 
spring of a recent, or the symptom of an approaching, 
revolution. During the quieter hours of the eighteenth 
century Englishmen rather played with political theories 
than seriously discussed them. The interest in politics 
was chiefly personal. References to general. principles 
are introduced in rhetorical flourishes, but do not 
form the basis of serious argument. 1n the mass of 
pamphlets and speeches which fill our library shelves it 
is rare to find even a show of political philosophy-13. 
--------- M ------- --------------------- M ------------ 
For Stephen, "political philosophy" involved political pres- 
criPtion": 
"At some future day, " he wrote in his History f English 
Thouaýt inn thhe. Ointeenth Centur , "if the aspirations of iloso u t1f t . the Jec T stIl 
cnl 
ýPhs pphilosopfi7eerrss arree justifilee therýe will be a science of 
sociology. We shall unravel the laws of growth of the 
social organism, and determine the condition of its health 
or disease. Then, and not till then, it will be possible to 
presentýpolitical science as a coherent body of doctriness 
deduced from certain axioms of universal validityl but lead- 
ing to different conclusions according to the varying 
conditions of human society .... Then we shall 
have at once 
a firm base for our speculations, and the utmost possible 
flexibility in their application. We shall see how to recon- 
cile justice and expediency; and establish the rights of 
man, not as conflicting with considerations of utility, but 
as logical consequences of the laws of social health. " 
Vol. 11,110 (1962 edition). 
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In the eighteenth ce6tury the centre for (prescriptive) 
political philosophy moved to the continent whilst British 
thinkers concerned themselves with the subjects of morality 
and art. When a person like Hume considers political matters, 
it is in the form of explanatory essays rather than an attempt 
to provide alternative political norms. Anglo-Saxon political 
thought was to take a radical turn only in the American colonies; 
and only then does reference to rational laws of nature re-emerge 
in the form of a political prescription that stands in contra- 
diction to existing institutions. British thinkers do not 
concern themselves with making British political institutions 
conform to abstract concepts of natural right and natural law. 
In this orientation Shaftesbury is an early representative. It 
is true that Shaftesbury does make political recommendations. 
But it should be recognised that: 
1. Shaftesbury never himself refers to-the potentially 
radical doctrine of laws of nature. 
2. Shaftesbury nowhere attempts to outline a general 
theory of politics. His political ideas are the 
off-spring of his enquiries in the fields of 
aesthetics and morality. 
3. Any political recommendations that Shaftesbury makes 
are not seen by him to contradict the political norms 
of his own country. 
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As- a consequence of these aspects of Shaftesbury's writings, 
he may be said to have appealed to the demands of the eighteenth- 
century public. His writings are appropriate to the political 
stability of that era. Only towards the end of the eighteenth 
century, when a rising industrialism and the French Revolution 
disturbed the national and international political fabrico did 
prescriptive political philosophy again seem to be relevant to 
British thinkers and their audience. 
It has been said that the French Revolution enlightened 
English readers to the revolutionary potential of Shaftesbury's 
ideas on "sentimental benevolencei, 
149 
after which his popularity 
declined. However, a better explanation of the decline in the 
popularity of the Characteristics after 1790 is the fact that 
Shaftesbury's writings ceased to be relevant. In the first 
place, the element in Shaftesbury's thought which caused him to 
be looked upon as important by other thinkers had been more 
clearly elaborated by these thinkers. Both Hutcheson and Hume 
had provided more systematic explanations of the role played by 
emotion in our moral judgements. Secondly, it became more 
difficult to accept that everything that happens is for the best, 
as the blood-letting in France, the Napoleonic conquest of 
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Europe, the horrors of the slave trade, and the miseries of 
industrialisation all showed themselves to the world. Compared 
with these the Lisbon earthquake that was pointed to by Voltaire 
was both minor and temporary. Thirdly, the bourgeois class that 
was becoming socially dominant as industrialism spread did not 
find Shaftesbury's emphasis on social responsibility attractive. 
They preferred the idea that an "invisible hand" would auto- 
matically convert their pursuit of private gains into the public 
good. Fourthly, the attempt of Jeremy Bentham and the 
utilitarians to make taste a product of personal disposition based 
upon quantities of pain and pleasure stood in stark contrast to 
Shaftesbury's qualitative philosophy. Yet it was the utilitarian 
philosophy that the new middle class took to its bosom as the 
most appropriate means of explaining human experience and guiding 
human conduct. Finally, when an interest in attaining politeness 
was replaced by the interests of production and industrY9 the 
good-humoured pursuit of taste was replaced by the serious pursuit 
of profit. Only in the literary field did thinkers like Wordsworth 
and Coleridge'provide a contrast to the sober reasoning of the 
industrial nation, and it was to these rather than to Shaftesbury 
that those who wished to find a qualitative note in human 
experience began to turn. 
---00000--- 
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APPENDIX A 
Preface to the "SELECT SERMONS OF DR. WHICHCOT". [sic] 
_(London, 
1698). 
Amongst those many Things which are made Publick; it may be 
thought, perhaps, of Sermons; that they are, of any other, the 
least wanted; and for the future, least likely to be found want- 
ing: since to that rich and inexhaustible Store, with which the 
Learned and Orthodox Divines of England have already furnished 
uss there is daily fresh addition, from worthy and able Hands. 
Neither, have we cause to fear a Cessation in this kind; or 
that so great a Blessing is likely to fail us, for the future; 
having such security, not only from the unwearied Zeal of present 
Divines (of whom we may always hope a worthy Succession) but, 
from the just esteem which the Publick never fails to shew, for 
such pious Discourses: Upon which account, we find that many of 
these are every day made Publick: and, as it were, forced into 
the World; notwithstanding the great Modesty of their Authors, 
whose Humble Thoughts, and devoutly resigned Affections, lead 
them not towards Eminence, and Advancement in the World. 
It may seem strange, therefore, that in such an Age as this, 
any one should be so officious, as to search after, and publish 
the Sermons of a Man long since dead, who (himself) never meant 
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to Publish any; or thought so highly of himself, as that he 
could benefit the World by such a Publication. 
It is certain, that we must not ever imagines nor can it 
enter into a Mind truly Christian, that because we see not an 
apparent Change for the better, in the Lives of Christian 
Professors; that, therefore all Preaching is ineffectual; or 
that here in England, the Labours of the most Eminent Divines 
that perhaps the World ever afforded, have been of no use at 
all: It might be said with the same reason (thol very prophanely, 
and wickedly) that because the Christians are not reported to 
exceed the other Nations of the World, in Probity, and Good 
Living; but are said to be rather inferior in this respect, to 
the Civilized People, whether Pagan or Mahometan, lying round 
them; that therefore the Christian Religion is of no effect at 
all,, nor any ways operative upon the Lives of its Professors. 
But, if we consider this, as becomes us; and not per- 
versely, as many do; it will be found that we are, even in this 
sense, the most highly indebted to Christianity; and should 
look upon It as the greatest Blessing imaginable; not only for 
its spiritual Advantages, which are Unspeakable; but for its 
Temporal Benefits, and Securities; inasmuch as that Mankind 
being so inclinable to Ill, we should have a Religion so full of 
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all good Precepts, and so enforcing with respect to all the 
Duties of Morality, and Justice. So that our Amazement ought 
rather to be; how Men, with such a Religion, should lead such 
Lives! and how Malice, Hatred, or Division, should have place 
in such Societies as these; which we might expect to see dis- 
tinguished from all others, rather by a perfect Harmony, and 
Agreement, than by the fiercest Quarrelsq Contentions, and 
Animosities. 
And, indeed, when we consider the Nature of Preaching_; how 
excellent an Order and Establishment it is; how highly raised 
and magnified in the Christian World: When we consider Numbers 
of Holy Men set apart for this great Work; having all advantages 
given them, the better to set forth those Glorious Truths of 
Revelation, and to create a Reverence of Religion in the Minds 
of Men; when we consider the Solemnity of a Church-Assemblyt 
and the awful Presence and Authority of the Christian Orator; 
we may be apt to wonder perhaps, why we see not greater and more 
happy Effects hereof, in the World. However, we must of 
Necessity conclude, That this Institution being undoubtedly so 
powerful a support of our Religion; if such Assemblies as these 
were not upheld,, if such Authority as this did not subsist, the 
consequence would be, that as in a little time there would be no 
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more Christianity left in the World, so neither any Morality; 
since, notwithstanding all the Helps of Preachings and the 
Assistance and Support which Virtue receives from hence, the 
Lives of Men are still so far from being Reform'd, and the 
World so little Improvedi in these latter Ages. 
But, how reverently soever we have cause to think con- 
cerning this Institution, and the undoubted good Effects of it, 
upon Mankind; and, whatever high Opinion and Esteem we may 
justly have of their Performance in whose Hands this Power is 
placed; it seems not wholly impossible, but that there may be 
some Defect in this great Affair; and that the Causes of ill 
Success may not lye altogether in the Depravity,, Perverseness, 
or Stupidity of Mankind, who are the Hearers and Readers of 
these Doctrines. 
In some Countries, and amongst some sorts of Christians, 
we have seen, that the Whole of this Institution has not been 
appropriated to Spirituals; buts that a great part of those 
Divine Exhortations have had something in common with the 
Policies of the Worlds and the Affairs of Government. And, of 
whatsoever Benefit this may have been to Mankinds or to the 
Peace of the Christian World; it must be own'd that Preaching 
it self, will be so much the less apt to make any happy 
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Revolution in Manners, as it has at'any time been serviceable 
to Revolutions in State, or to the support of any other 
Interest than that of Christ's Kingdom. 
Nor do we find, since the Arts of Government, and Mysteries 
of Religion, have been thus suited together; that either has 
beeh much advantag'd by the Union; it having never yet appear'd, 
that Divinity has been greatly better'd by Policy; or that 
Policy has been any where mended by Divinity. 
Amongst those Writers who have been forward in making this 
Unprosperous Alliance, and Building a Political Christianity; 
there has-been one of our Nation (in the Time wherein our 
Author liv1d) who whether he may have been serviceable any way 
to the Civil Government, or Christian Church; it may be con- 
cluded, at least, that he has done but very ill Service in the 
Moral World. And, however other parts of Philosophy may be 
obliged to him, Ethicks will appear to have no great share in 
the Obligation. He has, indeed, with great Zeal, and Learning, 
been oppos'd, by all the eminent and worthy Divines of the 
Church of England: And had the same Industry been applied to 
the Correction of his Moral Principles, as has been bestow'd in 
refuting some other of his Errours, it might perhaps have been 
of more Service to Religion, in the Main. 
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This is He who reckoning, up the Passions, or Affections, 
by which Men are held together in Society, live in Peace, or 
have any Correspondence one with another, forgot to mention 
Kindness, Friendship, Sociableness, Love of Company and Con- 
verses Natural Affection, or any thing of this kind; I say 
ForEot, because I can scarcely think so ill of any Mang as 
that he has not by experience found any of these Affections in 
himself, and consequently, that he believes none of them to be 
in others. But, in the place of other Affectionss or good 
Inclinations, of whatever kind, this Author has substituted 
only one Master-Passion, Fear, which has, in effect devour'd 
all the rest, and left room only for that infinite Passion to- 
wards Power after. Power, Natural (as he affirms) to All Men, 
and never ceasing. but in Death. So much. less Good-nature 
has he left with Mankind, than what he allows the worst of 
Beasts: Having allotted to us, in the way of our Natures such 
mischievous Passions as are unknown to them; and not so much 
as allow'd us any Degree of their Good ones, such as they All 
are known to have, and are never wanting to exert towards their 
own Kind: By which Excellency of Nature (so little reckon'd 
upon, in the Case of Mankind) their common Interest is duly 
serv'd, and their Species propagated and maintain'd. 
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Had not the Poyson of these Immoral and (in reality) 
Atheistical'Principles been diffused more than Itis easie to 
imagine, (at that time especially when Dr. Whichcot appear'd) 
we should, perhaps, where Morality was concern'd, have heard 
less of Terror and Punishment; and more, of Moral Rectitude 
and Good-nature. At least, it should not have grown customary 
to explode Good-nature, and detract from that Good which is 
ascrib'd to Natural Temper, and is accounted Natural Affection, 
as having Ground and Foundation inýMeer NATURE: On the con- 
trary; it would have been the Business of those who had 
manag'd the Cause of Religion, to have contended for these 
better Dispositions; and to have shewn, how deep a Root and 
Foundation they had in Human Nature; and nots just contrary- 
wise, to have built on the Ruine of these. For, with some 
people, this was then become a, Method to prove Christianity. 
Revelation was to owe its Establishment to the Depression and 
Lowering of such Principles as these, in the Nature of Man: 
And the Weakness of these was made the Strength of Religion. 
As if Good-nature, and Religion, were Enemies: A Thing, indeed, 
so unthought of, amongst the Heathens; that PIETY (which was 
their best Word to signifie Religion) had more than half its 
Sence, in Natural and Good Affection; and stood not only for 
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the Adoration, and Worship of God; but for the Natural Affec- 
tions of Parents to their Children, and of Children to their 
Parents; of Men to their Native Country; and, indeed, of 
all Men" in their several Relations one to another. 
It must be confess'd. that it has been the Reproach of 
some Sects of Christians amongst us; that their Religion 
appearld to be, in a manner, opposite to Good-nature; and 
founded in Morosenesso Selfishness, and III-will to Mankind; 
Things, not easily reconcileable with a Christian Spirit. But, 
certainly, it may be said of the Church of England, if of any 
Church in the World, that this is not Her Spirit: But,, it is 
by Characters and Features just contrary to these, that this 
Church shews Herself, above all others, most worthily and 
nobly Christian. 
It is certain, that there is nothing more contended for, 
by those who would not willingly admit a Deity; nor is there 
any thing of greater Use to them, in their Way of Reasoning; 
than to have it pass as current, that there are in Man, no 
Natural Principles inclining him to Society; nothing that 
moves him to what is Moral, Just and Honest; except a Prospect 
of some different Goods some Advantage of a different Sort 
from what attends the Actions themselves. Nor is it strange, 
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that they who have brought themselves off from so much as 
believing the Reality of any Ingenuous Action, perform'd by 
any of Mankind, meerly through Good Affections and a Recti- 
tude of Temper; should be backward to apprehend any Goodness 
of that sort, in a Higher Nature than that of, Man. But it is 
strange to conceive, how Men who pretend a Notion and Belief 
of, a Supream Power acting with the greatest Goodness, and with- 
out any Inducement but that of Love and Good-will; should 
think it unsuitable to a Rational Creatureq derived from Him, 
to act after His Example: and to find Pleasure and Contentment 
in Works of Goodness, and Bounty, without other Prospect. But, 
what is yet more unaccountable, is, that Men who profess a 
Religion where Love is chiefly enjoyn1d; 'where the Heart is 
expresly call1d for, and the outward Action without that, is 
disregarded; where Charity (or Kindness) is made all in all; 
that Men of this Perswasion, should combine, to degrade the 
Principle of Good-nature, and refer all to Reward; which 
being made the only Motive in Men's Actions, must exclude all 
worthy and generous Disposition, all that Love, Charity, and 
Affection, which the Scripture enjoyns; and without whichs no 
Action is Lovely, in the Sight of God, or Man; or in it self, 
deserving of Notice, or kind Reward. 
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But, perhaps, one Reason of this Misfortune has been; that 
some Men, who have meant sincerely well to Religion and Vertue, 
have been afraid least [sic] by advancing the Principle of 
Good-nature, and laying too great a Stress upon it, the appa- 
rent Need of Sacred Revelation (a Thing so highly Important to 
Mankind) should be, in some Measure, taken away. So that 
they were forced, in a Manner, to wound VERTUE, and give way 
to the Imputation of being Mercenary,, and of Acting in a 
slavish Spirit, in Ways_of Religion , rather than admit a sort 
of Rival (in their Sense) to the Faith of Divine Revelation: 
Seeing that Christianity (they thought) would, by this Means. 
be made less necessary to Mankind; if it should be allow'ds 
that Men could find any Happiness in Vertue, but what is in 
Reversion. 
Thus, one Party of Men, fearing the Consequences which 
may be drawn from the Acknowledgment of Moral and Social Prin- 
ciples in Human-kind, to the Proof a Deity's Existence; and, 
another Party fearing as much from thence, to the Prejudice of 
Revelation; Each have in their turns, Eade War (if I may say 
so) even on Vertue it self: Having exploded the Principle of 
* Expression of Dr. Whichcot's. 
391 
Good-nature; all Enjoyment or Satisfaction in Acts of Kind- 
ness and Love; all Notion of Happiness in temperate Courses 
and moderate Desires; and, in short, all Vertue or Founda- 
tion of Vertue; unless that, perhaps, be call'd Merit, or 
Vertue, which is left remaining, when all Generosity, free 
Inclination, Publick-spiritedness, and every thing else 
besides private Regard, is taken away. 
If this may be said to be our Casep under this Dispute; 
and, that true Religion it self (which is Love be thus 
endangerld; and Morality so ill treatedq between two such 
different and distant Parties; if each of these, notwithstand- 
ing their vast Disagreement, do yet, in this Matters so 
fatally agree; to decry Human Nature, and destroy the Belief 
of any immediate Good or Happiness in Vertue, as a Thing any 
way suitable to our Make and Constitution; there is, then, 
so much the more Need of some great and known Man to oppose 
this Current. And, here it is that-our Author has appear'd 
so signally. 
Whatsoever (says he) some have said; Man's Natur -e is not so untoward a Thing (unless it be abused) 
but that there is a secret ýMpathy in Human Nature, 
with Vertue and Honesty; which gives a man an 
Interest even in bad Men. --God, in infinite Wisdom, has so contrived; that, if an Intellectual 
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Being sink it self into Sensuality, or any way defiles 
and pollute it self; then, Miseries and Torments 
should befall it, in this State - VERTUE, and VICE (says he are the Foundations of Peace and Happiness, 
or Sorrow and Misery. -There is Inherenf Punish- 
ment belonging to all Vice; and no Power can aiVide 
or separate them. Forý', _thol God should not, in a 
positive Way, inflict Punishment; or any Instrument 
of God punish a Sinner; yet, he would punish Him- 
self; his Misery and Unhappiness would arise from 
R'im'self. 
Thus speaks our 'e'xcellent Divine, and truly Christian PhilO- 
sopher; whom, for his appearing thus in Defence of Natural- 
Goodness we may call the Preacher of Good-nature. This is what 
he insists on, every-where; and, to make this evident, is, 
in a Manner, the Scope of all his Discourses. And, in con- 
conclusion of 'all this; Itis hop'd that what has been here 
suggested, may be sufficient to justifie the Printing of 
these Sermons. 
As for our Author himself; what his Life was; how great 
an Example of that happy Temperg and God-like Disposition, 
which he tabo'urld'to inspire; how much he wasq for the 
Excellency of his Life, and admirable Temper, esteem'd and 
belov'd of all; and even in the worst of Times, when Feuds, 
and AnimOS'ities, 'on the Account of Religiong were highest 
(during the Time of the late great Troublesq) how his Character 
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and Behaviour drew to him the Respect of all Partiest so as 
to make him be remarkably distinguished; how much in Esteem 
he was with the greatest Men; and how many constant Hearers 
he had of the best Rank, and greatest Note, even of the most 
eminent Divines themselves; this is sufficiently known. And 
the Testimony which the late Arch-bishop Tillotson has given 
of, him, tho'. 'it be in a Funeral Sermon, is known to be in 
nothing superiour to his Desert. 
The Sermons which are here Printed, have been selected 
out of Numbers of others less perfect; there being not any 
of our Author's extants but such as were written after him at 
Church: He having used no other than very short Notes, not 
very legible: Thol these have been of great Use to the 
Publisher, in whose Hands they have been. 
The unpolish'd Style, and Phrase of our Author, who drew 
more from a College, than a Court; and who was more used to 
School-Learning, and the Language of an Universitys than to 
the Conversation of the fashionable World, may possibly but 
ill recommend his Sense to the Generality of Readers. And 
since none of these Discourses were ever design'd for the 
World, in any other Manner than as he (once for all) pro- 
nounc'd them from the Pulpit; they must of Necessity appear 
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to have a Roughness in them, which is not found in other 
Sermons more accurately penn'd by their Authors. For, tho' 
the Publisher has sometimes supplied him out of himselfs by 
transferring to a defective Place, that which he found in 
some other Discourse, where the same Subject was treated; 
yet', so great a Regard was had to the very Text, and Letter 
of his Author; that he would not offer to alter the least 
Word: And, wheresoever he has added any Thing, to correct 
the most appaýent Omission, or Fault of the Pen-man; he has 
taken Care to have it mark'd in different Characters: That 
nothing might appear as our Author's own, which was not 
perfectly-His. Tho', ýsome others in the World have been very 
far from this Caution: Since, of late, some things have been 
set out in. our Author's Name, which his best Friends disown 
to be his; and'which any one who studies him in his Genuine 
Works, will easily know to be unworthy of him. 
And, now, when these Disadvantages which have been mentionedo 
are considered; since they are no more than what sensible 
People will easily make Allowance for; Itis presum'd there 
may be in the World some Persons who will, notwithstanding, 
think these Sermons to be of Worth, and may perhaps discover in 
them some peculiar Beauties, such as are not to be despised for 
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want of that Ornament which might have accompany'd them, I 
know that there are now growing up, in the World, too many who 
are prejudic! d against all Pulpit-Discourses; and who, in 
this prophane Age, are led to think not only the Institution 
of Preachinq, but even the Gospel it self, and our Holy 
Religion to be a Fraud. But, notwithstanding all the Pre- 
judice of this kind; 'tis to be hop'd that even some of these 
Persons (if they have any Candour left) may be induced to applaud 
some Things that they may meet with, here: So as from hence, 
perhaps, to like Christianity the better. This we may with 
Assurance, say; that were there besides ours, any Religions 
Ancient, or Modern, that had so Divine a Man as this, to 
shew; these very Men would admire and reverence him; andq 
tho' a Priest of that Religion, and bound to comply with esta- 
blish'd Superstition, would praise his Vertue; and* perhapso 
be the forwardest to extol his Sentences and Works, in Oppo- 
sition to our Sacred Religion. But this is hard, that even 
Heathen Religion, and Paganism can be more mildly treateds and 
cause less Aversion than Christianity. To such Men as these, 
I can say nothing'further. But, if they who are thus set 
against Christianity, cannot be won over, by any Thing that 
they may find here; yet we may assure our selves, at least, 
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of this good Effect from hence; that the excellent Spirit 
which is shewn here, and that Vein of Goodness, and Humanitys 
which appears throughout these Discourses, will make such as 
are already Christians, to prize and value Christianity the 
more: And, the Fairness, Ingenuity, and impartiality* which 
they may learn from hence, will be a Security to them, against 
the contrary Temper of those other irreconcileable Enemies to 
our Holy Faith. 
00000--- 
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APPENDIX B 
Letter VIII from "LETTERS OF THE EARL OF SHAFTESBURY TO A 
STUDENT AT THE UNIVERSITY" Printed first in the year MDCCXLVI 
June 3d,, 1709. 
I received your's since your recoverys which I am glad to 
hear of. The new book you have discovered, and the account of 
it gave me great satisfaction. Your conjectures of it perhaps 
are not amiss. Dr. TINDAL's principless whatever they may be 
as to church government, are, in respect of philosophy and 
theology, far wide from the author's [i. e. Shaftesbury] of 
the rhapsody [i. e. The Moralists]. 
In general truly it has happened, that all those they call 
free writers now-a-days, have espoused those principles, which 
Mr. HOBBES set a foot in this last age. Mr. LOCKE, as much as 
I honour him on account of other writings (viz. on government, 
policy, trade, coin, education, toleration Etc) and as well as 
I knew him, and can answer for his sincerity as a most zealous 
Christian and believer, did however go in the self same track. 
and is follow'd by the TINDALS, and all the other ingenious 
free authors of our time. 
'Twas Mr. LOCKE, that struck the home blow: for Mr. HOBBES's 
character and base slavish principles in government took off 
the poyson of his philosophy. 'Twas Mr. LOCKE that struck at 
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all fundamentals, threw all order and virtue out of the worldq 
and made the very ideas of these (which are the same as those 
of GOD) unnatural,, and without foundation in our minds. Innate 
is a word he poorly plays upon: the right word, tho' less used, 
is connatural. For what has birth or progress of the foetus out 
of the'womb to do in this case? the question is not about the 
time the ideas enter'd, or the moment that one body came out of 
the other; but whether the constitution of man be suchs that 
being adult and grown up, at such or such a time, sooner or 
later (no matter when) the idea and sense of order. adminis- 
tration, and a GOD will not infallibly, inevitably, necessarily 
spring up in him. 
Then comes the credulous Mr. LOCKE, with his Indian, 
barbarian stories of wild nations, that have no such idea, (as 
travellers, learned authors! and men of truth! and great 
philosophers! have inform'd him; ) not consideringg that this 
is but a negative upon a hearsay, and so circumstantiateds that 
the faith of, the IndianAenyer may be as well question'd, as 
the veracity or judgment of the relater; who cannot be supposed 
to know sufficiently the mysteries and secrets of those bar- 
barians; whose language they but imperfectly know; and to whom 
we good Christians have by our little mercy given sufficient 
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reason to conceal many secrets from us; as we know particularly 
in respect of simples and vegetabless of which tho' we got the 
peruvian bark, and some other noble remedies; yet, 'tis certain, 
that through the cruelty of the Spaniards,, as they have own'd 
themselves, many secrets in medicinal affairs have been sup- 
press'd. 
But Mr. LOCKE, who had more faith, and was more learn'd 
in modern wonder-writers, than in antient philosophy, gave up 
an argument for the-, D6ity, which CICERO (tho' a profess'd 
Sceptick) would not explode; and which even the chief of the 
Atheistick philosophers anciently acknowledged, and solv'd 
only by their primus in. orbe'Deos fecit timor. 
THUS virtue, according to Mr. LOCKE, has no other measure, 
law, or rule, than fashion and custom: morality, Justice, 
equity, depend only on law and*will: and GOD indeed is a 
perfect free agent in his sense; that is, free to any thing-, 
that is however ill: for if he wills it, it will be made good; 
virtue may be vice, znd vice virtue in its turn, if he pleases. 
And thus neither right nor wrong, virtue nor vice are any thing 
in'themselves; nor is there any trace or idea of them naturally 
imprinted on human minds. Experience and our catechism teach 
us all! I suppose 'tis something of like kind, which teaches 
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birds their nests, and how to fly the minute they have full 
feathers. Your THEOCLES, whom you commend so much, laughs at 
this; and, as modestly as he can, asks a Lockist, whether the 
idea of woman (and what is sought after in woman, ) be not 
taught also by some catechism, and dictated to the man. Perhaps 
if we had no schools of Venus, nor such horrid lewd bookst or 
lewd companions; we might have no understanding of this* till 
we were taught by our parents: and if the tradition should 
happen to be lost; the race of mankind might perish in a sober 
nation. -This is very poor philosophy. But the gibberish 
of the schools, for these several centuries, has, in those 
latter days of liberty, made any contrary philosophy of good 
relish, and highly savoury with all men of wit; such as have 
been emancipated from that egregious form of intellectual 
bondage. But I see you are on a better scent. 
I can say no more at present: only I would not have you 
inquire further, as yets after that book, entituled, an inquiry: 
Because it was an imperfect thing, brought into the world many 
years since, contrary to the author's design, in his absence 
beyond sea, and in a disguis'd disorderld style. it may one 
day perhaps be set righter; since other things have made it to 
be inquired after. Have patience in the mean while, and 
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continue your studies. Dispute with no body on any subject. 
Keep your remarks to your self; and cultivate the good maxims 
and principles you have received. Be humble in all your 
manners$ gesture, and behaviour: for that chiefly suits with 
the character design'd. GOD guide you in all true piety, 
moderation, and virtue. Farewel. 
---ooooo 
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